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To better understand why perpetrator organizations desist from terrorist violence, we 
must first understand how perpetrator organizations desist from terrorist violence. With 
this research I aim to improve our empirical understanding of patterns of collective 
desistance from terrorism in support of a robust research agenda to advance theory and 
policy on this topic. First, I review the existing scholarly literature on collective 
desistance to identify conceptual and practical limitations. Second, I describe several key 
challenges for empirical analysis of collective desistance from terrorism. Third, I 
leverage more than 40 years of event data from the Global Terrorism Database to analyze 
patterns of desistance among 632 organizations that carried out terrorist attacks between 
1970 and 2013. In doing so, I use descriptive statistics and brief qualitative case studies 
to critically evaluate the results of this relatively large-N analysis and illustrate its 
strengths and limitations. Fourth, I expand the analysis to consider how characteristics of 
perpetrator organizations’ terrorist activity relate to patterns of desistance. Finally, I 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of this study for research, theory, and 
policy, as well as the limitations and opportunities for improvement and expansion upon 
the current research.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Collective Desistance from Terrorism 
 
This research is intended to bridge a gap in the literature on terrorist activity with respect 
to two dimensions. First, both criminology generally and terrorism studies in particular 
focus more on individual-level mechanisms as they relate to criminal behavior, despite 
the fact that many types of crime, including juvenile delinquency, gang violence, 
organized crime, corporate crime, and terrorism, are largely conceived of and carried out 
as, if not defined by, collective action (LaFree & Miller, 2008). Second, researchers that 
do study group dynamics typically focus on the onset of groups, or the process by which 
individuals join groups, while failing to systematically evaluate the dynamics of their 
decline (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; J. Miller, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2008; 
Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, & Tobin, 2006; Thrasher, 1927). Despite these 
specific gaps, there is a rich literature in criminology and other disciplines, including 
sociology and political science, which can be constructively leveraged and built upon to 
better understand how terrorist organizations decline (e.g., Agnew, 2010; Crenshaw, 
1987; Gurr, 1970). My objective here is to synthesize existing theoretical insights from 
criminology and other relevant disciplines and exploit data on more than 40 years of 
domestic and international terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database to identify 
and investigate patterns of decline and desistance among terrorist organizations1 toward 
                                                 
1 There is little agreement in the literature regarding the terminology used to describe 
these entities; most scholars use the terms terrorist group and terrorist organization 
interchangeably (E. Miller, 2012a, 2013b; Phillips, 2014b). Note that this discussion and 
analysis references collectivities with varying degrees and types of organization, but 
excludes unaffiliated individuals. 
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the goal of developing a broader, empirically grounded, theoretical and practical 
understanding of these patterns and their predictors.  
 
The fact that research on crime, including terrorism, focuses on individuals is certainly 
not unreasonable, as perpetrators are indeed individuals and, for the most part individuals 
rather than collectives are ultimately held responsible for breaking the law. Even in the 
case of corporate crime, which is typically conceived of as offenses carried out by 
corporations, the focus of the criminal justice system is often individual officials. 
Simpson (2002) notes that cases of antitrust and environmental offenses frequently 
involve the prosecution of individuals rather than companies because of the belief that 
targeting individuals will produce a greater deterrent effect. However, individuals do not 
act in a vacuum and there is extensive evidence that the collective, or group, plays an 
important role in the perpetration and exacerbation of criminal activity. For example, 
researchers have observed and painstakingly studied peer influences and the salience of 
co-offending in myriad behaviors, including alcohol use among college students (Borsari 
& Carey, 2001; Guo, Li, Owen, Wang, & Duncan, 2015), desistance from marijuana use 
(Maume, Ousey, & Beaver, 2005), general delinquency and desistance from delinquency 
(McGloin, Sullivan, Piquero, & Bacon, 2008; Reiss & Farrington, 1991; Short & 
Strodtbeck, 1974; Warr, 1998; Warr & Stafford, 1991), and adult offending (Reiss, 
1988). With few exceptions, the unit of analysis in studies on co-offending is the 
individual or the incident (exceptions include Asal & Rethemeyer, 2006, 2008; Breiger & 




Perhaps the most relevant and fruitful insights on collective offending, and those that 
could potentially inform our understanding of terrorist group activity, are found in the 
scholarly literature on criminal gangs. Nearly a century ago, Thrasher (1927) observed 
that while the gang does not cause crime per se, it “aids in making chronic truants and 
juvenile delinquents and in developing them into finished criminals.” More recently, 
studies routinely find that gang membership is a consistent predictor of involvement in 
violence and recidivism (McGloin, 2007). Yet few study patterns of activity among gangs 
themselves as a unit of analysis (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). Likewise, scholars routinely 
observe that group membership is an influential element of engagement in terrorism. That 
is, individuals with radical beliefs may never act on them if not for the support and 
encouragement of groups or networks. Explanations of terrorism as a form of collective 
violence certainly privilege the impact of group processes on individuals, whether they 
focus on social-structural motivations or resource mobilization (Barkan & Snowden, 
2001; Bouhana & Wikström, 2008). Some highlight the motivations of individuals that 
are generated by collective experiences, including strains or grievances (Agnew, 2010; 
Black, 2004; Senechal de la Roche, 1996; Smelser, 1963). Black (2004, p. 10; 13), 
describes terrorism as “unilateral self-help by organized civilians” characterized by 
“strong ties among the aggrieved and a lack of ties to their adversaries.” Others suggest 
that the difference between an aggrieved individual who is able to wage a terrorist 
campaign and one who is not is a matter of collective identity and resource mobilization 
(Crenshaw, 1987, 2001; Tilly, 1978). Moghaddam (2005) views an individual’s 
engagement in terrorist activity as a psychological process through which one responds to 
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perceived injustice by joining, assimilating, and drawing on the resources of a group or 
organization. Ultimately, scholars devote a great deal of attention to the impact of groups 
on individuals because groups provide a structural, ideological, logistical framework for 
criminal activity, including terrorism. As Atran suggests, “small group dynamics can 
trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary people” 
(2006, p. 141)  
 
Despite the fact that collective action is an important feature of many types of criminal 
behavior, criminologists and terrorism scholars have not adequately explored the 
dynamics of the groups themselves, whether street gangs, criminal organizations, or 
terrorist groups. This may be due, in part, to an assumption that understanding group 
dynamics largely follows from understanding individual or contextual dynamics. In other 
words, if the conditions are right for individuals to engage in collective violence, or cease 
engaging in collective violence, groups will come or go accordingly. Indeed, researchers 
who investigate the processes by which individuals leave gangs or terrorist groups finds 
that they have much in common (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Decker & Lauritsen, 2006; 
Horgan, 2009; Pyrooz & Decker, 2011). However, the link between individual behavior 
and collective behavior is not well understood, particularly with respect to 
disengagement, and scholars studying diverse types of criminal behavior have indicated 
that we cannot assume that as the individuals go, so goes the group. While the existence 
and activity of groups of offenders certainly depends upon engagement of its 
membership, given a sufficient pool of motivated recruits collective mechanisms 
involving mobilization, resources, motivation, and group cohesion and strength are 
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equally if not more relevant to understanding patterns of crime, be it drug crime 
(Blumstein, 1993), gang-related offenses (Reiss, 1988; Short & Strodtbeck, 1974), 
corporate crime (Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993), or terrorism (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; 
Crenshaw, 1987, 1991, 2001).  
 
Another possible explanation for the scarcity of research that treats the group as the unit 
of analysis is the essential need for systematically collected empirical data that can be 
very difficult to obtain (Simonelli & Asal, 2014). In his introduction to Thrasher’s 1927 
study of more than 1,300 gangs in Chicago, Short (1963, pp. xv–xvi) notes that Thrasher 
conducted “the most comprehensive study of the phenomenon of adolescent gangs ever 
undertaken,” but, “The very scope of Thrasher’s investigation, his methods, and his 
primary purpose also stood in the way of theoretical development. The task of statistical 
manipulation of more than 1,300 cases on which very little data in common were 
collected was an impossible barrier to conceptualization beyond relatively crude 
classification” (Short, 1963, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv). Remarkably, there have been few attempts 
since Thrasher’s to systematically analyze quantitative data on the characteristics and 
activities of a large number of groups or organizations that engage in conventional crime 
(Decker & Pyrooz, 2015). This is due, in part, to the fact that gangs are difficult to define 
and count, and comprehensive data on their activities are extremely labor-intensive to 
collect (Jankowski, 1991; Weisel, 2002).  
 
Likewise, in his introduction to a new edition of the 1980 study that he and Yeager 
conducted on a sample of 477 Fortune 500 companies, Clinard (2006) contrasts it with 
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what he identifies as the only other comprehensive study of corporate crime ever 
produced: Sutherland’s (1949) study of 70 of the largest companies. Sutherland, whose 
efforts took 25 years, considered the full life span of the companies in his sample. Clinard 
and Yeager (1980) investigated more companies in much greater detail, but for only two 
years, 1975 to1976. Clinard (2006) points out that the authors of both studies 
acknowledge the difficulty of systematic data collection on the topic. 
 
This is not to say that criminal groups have been ignored entirely. However, when 
researchers do study groups they typically focus on the ways in which groups form, and 
in-depth case studies on small numbers of groups or organizations. Prior research on 
collective offenders has largely focused on the onset of gang or terrorist activity, 
including both radicalization among individuals and the genesis of groups (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008; J. Miller, 2006; Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2008; Thornberry et al., 2006; 
Thrasher, 1927). While understanding the onset of violence is undoubtedly important, the 
implicit assumption that a decline in violence is simply a result of the absence factors that 
cause violence is problematic. Instead, criminologists Uggen and Piliavin (1998) 
encourage those developing theoretical explanations of desistance from crime to 
accommodate the possibility of asymmetrical causation and systematically investigate 
causes of desistance in particular (Chamlin & Cochran, 1998; L. E. Cohen & Land, 1987; 
Lieberson, 1985). Indeed, there is a robust literature in criminology that explores 
desistance from criminal activity among individuals, including the effects of social 
processes, developmental processes, and criminal justice processes (Farrall & Maruna, 
2004; Gibson & Krohn, 2013; Kazemian & Maruna, 2009; LaFree & Miller, 2008; Laub 
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& Sampson, 2001; Maruna, 2001). However very little, if any, of this literature examines 
the cessation of criminal activity among collectives. Thrasher’s (1927) in-depth 
investigation of gangs reveals few key insights about the dynamics of gangs as entities. In 
particular he notes that gangs vary in their degree of cohesion and a group will develop 
into a more solidified unit “if conditions are favorable to its continued existence” (1927, 
p. 47) but that “the ganging process is a continuous flux and flow, and there is little 
permanence in most of the groups” (1927, p. 31). We know very little about the 
conditions that are favorable or not to the continued existence of a criminal group. 
 
Numerous carefully researched and insightful case studies on groups and organizations 
that engage in illegal activity have been conducted in order to better understand how they 
operate (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006, 2009; Dugan, Huang, 
LaFree, & McCauley, 2008; Jankowski, 1991; Ross & Gurr, 1989; Sutherland, 1949; 
Thrasher, 1927; United States Institute of Peace, 1999; Weisel, 2002). While many of the 
case studies are impressive in their depth, ability to capture nuanced and complex 
experiences of groups, and make rich contributions to the understanding of specific 
contexts and events, because they are narrow in scope their contribution to theory 
development and generalizable principles is limited. It is likely that the most well 
researched terrorist organizations differ in important and systematic ways not only from 
each other, but from lesser-known organizations as well. Analysis of a more 
comprehensive array of terrorist organizations supports greater breadth of understanding 
regarding the ways in which these groups desist from terrorist violence (Dugan, LaFree, 
& Miller, 2012; McCauley, 2008).    
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A growing number of studies quantitatively analyze relatively large numbers of terrorist 
perpetrator organizations (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012; Dugan, 
2012; Dugan et al., 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015; Simonelli & Asal, 2014), 
including some that investigate the desistance of terrorist organizations in particular 
(Blomberg, Engel, & Sawyer, 2010; Blomberg, Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2011; Gaibulloev 
& Sandler, 2013; S. G. Jones & Libicki, 2008; E. Miller, 2012a; Phillips, 2014a, 2015; 
Young & Dugan, 2014). In contrast to in-depth case studies, these relatively large-N 
studies seek to identify common patterns and principles that can be used to form the basis 
of a broader understanding of collective desistance. However, while qualitative analyses 
and case studies risk overlooking the forest for the trees, relatively large-N studies may 
have the opposite problem. That is, while grappling with large datasets researchers often 
rely on analytical techniques and theoretical assumptions that greatly oversimplify the 
diverse patterns of terrorist activity among groups and organizations. In particular, 
reducing the dynamics of violent terrorist activity to a dichotomous measure of active or 
inactive, or to a single number of years active, impedes our ability to fully capture 
various dimensions of activity, including both time span and frequency of attacks, that 
comprise the groups’ trajectory of desistance from violence. In addition, when leveraging 
a relatively large set of data with violent terrorist organizations as the unit of analysis, 
researchers can sometimes overlook critical contextual variation, such as the non-terrorist 
activities of the groups, or other external factors that influence the terrorist behavior that 
comprises the dataset. 
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Partly as a result of these gaps, the development of theories to help understand and 
generate hypotheses regarding patterns of criminal activity among groups, including 
desistance from criminal activity among groups, is extremely limited both in the field of 
criminology and the multi-disciplinary field of terrorism studies in particular. There are 
many ways in which existing theories designed to explain individual processes and 
behavior can be adapted to provide insight for group-level patterns of activity, however 
this requires careful consideration of key concepts. These include defining the somewhat 
vague concept of desistance as it applies to groups, which is as complex if not more so as 
defining it for individuals, and considering what mechanisms—as well as experiences, 
beliefs, traits— typically attributed to people can be extended to groups of people.  
 
Given the diversity of perpetrator organizations, development of theory that seeks to 
explain group-level activity stands to benefit from an inductive approach that leverages 
empirical data on said activity in a way that complements the deductive theorizing that 
has already been done based primarily on archetypical cases of well-established 
perpetrator groups. Of equal if not greater importance are the policy implications of this 
line of inquiry. With respect to terrorism, we have limited understanding of the most 
effective policies to counter terrorist organizations and hasten their demise (Dugan & 
Chenoweth, 2012; Dugan et al., 2008; Lafree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; Lum, Kennedy, & 
Sherley, 2006). There are lessons to be learned from criminology, and the research that 




The purpose of this research is not to formally test extant theories or articulate a 
comprehensive theoretical paradigm to explain collective desistance from terrorism. 
Although I synthesize relevant theoretical perspectives across disciplines in order to 
establish context, many key concepts identified in the existing literature remain 
unmeasured and untestable. Instead, I address the following research questions. 
1. What are the ways in which organizations that engage in terrorist violence desist 
from engaging in terrorist violence? What patterns or trajectories of declining 
violence do we observe among organizations that engage in terrorism? 
2. How do salient attributes of perpetrator organizations’ terrorist activity relate to 
their patterns of desistance from terrorist violence? For example, are particular 
tactics or patterns of onset correlated to particular patterns of desistance? 
3. What are the key implications of measurement and analytical strategy for the 
study of collective desistance from terrorism? How do these issues impact our 
understanding of the longevity and patterns of decline of terrorist organizations? 
 
The current research aims to advance our understanding of group-level desistance from 
terrorist activity as follows. First, I review the relevant theoretical landscape and 
empirical analyses of terrorist group longevity and decline. I discuss the ways in which 
existing theories of violence designed to explain behavior among individuals, and 
theoretical explanations of violence from other disciplines can be adapted for and inform 
the development of theory to explain group-level terrorist activity. Second, I discuss the 
methodological limitations of the existing analyses of terrorist groups and describe a 
methodological strategy for modeling the dynamics of perpetrator organizations’ terrorist 
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activity using group-based trajectory analysis (Nagin, 2005), in concert with descriptive 
statistics and case studies. Third, I conduct original analyses of patterns of activity among 
terrorist groups, exploring various dimensions of their activity. In these analyses, I define 
terrorist groups empirically, based on their status as perpetrators of terrorist attacks 
characterized by the Global Terrorism Database as “the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree et al., 2015, p. 13). I conclude by 
discussing the implications of these findings for research and policymaking, and identify 
several key areas for further investigation that are critical components of a research 
agenda on collective desistance from terrorism. By presenting a multi-method analysis 
that combines descriptive statistics and group-based modeling of trajectories of violence 
among a relatively large dataset of terrorist perpetrator organizations with case studies 
selected to illustrate the contextual variation in these patterns, this research serves to 
improve our understanding of the complexity of this type of criminal behavior and 
identify essential facts that a useful theoretical paradigm must accommodate. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical and Empirical Literature2 
 
To better understand the dynamics of terrorist groups, I draw on an extensive body of 
literature across several relevant disciplines. As a form of political violence, terrorism has 
long been studied by political scientists. However, it undoubtedly falls within the purview 
of criminology established by Sutherland (1934, p. 1) as “the body of knowledge 
regarding crime as a social phenomenon that includes within its scope the process of 
making laws, of breaking laws, and of reacting toward the breaking of laws.” Beyond this 
mere definitional compatibility, and despite the sometimes dramatic and unique qualities 
of terrorist attacks, we observe numerous features of terrorist crimes and criminals that 
are shared in common with conventional crimes and criminals. Of particular relevance to 
the present research is the fact that terrorism is often, but not exclusively, perpetrated by 
groups of individuals. In fact, the literature describing the composition and formation of 
terrorist groups is strikingly reminiscent of observations on criminal gangs (Sageman, 
2004; Thrasher, 1927). 
 
A few theoretical frameworks exist, however most are incomplete for explaining group-
level desistance from terrorist activity (LaFree & Miller, 2008). In general, existing 
theoretical paradigms in the fields of criminology and sociology either focus on 
individual-level or contextual mechanisms without clearly laying out the implications for 
group dynamics, or they focus on the onset of groups without laying out the implications 
                                                 
2 An earlier version of this chapter was previously published in: 
Miller, E. (2012). Patterns of Onset and Decline Among Terrorist Organizations. Journal 
of Quantitative Criminology, 28(1), 77–101. 
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for decline. Some scholars do directly address the decline of terrorist groups, but from the 
vantage point of a few idiosyncratic examples of long-established terrorist groups rather 
than a comprehensive profile of the myriad types of groups (Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 
2006, 2009; Ross & Gurr, 1989; United States Institute of Peace, 1999). Here I briefly 
review the landscape of key theoretical and conceptual paradigms that are most relevant 
for explaining the phenomenon of collective desistance from terrorism, with the intention 
of identifying ways in which they would need to be adapted in order to inform the 
question at hand, and the practical implications of empirical evaluation. Three of the most 
relevant theoretical and conceptual frameworks from criminology, sociology, political 
science, and terrorism studies are: 1) theoretical explanations that emphasize the 
importance of grievance or strain; 2) theoretical explanations that emphasize 
organizational mechanisms such as recruitment, cohesion, and resource mobilization; and 
3) inductively generated typologies that enumerate the myriad causes of collective 
desistance from terrorism. 
 
While these three frameworks approach the question of collective desistance from 
terrorism in different ways, they share in common a theoretical or practical relevance to 
this topic. As Table 2.1 indicates, each of these frameworks identifies or implicates key 
constructs that are likely to influence or characterize the decline of terrorist organizations. 
The first two are theoretical frameworks developed by criminologists, sociologists, and 
political scientists, primarily as general explanations of crime and violence. Any 
implications they may have for collective desistance from terrorism in particular must be 
inferred from the general principles they put forth. 
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Table 2.1 Key theoretical and empirical constructs related to collective desistance 
from terrorism  
(Adapted from: E. Miller, 2012a, p. 80) 
THEORY: GRIEVANCE, STRAIN, AND COPING 
Merton (1938) Agnew (1992; 2010) 
 -Relief from tension between social  -Decrease in strain: 
  goals and structural means      Scope 
      Magnitude 
Gurr (1970)      Civilian targets 
-Decrease in relative deprivation      Injustice 
-Resolution of grievance      Asymmetry 
 -Increase in coping mechanisms: 
Baumgartner (1984)      Social support 
Senechel de la Roche (1996)      Social control 
Black (2004) -Breakdown of collective orientation 
-Resolution of grievance (those in power 
desist from promoting perceived injustice) 
-Decrease in beliefs/conditions favorable 
to terrorism 
THEORY: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS/MECHANISMS 
Tilly (1978) Crenshaw (1987) 
-Breakdown in organization -Loss of group cohesion/solidarity 
-Loss of resources -Decreased support of constituency 
-Failure of mobilization -Decreased salience of purposive 
incentives 
TYPOLOGIES: WHY TERRORISM ENDS 
Ross & Gurr (1989): Cronin (2006; 2009): 
–Preemption –Capture/Killing of leaders 
–Deterrence –Unsuccessful generational transition 
–Burnout –Achievement of the cause 
–Backlash –Transition to legitimate political process 
  –Loss of popular support 
Crenshaw (1991): –Repression 
–Physical defeat by government –Transition out of terrorism: 
–Group abandons terrorist strategy Toward criminality 
–Organizational Disintegration Toward full insurgency 
    
USIP (1999): Jones & Libicki (2009): 
–Success –Policing 
–Preliminary success –Military force 
–Organizational breakdown –Splintering 
–Dwindling support –Politics 
–New alternatives –Victory 
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The third approach stems from a growing literature in which terrorism scholars attempt to 
classify empirically observed ways in which terrorist groups have ceased offending or 
ceased to exist. It is important to note that many of the constructs identified in Table 1 are 
not mutually exclusive or likely to operate in a vacuum. Indeed, one of the tenets most 
commonly agreed-upon by scholars who investigate the decline of terrorist organizations 
is that there is rarely a single reason for a group to desist from terrorism. Rather, the best 
explanation is likely to involve multiple forces, both internal and external to the group, 
operating in concert to promote the organization’s demise (Crenshaw, 1991; McCauley, 
2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989). Bearing this in mind, my primary goal in reviewing these 
theoretical and typological mechanisms is to illustrate that they each include elements 
that suggest that collective desistance from terrorism, not unlike desistance from other 
types of crime (Laub & Sampson, 2001), is likely to be a process rather than a state. As 
such, we require methodological tools that allow us to evaluate the process of decline 
among groups (Bushway, Piquero, Broidy, Cauffman, & Mazerolle, 2001; Bushway, 
Thornberry, & Krohn, 2003). 
 
Grievance, Strain, and Coping 
Perhaps one of the most salient features of terrorism is that which differentiates it from 
other types of crime: the fact that it is typically defined as having political goals (Schmid 
& Jongman, 2005). Because of this, many scholars seeking to better understand terrorism 
and political violence in general focus on the grievances of the perpetrators and their 
ability, or lack thereof, to address grievances in non-violent ways. In the field of political 
science, Gurr (1970, 2011) is credited with theorizing about relative deprivation (also 
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referred to as sense of injustice, or grievance) as a key source of motivation for political 
violence. Gurr suggests that the perceived tension between what is and what ought to be 
with respect to values such as security, welfare, and self-determination varies in scope, 
intensity, and duration, and is an important predictor of the likelihood of engaging in 
collective violence. Though Gurr’s relative deprivation theory was primarily influenced 
by psychological research on the link between frustration and aggression, it bears a strong 
resemblance to the strain theory variants advanced by criminologists that are partly 
rooted in sociology.  
 
Leveraging Durkheim’s (1897) concept of anomie, Merton (1938, 1968) establishes a 
framework in which antisocial behavior, instead of stemming from unrestrained 
biological impulses, is a result of the disconnect between culturally ascribed goals and 
structurally constrained means of achieving them. Indeed, under certain structural 
conditions this disconnect causes frustration and otherwise deviant behavior is not only 
possible, but also normative rather than deviant. Merton identifies five ways in which an 
individual can adapt to this frustration in specific situations: conformity, innovation, 
ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. The two possible responses that are most relevant to 
violence, and to terrorism in particular, are innovation (the internalization or acceptance 
of culturally defined goals, but not the institutional restrictions on how they may be 
achieved) and rebellion (making efforts to change the social structure rather than adapt to 
it). Though Merton’s aim is to better specify the complex link between poverty and crime 
by identifying these varied responses, he acknowledges that this initial effort does little to 
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articulate what determines the mode of response, aside from the somewhat poorly defined 
concepts of assimilation or socialization. 
 
The grievance- or strain-based theoretical framework has evolved and been expanded 
upon, with mixed empirical support, by many scholars attempting to specify the relevant 
sources, types, and dynamics of strain or conflict that impact delinquency and 
conventional crime (Agnew, 1992, 2007; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; A. K. Cohen, 1955; 
Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001) as well as collective violence (Baumgartner, 1984; Black, 
2004; Senechal de la Roche, 1996; Smelser, 1963). Several of these approaches share in 
common a distinct neutrality regarding the perception of right and wrong, or offender and 
victim. In fact, the idea that the perpetrators of collective violence often see themselves as 
holding their targets collectively liable for perceived injustice, particularly in an 
asymmetric power dynamic, is a central theme of this theoretical perspective. Rather than 
reserving the term “social control” to refer only to actions taken by those in positions of 
power to punish those deemed deviant, some scholars conceive of violent behavior like 
terrorism as a general form of social control in response to injustice or wrongdoing not 
unlike that exercised by those in power (Baumgartner, 1984; Black, 2004; Senechal de la 
Roche, 1996).  
 
Agnew (1992) also expands the strain framework into a much more general theory of 
crime and delinquency. Like Gurr, but unlike many other strain theorists, Agnew 
conceives of strain as an individual-level social-psychological mechanism that varies 
with respect to magnitude, duration, recency, and clustering. He argues that several types 
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of strain are possible, resulting from the prevention of achieving goals, removal of 
positive stimuli, and presentation of negative or noxious stimuli. More specifically, these 
can be manifested as tension between aspirations, expectations, and achievements, or as a 
perception of injustice. Furthermore, Agnew goes on to identify cognitive, behavioral, 
and emotional coping strategies that may allow individuals to adapt in pro-social ways to 
the fear and anger caused by strain. 
 
Though Agnew’s general strain theory departs considerably from Merton’s original 
framework, it does include a number of constructs commonly considered by scholars who 
seek to explain engagement in terrorism: perceived injustice, grievance, frustration, and 
availability of legitimate means for resolving grievances. In fact, Agnew (2010) 
synthesizes a broad swath of scholarly literature on the topic of terrorism under the 
banner of general strain theory. He suggests that terrorism is more likely when 
individuals experience collective strain that is widespread and injurious, high in 
magnitude, impacts civilians, is perceived to be unjust, and is inflicted by more powerful 
entities. According to Agnew’s general strain paradigm, these conditions lead to anger, 
humiliation, and hopelessness. In the absence of social support and social control to 
provide the necessary resources to respond to these conditions through legal, non-violent 
channels they promote beliefs and conditions favorable to terrorism. 
 
Agnew’s all-inclusive, and partly tautological (e.g., beliefs favorable to terrorism are 
favorable to terrorism) framework posits a number of hypotheses about the relationships 
between strain, intervening factors, and terrorism, but what does this mean for the study 
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of collective desistance? How should constructs like scope and magnitude of strain be 
operationalized in the context of terrorism? If strain theorists have identified the 
conditions under which terrorism will occur, can we assume causal symmetry and infer 
that existing terrorist campaigns will end if the magnitude, scope, injustice, or 
injuriousness of the grievance is abated, or if the aggrieved parties gain the capacity or 
desire to respond to the strain in non-violent, pro-social ways? Are these processes that 
develop rapidly or gradually among groups and individuals? While these unanswered 
questions must be addressed in order for strain-based theories to offer a viable 
explanation of collective desistance from terrorism, consideration of these potentially 
relevant factors begins to illustrate the complexity of collective offending dynamics. 
 
Organizational Mobilization 
In the fields of psychology, sociology, criminology, and terrorism studies, classical forms 
of frustration-aggression or strain models have received limited empirical support and 
considerable criticism (Agnew, 1992; Barkan & Snowden, 2001; Bernard, 1984; Gurr, 
2011; Kornhauser, 1978; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Tilly, 1978). One key source of 
criticism is the fact that these models over-predict offending. That is, to some extent 
frustrations and strain are universal, yet not everyone responds to perceived injustice with 
aggression or violence. Efforts to accommodate this criticism by more fully specifying 
sources of strain and intervening mechanisms have received marginally better empirical 
support (Agnew, 2006). However, they sacrifice theoretical clarity and parsimony, and 




In contrast, a second theoretical framework suggests that since grievance is essentially 
universal, explanations of violence must focus on differentiating aggrieved individuals 
who engage in violence from those who do not (Barkan & Snowden, 2001; Rule, 1988). 
In comparison to theories based on strain, grievance, and coping, which hinge on 
individual mechanisms, this perspective focuses much more on the influence of groups or 
organizations. For example, one of the principal theorists from this school of thought is 
Tilly (1978), who suggests that organization, resources, and mobilization are the key 
conditions influencing the use of violence in pursuit of interests. Furthermore, violent 
actions are not exceptional, but rational and arise out of normal, nonviolent action.  
 
Within this basic premise, a number of other scholars have considered the dynamics and 
characteristics of organizations to be particularly influential to patterns of terrorism and 
political violence. Rule (1988) expands upon Tilly’s work to accommodate the possibility 
that collective violence can be both instrumental (a means to an end) or expressive (an 
end in itself, such as an expression of solidarity). Crenshaw (1987, 2001) adopts a similar 
dichotomy as the central framework of her theory of terrorism, distinguishing between 
group processes that are oriented around instrumental goals, and those that are oriented 
around organizational processes related to the continued existence of the group rather 
than explicit political goals (Wilson, 1973). Crenshaw suggests that these conditions are 
not mutually exclusive; both types of objectives are important, and in fact groups that are 
formed around instrumental goals often evolve into groups that are motivated by survival 
as political objectives are overshadowed by social relationships among group members. 
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Regardless, like Tilly, Crenshaw maintains that the factors that influence patterns of 
terrorism have to do with the formation and endurance of organizations, including 
entrepreneurship, a committed constituency for mobilizable resources, and the salience of 
incentives that legitimize violence. 
 
With respect to collective desistance in particular, Crenshaw points out that the 
appropriate policy prescriptions for terrorist groups that are instrumentally oriented may 
be at odds with those for groups that are organizationally oriented. Particularly with 
respect to terrorist groups with primarily organizational objectives, much like we see with 
criminal gangs (Klein, 1997; Klein & Crawford, 1967; Thrasher, 1927), group cohesion 
and solidarity are of utmost importance. Conflict with security forces or other groups can 
serve to reinforce the solidarity of terrorist groups. Furthermore, like commercial firms, 
terrorist organizations do not operate in a vacuum, but instead exist among other groups, 
often in competition for scarce resources, support, and personnel.  
 
Several recent empirical analyses of the duration or longevity of terrorist groups are 
based on this premise (Dugan et al., 2008; Phillips, 2014a, 2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). 
Dugan and her colleagues (2008) focus on the case of the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) to address the question of how the tactics of a terrorist 
group impacts its survival through constituency support. Specifically, they find support 
for the hypothesis that, while constituents do support violence against targets they believe 
to be collectively liable for perceived injustice (Baumgartner, 1984; Black, 2004), there 
are limits to a diaspora’s willingness to support a perpetrator group’s indiscriminately 
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brutal attacks. In the case of ASALA, they argue that the group’s tactics, which came to a 
tipping point in a particularly reckless attack at Orly airport in Paris in 1983, undermined 
its legitimacy and ultimately led to its demise (Dugan et al., 2008). 
 
Young and Dugan (2014) examine the survival of terrorist organizations, finding that 
perpetrator groups that exist among greater numbers of other perpetrator groups have a 
greater likelihood of failing (carrying out their last recorded attack) in a given year. The 
authors interpret this as support for the hypothesis that groups with greater numbers of 
competitors are more likely to fail, however it is not clear from this analysis that the 
groups in question are truly competitors, rather than some other type of relation, such as 
collaborators. Phillips uses a similar analytical strategy, in addition to in-depth case 
studies, to examine the specific effects of violent rivalries (2015) and cooperation 
(2014a) on group longevity. In contrast to Young and Dugan’s (2014) results, Phillips 
(2015) finds that terrorist groups engaged in violent rivalries are actually less likely to 
cease offending, an observation that is reminiscent of Thrasher’s assertion that gangs 
“develop through strife and thrive on warfare” (1927, p. 116).  
 
Phillips, drawing on the organizational mobilization framework described above, 
suggests that rivalry is a specific type of competition, and that the effect he finds is 
potentially a result of multiple mechanisms. First, he argues that otherwise ambivalent 
civilians may be more inclined to engage and support a particular side of a rivalry. 
Second, violent rivalries encourage innovation. Third, such rivalries incentivize group 
members by engaging their sense of solidarity. And fourth, violent rivalries reduce the 
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likelihood of successful peace agreements. Phillips (2014a) also finds that terrorist groups 
engaged in cooperative relationships with other groups are more likely to survive, and 
that the strength of this relationship is greater in contexts where the groups face greater 
obstacles for survival, such as autocratic states. Others have also investigated the impact 
of mobilization-related variables on terrorist group survival, including state support 
(Carter, 2012), duration dependence (Blomberg et al., 2010), and group size, tactics, 
geography, and ideology (Blomberg et al., 2011; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013). But 
perhaps the most important contribution of Phillips’ research in this area is that he begins 
to effectively bridge the gap between qualitative studies, which typically contain rich 
detail on a small number of groups, and quantitative studies that provide potential for 
generalizable findings but frequently overlook important features of how groups co-exist, 
interact, and evolve.  
 
Because the organizational mobilization framework focuses on the salience of group-
level mechanisms, it is somewhat better suited than the strain/grievance framework for 
generating hypotheses about patterns of activity among terrorist groups. As Table 1 
shows, theorists have established a very general framework for understanding what 
organizational attributes promote terrorism, however we must still make certain 
inferences regarding the causal symmetry of these influences in order to adapt them for 
understanding the decline of groups. For example, if resources and constituency support 
allow an aggrieved group to mobilize, we must assume that the lack thereof would cause 
the group to fail. Although this basic premise involves some degree of tautology—the 
continued existence of a group could easily be taken as evidence of effective 
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mobilization—researchers have sought to operationalize it in ways that are falsifiable and 
have generated interesting initial findings. 
 
What is important about this literature, and most relevant to the present study, is that the 
theorized mechanisms represent processes rather than states. While scholars have only 
begun to quantitatively investigate the specific ways in which de-mobilization operates, it 
seems clear that active terrorist organizations rarely disappear over night. Instead, even 
the “sudden desistance” investigated by Dugan, Huang, LaFree, and McCauley (2008, p. 
231) in the case of ASALA took place over a period of approximately seven years. 
Despite this, virtually all of the quantitative analyses conducted on the topic of terrorist 
group longevity adopt duration or survival analysis as a methodological strategy, defining 
the point of terrorist group failure or end as the year of a group’s last recorded attack with 
no consideration for the trajectory of decline that characterizes failure as a process, 
perhaps a very long one, rather than a discrete state (Blomberg et al., 2010, 2011; 
Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013; Phillips, 2014a, 2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). This 
methodological limitation will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
  
Typologies 
A third conceptual approach to understanding collective desistance from terrorism 
involves the development of typologies to classify reasons for organizational decline and 
desistance from terrorism. This empirically grounded strategy has been popular among 
terrorism researchers in recent decades, and a number of competing typologies have 
emerged. Table 1 shows several typologies of reasons for collective desistance that 
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terrorism researchers have developed based primarily on in-depth case studies. Although 
they vary in terms of level of specificity and terminology, there is considerable overlap in 
substance and scholars agree that groups are unlikely to end for a single, straightforward 
reason. Instead, factors internal and external to the group interact to influence its 
longevity (Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006, 2009; Ross & Gurr, 1989; United States 
Institute of Peace, 1999). 
 
The typical analytical strategy used in these studies is to propose a set of possible 
mechanisms by which terrorist groups decline, and then evaluate them in the context of 
several case studies. For example, Ross and Gurr (1989) identify four reasons that 
terrorist groups might decline, based on a two-by-two matrix of influences internal or 
external to the group that impact the group’s military or political strength. Ross and Gurr 
refer to external influences on a group’s military strength as preemption, which is most 
similar to target hardening with respect to conventional crime. Deterrence, or increases in 
the perceived risks of participating in terrorism, impacts the group’s military strength 
through internal mechanisms. They refer to disintegration of the cohesion of the group’s 
members as burnout, which represents an internal influence on the group’s political 
strength. And backlash, or a loss of support among the group’s constituency, represents 
an external threat to a group’s political strength. Ross and Gurr illustrate this typology in 
the context of two terrorist organizations: Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in 
Canada, and the Weather Underground in the United States. 
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As Table 1 shows, several key mechanisms that are reminiscent of the organizational 
mobilization framework appear across several of the typologies. Namely, these include 
loss of support (either internal or external), and organizational disintegration, which is 
essentially a reference to internal cohesion and cross-generational transmission of the 
cause. Repression by security forces and success or engagement in politics are also 
featured in several of the typologies. The more recent typologies developed by Cronin 
(2006, 2009) and Jones and Libicki (2008) increase in specificity, including several 
proximate causes of organizational dissolution such as killing/capturing a leader, and 
splintering into other terrorist organizations. 
 
Unlike earlier studies that rely heavily on case studies to illustrate types of organizational 
decline, Jones and Libicki (2008) apply the typological approach to data collected by the 
RAND-MIPT partnership to conduct the first quantitative analysis of desistance among a 
relatively large sample of terrorist organizations. They use data on 648 groups active 
between 1968 and 2006, and define the end of a terrorist group as “the earliest evidence 
that the group no longer existed or that the group no longer used terrorism to achieve its 
goals… Regardless of the reason, the group did not commit further terrorist attacks under 
its name” (2008, p. 5). The typology of reasons for ending they use includes: policing, 
military force, politics, victory, and splintering. Jones and Libicki classify 268 terrorist 
groups as having ended, and an additional 136 entities as having superficially ended 
because they splintered into new entities. Transition to politics, including peace processes 
that allowed the organization to engage in electoral politics, was the most common reason 
for desistance from violence (43% of 268 organizations). The next most common cause 
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of desistance was counterterrorism efforts by law enforcement and security forces (40%). 
This includes legislation and prosecution, as well as policing functions such as 
surveillance, infiltration of groups, and arrest of group members. Jones and Libicki 
observe that 10 percent of the groups stopped carrying out terrorist attacks because they 
had achieved their goals, and that military force is the cause for desistance in only 7 
percent of their sample.  
 
Jones and Libicki’s systematic analysis of a relatively large number of terrorist 
organizations made a critical contribution to understanding how terrorist groups end. 
However, there are several key limitations to this analysis. First, it is not clear how they 
determined whether or not a group desisted from terrorism. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, it is not clear how the classified a single cause for the organizational 
desistance of each terrorist group, when scholars routinely indicate that the decline of 
terrorist groups is a product of many factors (Crenshaw, 1991; McCauley, 2008; Ross & 
Gurr, 1989; United States Institute of Peace, 1999). Finally, in their discussion of the 
results, Jones and Libicki (2008) make note of the fact that the use of military force is so 
rarely the reason for organizational desistance from terrorism. However, they, as well as 
many of their readers (e.g., Adams & Barrie, 2013; Bapat, 2014; Malkki, 2009), 
seemingly misinterpret this as an assessment of the relative effectiveness of military force 
as a counterterrorism mechanism. Because Jones and Libicki do not evaluate all cases in 
which military force (or policing, or political processes) were used in order to determine 
how frequently each led to the decline of an organization rather than its persistence, their 
analysis in no way provides information about the suitability of one particular strategy 
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over another. In fact, the use of military strategies to counter terrorist organizations is 
likely fairly rare, and a function of the level of threat posed by the group. They may 
actually be highly effective, but excessively costly and unnecessary for countering 
terrorist organizations. In comparison, addressing violence through law enforcement is a 
fairly typical approach and the fact that it is more commonly the cause for organizational 
demise is not necessarily indicative that policing is a more effective strategy. Although 
this practice of selecting on the dependent variable is susceptible to misinterpretation, 
Jones and Libicki’s efforts to apply quantitative statistical analysis to the question of 
collective desistance from terrorism demonstrates a great deal of potential that many 
others have expanded upon (Blomberg et al., 2010, 2011; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013; E. 
Miller, 2012a; Phillips, 2014a, 2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). 
 
Having identified the basic principles and limitations of these three approaches to 
understanding collective desistance from terrorist violence, we can see that they vary on 
multiple dimensions. The strain/grievance perspective and the organizational 
mobilization perspective are deductive, while the efforts to develop typologies are 
primarily inductive though not inconsistent with certain theoretical principles. The 
strain/grievance perspective is somewhat more suited to explain the behavior of 
individuals rather than the behavior of groups, while the organizational mobilization 
perspective and the typologies were developed specifically to explain the dynamics of 
groups. Likewise, the strain/grievance perspective was developed with the intention of 
explaining the occurrence of violence, but its implications for desistance rely on a 
questionable assumption of causal symmetry. In contrast, the organizational mobilization 
 29
perspective more directly addresses the question of group dynamics, including decline, 
and the typologies were specifically generated to classify the ways in which terrorist 
organizations end. 
 
What all three approaches have in common is the proposition that myriad factors internal 
and external to a perpetrator group can influence patterns of group activity. Furthermore, 
they each raise important implications for the operationalization of desistance and 
hypothesis testing. Specifically, before we are able to adequately evaluate why terrorist 
groups decline, we must better understand how terrorist groups decline. In order to move 
the field forward based on any or all of these frameworks, we require a better empirical 
understanding of the phenomenon, and thus better tools for quantifying and 
characterizing patterns of collective desistance from terrorism. In the next chapter I 
examine several of the methodological challenges to studying collective desistance from 
terrorist violence and how the current research aims to address them. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Data and Methodology3 
 
Before detailing the methodology of the current study, it is important to address two key 
challenges that motivate this research: the operational definition of terrorist 
organizations, and the operational definition of organizational desistance. In contrast to 
research on individuals, which, aliases and mistaken identity notwithstanding, are fairly 
straightforward to conceive of as individuals, gangs (Esbensen, Winfree, Jr., He, & 
Taylor, 2001; Weisel, 2002) and terrorist organizations (E. Miller, 2013b; Phillips, 
2014b) are extremely difficult to define and operationalize. The challenge of defining 
terrorist organizations involves all of the difficulties of defining terrorism itself, which is 
discussed at length elsewhere (Schmid, 2004; Schmid & Jongman, 2005), in addition to 
numerous other considerations related to both the behavior of the group as well as its 
very essence as a group, known in the field of psychology as entitativity (Campbell, 
1958; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). The concept of entitativity, or the degree to 
which a collection of individuals is an entity, holds that organizations vary in the extent 
to which their members are similar to each other, engaged in coordinated efforts to 
pursue common goals, and are physically near to each other, as well as the extent to 
which the boundaries of membership are fixed and stable rather than fluid. With respect 
to terrorism, “groups of individuals that carry out violent attacks may be small, 
clandestine, informally related clusters of people, broad networks united by leaderless 
                                                 
3 An earlier version of this chapter was previously published in: 
Miller, E. (2012). Patterns of Onset and Decline Among Terrorist Organizations. Journal 
of Quantitative Criminology, 28(1), 77–101. 
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resistance, or formally established, hierarchical organizations that are explicit about their 
existence and their objectives” (E. Miller, 2013b, p. 5146). 
 
Beyond variation in entitativity, organizations that perpetrate violent terrorist attacks are 
dynamic and multi-faceted in their behavior, typically engaging in many different types 
of activity, both legal and illegal, violent and non-violent. In certain situations it is 
problematic to assume that any organization that carries out at least one terrorist attack is 
a ‘terrorist organization’ when in fact, the use of violence may be an exception to the 
group’s usual repertoire, rather than a defining characteristic. This is perhaps most likely 
the case for perpetrator organizations that are attributed responsibility for a relatively 
small number of attacks. In this sense, reliance solely on event data on terrorist violence 
can lead to flawed conceptual and theoretical assumptions about the organizations that 
carry out these attacks. Not unlike Maslow’s (1966, p. 15) observation that “it is 
tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail,” if 
the only data you have are about terrorist violence, it is tempting to treat all perpetrator 
groups as if they were terrorist organizations.  
 
For example, several recent studies that examine the longevity of terrorist organizations 
using quantitative analyses of terrorist attack data corroborate Rapoport’s (1992) often 
cited estimation that the vast majority of terrorist organizations last for less than one year 
(Dugan, 2012; Dugan et al., 2012; LaFree et al., 2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). Other 
studies, which use more conservatively curated sets of data, estimate that the average life 
span of terrorist groups is somewhat longer (Blomberg et al., 2010; Cronin, 2009; 
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Phillips, 2014a, 2015; Vittori, 2009). A key difference is that these latter analyses are 
narrower in scope. They either include only organizations’ international terrorist attacks; 
or, they include only those terrorist organizations that are more established and explicitly 
committed to the use of terrorist violence to achieve their goals, rather than simply any 
group that has carried out at least one international or domestic terrorist attack (Cronin, 
2012).  
 
This difference in how ‘terrorist organizations’ are defined and operationalized for 
quantitative analysis has clear implications for the assumptions we make about their 
activity and the conclusions we draw about their life cycles. In particular, studies that 
analyze the terrorist activity of all perpetrator groups that have carried out at least one 
terrorist attack risk mischaracterizing the many groups that have been responsible for 
only a few attacks over the course of a short period of time. Dugan (2012, p. 188) and 
colleagues (Dugan et al., 2012, p. 10; LaFree et al., 2015, p. 81) characterize perpetrator 
groups that engage in terrorism for less than one year as “short-lived terrorist 
organizations” or “short-lasting terrorist organizations.” In reality, this pattern of data 
might be generated by a number of different scenarios, only one of which is that bona 
fide terrorist organizations carried out attacks for less than one year and then failed to 
survive. Other equally plausible explanations include the possibility that the attacks 
perpetrated by these named “organizations” are actually the work of other full-fledged, 
long-lasting terrorist organizations that have temporarily adopted a unique nom de guerre 
for the purpose of carrying out certain attacks. For example, the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center in New York was claimed by a group of perpetrators loosely linked 
 33
to al Qa’ida, calling themselves “Liberation Army Fifth Battalion” (Mitchell, 1993, p. 1). 
Or, it could be that the attacks were carried out by fully formed organizations that are not 
typically considered terrorist groups, but rather insurgent groups, non-violent protest 
groups, or even political groups whose engagement in terrorism is extremely unusual. In 
any case, the organizations may not be short-lived at all, but their activity makes them 
appear as such as an artifact of event-level data collection. 
 
LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015, p. 84) describe an example of this phenomenon: the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, which was the leading political party 
in power in Mexico for most of the 20th century. In 1997, PRI operatives carried out 14 
terrorist attacks against opposition political/militant groups. Since these are the only 
terrorist attacks attributed to the PRI, an analyst equipped with only data on terrorist 
violence would classify the perpetrator group as a “short-lived terrorist organization” 
even though by most definitions they are neither short-lived, nor a terrorist organization, 
because their existence spans nearly a century and is fundamentally characterized by 
electoral politics rather than the use of terrorist violence. 
 
Related to the challenge of operationalizing terrorist organizations, the second important 
definitional issue relevant to the current research involves the operationalization of 
collective desistance. Operationalizing any type of desistance is complex, because it 
involves quantifying the prolonged cessation of behavior or activity. Regardless of the 
behavior in question, this raises a number of difficult questions. For example, for how 
long must one abstain in order to be considered inactive and sufficiently unlikely to 
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reengage? Is desistance an absolute status, or is it assessed relative to historical or typical 
levels of activity? What is the significance of replacement activity—desisting from one 
type of behavior, but shifting to another?  
   
Each of these questions pose challenges for understanding desistance from conventional 
crime. Because the operationalization of desistance is not straightforward, applications 
are typically arbitrarily and idiosyncratically informed by the particular topic being 
studied and the availability of suitable data (LaFree & Miller, 2008; Laub & Sampson, 
2001; E. Miller, 2012a). Criminologists have observed that rather than maintaining a 
consistent state of offending or non-offending, individuals are likely to drift in and out of 
criminal activity (Glaser, 1964; Laub & Sampson, 2001; Maruna, 2001; Matza, 1964). 
The same is true of terrorist organizations, however the measurement of non-offending is 
further complicated because they, unlike human beings, can be resurrected following a 
period of inactivity due to non-existence. One example of this is the Black September 
Organization, the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was 
responsible for the September 1972 attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, 
Germany (Associated Press, 1984; E. Miller, 2011, 2012a). Following this pivotal attack, 
Black September was the target of Israeli counterterrorism operations named Wrath of 
God and Spring of Youth, which involved the capture or death of nearly all of its 
members. The group’s activity peaked in 1973, but declined rapidly and by all accounts, 
including claims made by PLO leadership, the group was completely dismantled by the 
mid-1970s. Nevertheless, nearly a decade later the group purportedly announced that it 
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was “resuming revolutionary activities,” raising puzzling questions about what 
characterizes the entitativity of this, or any, organization (Associated Press, 1984). 
 
Beyond the fact that there are no definitive measures of organizational desistance, the 
frequency of terrorist violence groups engage in over time varies dramatically in ways 
that are easily overlooked by analyses that measure only the duration of activity. Perhaps 
the greatest limitation of existing quantitative research on collective desistance from 
terrorism is that it typically relies on duration analysis or analysis of life spans. These 
methods reduce the data on a group’s terrorist activity to a dichotomous measure of 
whether or not the group was active during a particular time period, or simply the total 
length of time for which a group engaged in terrorist attacks (Blomberg et al., 2010, 
2011; Dugan, 2012; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013; LaFree et al., 2015; Phillips, 2014a, 
2015; Young & Dugan, 2014). This means that a perpetrator group whose activity spans 
10 years with an average of 0.2 attacks per year is accounted for in the same way as a 
perpetrator group whose activity spans 10 years with an average of 20 or 200 attacks per 
year. Likewise, a perpetrator group whose activity drops from 100 attacks per year to one 
attack per year and then remains active at that rate for another decade is still considered 
active in a survival analysis, despite a tremendous decline to what may be an essentially 
incidental rate of violence.  
 
Researchers who adopt more qualitative methodologies such as case studies have the 
advantage of being able to incorporate any and all of these facets of a group’s trajectory 
into their analysis (Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006; S. G. Jones & Libicki, 2008; Ross & 
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Gurr, 1989; United States Institute of Peace, 1999). In contrast, those relying on 
statistical analysis of quantitative event data representing only a group’s terrorist activity 
must be careful to avoid mistaken assumptions about the groups themselves or the 
processes by which they desist from terrorism or decline altogether. In the following 
description of the data and analytical methodology, I attempt to account for these 
methodological challenges in three ways. First, I use a dataset on terrorist violence that is 
comprehensive, rather than excluding particular types of terrorist violence, such as 
domestic terrorist attacks. Second, for my primary analysis I use a statistical method that 
models the fluctuations in a group’s trajectory of terrorist violence rather than just the 
span of its activity. And finally, I adopt a critical, multi-method approach that includes 
strategic case study information as well as quantitative analysis with the aim of 
challenging assumptions based on either case studies or aggregate statistics and assessing 
robustness. 
 
Perpetrator Organizations Identified in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
In order to investigate patterns of collective desistance from terrorism I use data on the 
violent terrorist activity of 632 organizations identified as perpetrators of attacks in the 
Global Terrorism Database (START, 2014). The GTD is an event-level database 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. It defines terrorism as “acts by non-
state actors involving the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a 
political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” 
(LaFree et al., 2015, p. 13). At the time of this analysis the GTD includes details on 
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125,087 domestic and international terrorist attacks that occurred around the world 
between 1970 and 2013.4 Because it includes both international and domestic attacks, and 
does not require that an attack target non-combatants, the GTD’s definition of terrorism is 
relatively broad (LaFree et al., 2015; Schmid & Jongman, 2005), and well-suited for the 
current study. Although certain research questions require more conservative or refined 
characterizations of terrorism, the fact that the focus of my investigation is on 
understanding of the ways in which perpetrator organizations desist from engaging in 
terrorist violence, and in some cases disband, it is important to leverage comprehensive 
data. Although the data collection process for the GTD is described at length elsewhere 
(e.g., Dugan, 2012; Jensen, 2013; LaFree et al., 2015; E. Miller, 2012a; START, 2015), 
here I outline key details that are relevant to the current research. 
  
GTD data collectors typically rely on media articles and newswires, but have also 
supplemented these sources with information from various published reports and 
chronologies of terrorist attacks. Thus, the variables included in the database are those 
customarily found in these types of unclassified sources. Each record routinely includes 
information about the date and location of the attack, the target or victims of the attack, 
the weapons and tactics used, and the outcome of the attack (e.g., details on casualties, 
                                                 
4 The GTD is missing data on attacks that occurred in 1993 because the original records 
were lost prior to being transferred to START. Therefore 1993 is excluded from the 
analysis. Because 1993 falls at an arbitrarily different point in the life course of each 
organization, I assume that this missing data do not systematically impact the results of 
this analysis. However, note that organizations that carried out attacks for more than one, 
but less than two years, including in 1993, are excluded from the analysis. Likewise, 
organizations whose peak of activity took place in 1993 will have this value replaced 
with their next-highest peak year. 
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damages, and hostages). Source materials provided information about the perpetrator of 
the attack in 55% of all cases. However, for some cases the only available information 
about the perpetrator is limited to generic descriptions such as “Protestant extremists” or 
“right-wing militants” that do not represent organized entities. The GTD also includes 
terrorist attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals; however, given my interest in 
patterns of collective desistance I exclude them from my analysis. Excluding generic 
descriptions and unaffiliated individuals leaves 2,437 non-generic, named perpetrator 
groups in the database. 
 
The data collection team records attributions of perpetrator responsibility for each attack 
in the GTD as reported in the original source articles, making adjustments to account for 
the use of aliases, variation between native language names and English language names, 
and standardization of acronyms. Although not all terrorist attacks are formally claimed 
by a perpetrator organization, the media source articles that the GTD data collection 
process relies upon typically report names of organizations that have at some point been 
self-identified by leaders, spokespeople, or other group members. In some cases source 
articles report attributions of responsibility that are based on statements made by 
authorities or witnesses to the attack, however the name or identity of the perpetrator 
organization almost always comes from the organization itself.5 
 
                                                 
5 Exceptions to this include the Baader-Meinhof gang, active in Western Europe in the 
1970s, and so-named by authorities and the media after two of the group’s leaders. The 
group referred to itself as the Red Army Faction (Aust & Bell, 2009). 
 39
As I have documented previously (E. Miller, 2012a, p. 83): “There is no requirement that 
a group is particularly well-organized or well-established. Thus, the perpetrators in the 
full dataset range from formalized hierarchical organizations to looser networks and 
groups with very few members. The GTD attributes attacks carried out by factions of a 
group to the “parent” group, with the sole exception of the relatively autonomous factions 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which represent unique entities in the 
data. The [data collectors attribute] attacks by splinter groups to the name of the splinter, 
based on the inference that the reasons for the splinter sufficiently justify the decision to 
distinguish their attacks from those of the “parent” entity. A similar rationale is applied to 
situations in which a group changes its name; the newly named group is coded as a 
separate entity, although this practice raises some important considerations for evaluating 
the decline of groups, which I will address in the discussion of the results. These coding 
practices rely on supplemental research by GTD staff to identify group names, aliases, 
and relationships between groups. The sources of this information vary extensively and 
include media reports, scholarly analysis, and various Internet-based resources. Although 
formal tests of inter-coder reliability have not been used, every effort is made to 
corroborate supporting information with multiple valid sources and the perpetrator group 
attributions are routinely reviewed for accuracy and consistency.” 
 
In order to concentrate on patterns of collective desistance from terrorism, I exclude from 
the analysis of desistance any groups that carried out attacks for fewer than 365 days and 
those whose peak number of terrorist attacks occurred in 2013, the last year of the time 
series. In order to minimize the potential bias of right-censoring among perpetrator 
 40
groups that have not been active long enough to run their course, I also exclude 
organizations whose first attack was after 2008, leaving 632 observations. These 
selection criteria have three purposes. First, they aim to exclude perpetrators that are not 
within the scope of my population of interest—terrorist perpetrator organizations—such 
as unaffiliated individuals, unknown perpetrators, and generic perpetrator attributions that 
do not represent cohesive entities. Second, by excluding groups that do not engage in 
terrorism for a span of at least 365 days, the analysis is not inappropriately influenced by 
groups that are likely not fully engaged in terrorism and therefore have very little terrorist 
activity from which to desist. This is consistent with Cronin’s (2012) practice of 
excluding groups that have only carried out a few attacks over a short period of time. In 
fact, in many cases source materials provide little or no information about these entities 
aside from their attribution of responsibility for an attack recorded in the GTD. Or, they 
are groups that primarily engage in other types of activity and the use of terrorist violence 
is atypical. Finally, this criterion also eliminates observations for which I have too few 
data points to assess statistical trends over time.  
 
Because the selection process is intended to isolate the population of interest, the 
implications for the representativeness of the data are generally not problematic. Indeed, 
the removal of perpetrator groups that are likely to be either terrorist groups that never 
fully formed, or other types of organizations that only momentarily engaged in terrorism, 
improves my ability to draw conclusions about patterns of collective desistance from 
terrorism.  
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However, the possibility remains that some of the excluded attacks were carried out by 
operatives of the groups included the analysis, causing their terrorist activity is 
underrepresented in the data. With respect to named organizations that I excluded 
because they engaged in terrorism for fewer than 365 days— it is possible that these 
perpetrators were actually part of the population of interest, but temporarily adopted a 
new name that GTD coders failed to recognize as a faction or alias of another, more 
active group. However, it is unlikely that these attacks are timed in a way that 
systematically biases the data.  
 
In contrast, attacks that I exclude because they were attributed to generic or unidentified 
perpetrators may also be the work of a more active group, and the possibility of 
systematic bias is somewhat more likely. In particular, one might speculate that members 
of an organization that is under increasing pressure to desist, either because the group has 
been legally banned, or is engaging in a peace process, or is subject to a military 
crackdown, may be less inclined to publicly claim responsibility for its attacks (LaFree et 
al., 2015, pp. 78–79). If this is systematically the case, it could certainly influence the 
results of an analysis of how perpetrator organizations desist from terrorism. Before 
presenting the central analysis of this study, in Chapter 4 I will examine the patterns of 
activity among perpetrator groups that have been removed from the sample. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
In this study I use group-based trajectory analysis (GBTA) to study patterns of desistance 
among terrorist perpetrator groups (E. Miller, 2012a). GBTA was developed by Nagin 
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and Land (Nagin, 2005; Nagin & Land, 1993) as a technique for studying patterns of 
behavior over the life course of individuals. This method allows analysts to estimate 
discrete classes of trajectories of activity over time that represent predicted patterns of 
activity that are derived from a set of observed values of change over time. Researchers 
also estimate the probability of a observation’s membership to a particular trajectory class 
of activity that is consistent with its patterns of behavior. Group-based trajectory 
modeling has been applied in numerous different contexts, including the life course of 
individuals (Bushway et al., 2001; Laub, Nagin, & Sampson, 1998; Nagin, Farrington, & 
Moffitt, 1995; Nagin & Land, 1993), crime trends over time among geographic locations 
such as neighborhoods (Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004), and patterns of 
terrorism across countries (LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2010; N. A. Morris & Slocum, 
2012). LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) use this method to study patterns of terrorism 
between 1970 and 2004 among a sample of 53 perpetrator groups that they identified as 
anti-American. Beginning the analysis in 1970, they used GBTA to identify waves of 
terrorist activity in a historical context. 
 
In the current study I apply GBTA to the life course of perpetrator groups, where the first 
year of analysis is the peak year of the group’s recorded terrorist violence (E. Miller, 
2012a). I focus on the group-year as a unit of analysis because it is a reasonable middle-
point among perpetrator groups that carry out many terrorist attacks and perpetrator 
groups that carry out few terrorist attacks, with respect to intermittency of offending. A 
longer period of observation would sacrifice potentially informative granularity, and a 
shorter period of observation would likely introduce many observations of inactivity that 
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mask broad patterns of the perpetrator groups’ terrorist activity.6 Dugan and colleagues 
(2012) used a similar strategy to investigate various dimensions of threat among terrorist 
perpetrator groups, using the first year of a group’s recorded terrorist activity as the start 
of the trajectory.  
 
In order to operationalize collective desistance from terrorism, I draw on the existing 
theoretical and conceptual literature that characterizes it as a process rather than a 
discrete state. Specifically, I investigate organizational desistance from terrorism as the 
pattern of a perpetrator group’s terrorist violence following its peak year of terrorist 
violence. By isolating post-peak trajectories, this study is very different from those that 
investigate the overall longevity of perpetrator groups’ engagement in terrorism. With the 
goal of understanding the ways in which perpetrator groups desist from terrorist violence, 
I acknowledge that a group might exist for one year or many years prior to reaching its 
peak level of activity. Having identified distinct patterns of post-peak terrorist violence, I 
next explore the extent to which these patterns are correlated with the perpetrator groups’ 
patterns of activity in ways that might be useful for informing theory and policy 
development regarding collective desistance from terrorism.  
 
The goal of this analysis is to identify and explore meaningful classifications of 
trajectories of activity over time. It is important to note that GBTA does not allow 
analysts to test for the existence of classifications, instead we assume a priori that the 
                                                 
6 Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that quarterly or monthly changes in activity 
could reveal interesting patterns (Behlendorf, LaFree, & Legault, 2012) that can be 
investigated in future analyses. 
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classifications exist. Instead is simply a useful method for summarizing large amounts of 
longitudinal data on the violent terrorist activity of the perpetrator organizations. It allows 
researchers to estimate the parameters of the trajectories, the distribution of perpetrator 
groups across trajectories, and the probability of each group’s membership to each 
trajectory class. 
  
In order to analyze patterns of organizational desistance independent of patterns of onset, 
I specify the model starting with the peak year of each group’s terrorist activity. The peak 
year of activity marks the beginning of the groups’ decline in terrorist activity and I 
disregard any offending that took place prior to the peak year so that the model will 
cluster together organizations with distinctively similar patterns of decline.7 Note that 
trajectory analyses based on the entire series from the group’s first attack to its last, like 
that conducted by Dugan and colleagues (2012), are informative, but do not to provide 
clear insight into patterns of desistance in particular. Instead, the resulting trajectory 
classifications are heavily influenced by variation at the beginning of the series thereby 
potentially obscuring distinct patterns of desistance. 
 
As I described in an earlier publication in which I used this method (E. Miller, 2012a, p. 
85): “The attack data in this analysis is count data, which necessitates the use of the 
Poisson probability distribution in the model (Nagin, 2005). Furthermore, perpetrator 
organizations are likely subject to periods of intermittency that prompts us to distinguish 
                                                 
7 Note: if a perpetrator organization has multiple peaks with the same number of attacks, I 
use the first one. 
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between zeros that result from inactivity and zeros that result from the absence of 
offending during a period of activity. To accommodate this characteristic of the data, I 
specify the model using a zero-inflated Poisson distribution, which estimates the 
probability that yit = 0 separately such that it accounts for the probability of inactivity, or 
0 (Nagin, 2005). Thus,  
 
Equation 1: 
0 1  
 
where  represents the probability that the perpetrator organization is inactive and  
is the probability that a zero occurs when the group is active, or 0. To calculate the 





	 1, 2, …  
 
In the first model, which is based on annual frequency of terrorist attacks, the assignment 
of perpetrator organizations to trajectory groups is a function of both the shape of the 
decline and the overall magnitude of activity. Both of these dimensions of activity are 
important elements of a group’s declining threat level, however this approach could 
potentially isolate those few perpetrator groups whose remarkably high levels of activity 
definitively distinguish them from all other perpetrator groups despite the fact that their 
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trajectories have little else uniquely in common. Therefore, it is useful to estimate a 
second model that isolates the rate of decline from the overall annual frequency of 
attacks. By doing this, the model assigns perpetrator groups to common trajectory 
categories not because of similarities in the overall frequency of offending, but rather 
because they share a distinctively similar shape of decline, regardless of overall 
magnitude. To achieve this, I estimate a second model where each yearly observation is a 
ratio of the number of attacks that year to the number of terrorist attacks at the perpetrator 
group’s peak year of activity.  
 
Because this computation transforms count data into a continuous scale of values 
between 1 and 0, this model is based on an uncensored normal distribution. The 
uncensored normal distribution is a specific case of the censored normal distribution and 







Finally, in order to explore how the groups’ patterns of activity relate to their trajectory of 
desistance, I investigate the relationship between of several independent variables and 
trajectory group membership. These variables include onset trajectory membership 
(estimated separately based on year of first attack to peak year), lethality of attacks, use 
of suicide tactics, and execution of logistically international attacks. Although not 
intended to comprehensively or formally test specific theoretical constructs, each of these 
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variables potentially bears relevance to the paradigms discussed in the previous chapter. 
In particular, onset trajectories represent organizational mechanisms or logistics relevant 
to the ability or willingness of the group to carry out a large number of attacks from the 
point of its initial engagement in terrorism, thus positioning it as either a major or minor 
threat to the state. The remaining variables: lethality, use of suicide tactics, and capacity 
to carry out attacks that physically cross state borders (i.e., logistically international 
attacks (LaFree et al., 2015 Chapter 8)) similarly assess certain elements of the 
perpetrator groups’ capabilities and willingness to adopt severe tactics, which may 
correlate to their patterns of desistance from terrorism. 
 
Model Selection 
“Identification of the most appropriate trajectory model is an iterative process that 
involves repeated maximum likelihood estimations of varying specifications that can be 
compared across several metrics. By repeatedly fitting the data with a comprehensive 
range of models that vary with respect to number of trajectory groups extracted and the 
order of the polynomial that defines the trajectories, I evaluate the models on the basis of 
formal fit statistics as well as substantively meaningful characteristics of the trajectories. 




BIC = log(L) – 0.5k log(N) 
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where L is the model’s maximum likelihood value, k is the number of parameters 
estimated, which is a function of both the number of groups and the order of the 
polynomial, and N is the sample size. When comparing BIC statistics across model 
variations, a larger value indicates superior model fit. The mechanics of this formula are 
fairly straightforward insofar as the first term evaluates the capacity of the model to 
accurately predict the observed data based on its estimated parameters. While this 
likelihood inherently improves as the number of estimated parameters (groups and higher 
order polynomials) increases, the second element of the BIC equation favors model 
parsimony by essentially penalizing the addition of parameters. This penalty is 
proportionately greater as the sample size increases and increasing the number of 
parameters in the model will only improve the BIC statistic if the benefits outweigh the 
cost.  
 
Continued improvement of the BIC statistic necessitates the consideration of other model 
comparisons, both statistical and substantive. First, even when the BIC value continues to 
increase, in the interest of parsimony a marked decline in the incremental improvement of 
subsequent models should be taken into account.  
 
Second, calculations of the mean posterior probability of group membership are 
indicators of model favorability. The posterior probability of group membership is the 
probability that a particular perpetrator organization’s activity most closely follows the 
pattern of a particular trajectory group, relative to the other trajectory groups. This value 
can be calculated for each perpetrator organization’s likelihood of membership to each 
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trajectory group, and is used to classify the organizations accordingly. Each perpetrator 
organization is essentially assigned to the trajectory group for which it has the highest 
posterior probability of membership. When the mean posterior probabilities of group 
membership are calculated for each trajectory group, they collectively provide a useful 
indication of whether or not the model is extracting sufficiently distinct groups. Nagin 
(2005) suggests that a reasonable diagnostic is that the mean posterior probabilities of 
group membership for all trajectory groups are greater than 0.7.  
 
Third, Nagin (2005) recommends computing the Odds of Correct Classification (OCC) 
for each group, which represents the ratio of the likelihood of correct classification based 
on the model to the likelihood of correct classification based on random assignment. He 
uses simulated data to illustrate that models that produce accurate classification typically 
generate OCC values greater than five for each trajectory group. 
 
Finally, in addition to the statistical assessments of model performance discussed thus far, 
model selection must also account for substantively relevant characteristics of the 
trajectory groups that are identified (Nagin, 2005). This typically involves two types of 
considerations. Not only must the selection process value parsimony mathematically, but 
also the analyst must be cognizant that as successive trajectory groups are extracted they 
represent a meaningfully distinct pattern of activity. Improved fit statistics are of little 
value if the resulting classification of perpetrator groups fails to distinguish substantively 
meaningful trajectory groups. Similarly, the perpetrator groups should be reasonably 
dispersed across trajectory groups such that none of the trajectory groups are comprised 
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of an extremely low number of perpetrator groups. An important caveat to this 
methodological goal, however, is that criminologists have long observed that a fairly 
select few tends to be responsible for a disproportionately large share of offending and 
the ability to isolate those entities can be particularly informative (Farrington & West, 
1993; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972)” (E. Miller, 2012a, pp. 86–87). 
 
Multi-Method Analysis 
While group-based trajectory analysis addresses some of the main limitations of methods 
commonly used to study terrorist group longevity and decline in terrorist activity among 
perpetrator groups, it is certainly not without limitations and in fact, introduces its own 
potential sources of error. For example, the analytical strategy I adopt—applying 
trajectory analysis to the post-peak terrorist activity of organizations that have carried out 
attacks over a span of more than 365 days—is poorly suited for evaluating the activity of 
perpetrator groups that were active for fewer than 365 days, or perpetrator groups that 
peak at the end of the data series, leaving no activity eligible for analysis. Furthermore, 
despite satisfactory fit statistics, group-based trajectory analysis can produce trajectory 
classes that are poor approximations of the underlying observed activity, and fail to 
account for important contextual phenomena.  
 
Although the analytical strategy I pursue here takes into account many more data points 
than calculations of life span or duration, quantitative analysis of a relatively large dataset 
remains susceptible to oversimplification of complex patterns of activity that can impact 
both substantive conclusions and resulting theoretical constructs. For example, Dugan 
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and colleagues (2012) adopt group-based trajectory analysis to study patterns of attack 
frequency, lethality, and duration among 535 perpetrator organizations identified in the 
GTD as active for more than 365 days between 1970 and 2008. Several of the 
assumptions the authors make about perpetrator groups are inconsistent with what 
qualitative analyses have found. In particular, the authors state that “a group’s longevity 
is not a decision; it is a desirable outcome,” (Dugan et al., 2012, p. 7) despite the fact that 
numerous studies of the reasons for terrorist groups’ decline or failure indicate that 
involuntary dissolution is one of many reasons, both internal and external, that a group 
might fail to survive (Crenshaw, 1991, 2001; Cronin, 2006, 2009; S. G. Jones & Libicki, 
2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989). In fact, Jones and Libicki (2008) observe that less than half 
(47%) of all terrorist organizations that ended did so as a result of police, security forces, 
or military suppression, while the remaining organizations ended because of internal 
conflict, decisions to transition to politics, or because they were successful at achieving 
their goals. The assumption made by Dugan and colleagues inherently, and perhaps 
problematically, influences the rational choice model that serves as the foundation for 
their eight hypotheses. The premise that organizations end only when they are “captured” 
(Dugan et al., 2012, p. 11)—and that frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks are 
operational choices made by organizations to increase constituency support and minimize 
the likelihood of capture—overlooks the diversity of influences on group behavior 
identified by qualitative researchers (Crenshaw, 1991, 2001; Cronin, 2006, 2009; S. G. 
Jones & Libicki, 2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989). 
In order to evaluate and challenge these limitations I adopt a nested mixed-method 
strategy that leverages the benefits of both relatively large-N analysis and relatively 
 52
small-N analysis (Lieberman, 2005). Within the framework of the group-based trajectory 
analysis, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of descriptive statistics for each of the 
trajectory classes, as well as the set of perpetrator groups that were excluded from the 
trajectory analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to independently investigate the ways 
in which measures of central tendency and deviation with respect to duration of terrorist 
activity, frequency of terrorist activity, and lethality of terrorist activity both pre- and 
post-peak align with the statistical approximations produced by the trajectory model. This 
will support a critical evaluation of variations in observed patterns of activity among 
perpetrator groups with the same trajectory classification. 
 
Case Studies 
To further illustrate the strengths and limitations of fitting a group-based trajectory model 
to diverse patterns of activity among groups that carry out terrorist attacks, I conduct 
brief case studies on patterns of desistance from terrorism for two perpetrator 
organizations associated with each trajectory classification. The purpose of these case 
studies is to demonstrate the various contexts in which perpetrator groups operate, 
including the ways in which they relate to other organizations, the ways in which they 
engage with authorities, as well as the variety of ideologies or objectives they pursue, and 
the tactics they use to pursue them. For example, terrorist attacks are not all equivalent, 
but vary in their lethality, targeting, and weapon use in ways that could substantively 
impact a perpetrator organization’s overall trajectory (Dugan et al., 2008, 2012). 
Furthermore, while the trajectories of terrorist attacks carried out by the perpetrator 
groups are limited to a single type of event, the case studies also allow me to analyze the 
 53
relevance of events other than terrorist attacks that may influence the perpetrator groups’ 
trajectory of terrorist violence.  
 
Because the purpose of the case studies is to both assess the ability of the trajectory 
model to capture the essential pattern of the perpetrator groups’ desistance from terrorist 
violence and to highlight the extensive contextual variation of the groups, I select 
multiple cases for comparison—a total of twelve. The process of selecting cases is based 
on several considerations. First, the observed activity of the perpetrator groups selected 
represent both typical and deviant examples of the statistical approximation generated by 
the trajectory model (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). In some cases, the trajectory model 
provides a particular estimation that is a good representation of an individual 
organization’s trajectory. In other cases extenuating circumstances not accounted for in 
the statistical analysis reveal that the best fitting trajectory based on the model is actually 
a poor characterization of the group’s activity. Likewise, some perpetrator organizations 
follow a fairly symmetrical pattern of increasing and decreasing use of terrorism, while 
others are much more erratic or driven by anomalous events.  
 
Second, the selected perpetrator groups represent contrasting ideologies, following 
Crenshaw’s (1987, 1991) assertion that a group’s ideology is likely to influence 
longevity, particularly in terms of its ability to maintain engagement among future 
generations. Third, the selected groups represent contrasting tactics, to include both 
highly lethal organizations as well as those that have limited their activities to primarily 
property damage rather than human casualties. Fourth, the selected cases represent 
 54
organizations with contrasting structures, including both loose networks of operatives and 
formal hierarchical paramilitary groups. Fifth, the selected perpetrator groups illustrate 
different mechanisms for decline, including various combinations of law enforcement 
efforts, military engagement, peace processes, and conversion to non-violent politics. 
Finally, they demonstrate different degrees of desistance, ranging from complete 
dissolution of an organization, to relative decline in violence to low-intensity terrorist 
activity, to minimal desistance and continued engagement in high-intensity violence. 
 
To analyze the selected organizations with respect to their desistance from terrorism, I 
leverage available data from historical documents such as government reports, media 
articles, and communiqués, essays by reputable security analysts, and scholarly content 
including published manuscripts and journal articles. In addition, I consult the Global 
Terrorism Database for detailed information about the perpetrators’ use of terrorist 
violence. Each of these types of sources contributes a unique perspective of information, 
albeit not always an unbiased perspective. The use of open-source materials to gather 
information on a sensitive topic like terrorism requires careful consideration of sources 
and impact of bias. For example, media reports have varying degrees of bias, both 
intentional and unintentional, that can be assessed in a number of ways to identify a pool 
of generally useful sources (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). These include consulting 
independent assessments of a media source’s validity and editorial objectivity, reviewing 
source articles for the presence of inflammatory rhetoric, and considering the extent to 
which facts reported by a particular source are generally corroborated by other, 
independent sources.  
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The GTD collection team uses an unpublished four-point scale of source validity that 
includes the following values: 1- inherently biased (includes perpetrator sources and 
sources from governments party to the conflict in question), 2- generally valid, but 
potentially somewhat biased or lacking editorial rigor, 3- highly valid, and 4- preferred (a 
short list of rigorous media sources from around the world that consistently report valid 
event data).  
 
It is important to note that the impact of source validity varies depending on the type of 
information in question. For example, highly rigorous professional media sources are 
useful to verify that an event took place, or pertinent details of the event like the number 
of casualties caused. However, inherently biased sources such as perpetrator websites or 
communiqués may be less reliable for information on the impact of an attack, but 
critically important for information on the motives or ideological influences of the 
organization. I adopt a similar approach to gather source materials for the case studies, by 
including information from a diverse array of sources, attempting to corroborate key 
details wherever possible, and linking consideration of source validity to the type of 
information in question. One key limitation of this process is my reliance on English-
language sources. 
 
The analytic technique that I adopt for the case studies is  “complex time series” (Yin, 
2014, p. 152), which is suitable when the primary phenomena in question are likely to 
follow a mixed, or non-linear pattern over time. Using the GTD and various source 
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materials described above, I details of the organizations’ desistance, or lack thereof, from 
terrorism, as well as other actions taken by other organizations, the government, or the 
groups themselves. This will allow me to identify the extent to which the statistical 
approximation generated by the trajectory analysis accurately represents underlying 
patterns of activity. It will also serve to illustrate the ways in which desistance from 






CHAPTER FOUR: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before presenting the principal analysis of this study, I first analyze descriptive statistics 
beginning with the full set of perpetrators identified in the GTD. The purpose of this is to 
document how I arrive at the set of perpetrator organizations on which I base the analysis, 
consider the ways in which perpetrators excluded from the analysis differ from those that 
are included, and illustrate some of the key patterns of activity that motivate the research. 
This chapter begins with 3,120 unique entries in the three perpetrator group name fields 
in the GTD. Collection of the GTD relies on open-source media reports, which 
sometimes include proper names of perpetrator organizations, but often include no 
information about perpetrators, generic information about perpetrators, or only names of 
unaffiliated individuals. Accordingly, three of the 3,120 entries are “Unknown,” 
“Individual,” and “Other,” which is a term data collectors at one time used to reference 
informal generic descriptors of perpetrators. In addition to these three entries, 680 entries 
do not reference formal organizations, but are essentially generic descriptors that were 
reported in the source materials. These range vary in degree of detail and usefulness from 
“Terrorists” and “Subversives” to “Smugglers and Elephant Poachers” and “Supporters 
of ex-President Gamsakhurdia” (the first democratically elected president of Georgia), to 
“Salafi Extremists.” 
 
Short-term Perpetrator Organizations 
Removing these entries from the analysis leaves 2,437 formally named entities that have 
carried out 57,240 terrorist attacks, resulting in 152,498 deaths between 1970 and 2013. 
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More than 70 percent of these named entities (70.8%) were active for 365 days or fewer. 
The 1,726 named organizations that engaged in terrorism for 365 days or fewer carried 
out 3,561 attacks, which killed 7,059 people between 1970 and 2013. The number of 
attacks per group ranges from one (1,198 groups; 69.4%) to 367 attacks perpetrated by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which began carrying out attacks under 
that name in April 2013.8 ISIL is also responsible for 1,431 fatalities from terrorist 
attacks, one-fifth (20.3%) of the fatalities caused by these short-term organizations. The 
next most active of the short-term organizations was the Dishmish Regiment, which 
carried out 43 attacks in India over the course of approximately six weeks in 1984. 
 
Figure 4.1 Time span of terrorist violence, perpetrator groups active ≤ 365 days 
                                                 
8 Note that ISIL is ultimately excluded from the analyses in subsequent chapters because 
they fail to meet several of the inclusion criteria, not only the requirement that a group is 
active for more than 365 days. ISIL also began carrying out attacks after 2008, and 2013 




































Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of time span, in days, of terrorist activity among the 
perpetrator organizations that engaged in terrorism for less than a year. This distribution 
is extremely skewed, with 1,361 groups (78.9%) active for only a single day. For the 
most part, the organizations that were active for less than one year are extremely poorly 
documented. In many cases their names are obscure, such as “The Illegal Fisherman of 
the Night” and “The Armed Secret Organization,” and the only information available 
about them pertains to their claim of responsibility for a terrorist attack. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the large number of organizations that carry 
out attacks for less than a year, or less than a day. One possibility is that law enforcement 
or security forces rapidly and effectively countered these organizations.  For example, 
Smith (1994, p. 26) observes, “The Order existed for only a year after its creation, and it 
is obvious that the alterations in federal law enforcement policy that took effect during 
1983 shortened the life span of The Order and its affiliates.” Another possible 
explanation is that, like many start-up companies or book clubs that fail to gain 
momentum, the groups never fully engaged as organizations. Though it is difficult to be 
certain given limited information, this is likely the case for the French anti-nuclear group 
that called itself “Commandos Opposing with Explosives the Self Destruction of the 
Universe (COPO)” (Bangor Daily News, 1976, p. 1)  
 
A third possibility is that they were fully established organizations that primarily engaged 
in other types of activity, such as electoral politics, and only carried out terrorist attacks 
as an exception to otherwise non-violent activities. Indeed, 60 of the 1,726 organizations 
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include the word “party” in their name, though note that one of these is the “Vengeance 
Party,” a group that claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and death of a Dutch priest 
in Lebanon in 1985 (Associated Press, 1985). 
 
A fourth possible explanation for the perpetrator entries in the GTD that engaged in 
terrorism for less than a year is that the attacks were carried out by individuals or groups 
of individuals who are genuinely committed to terrorist violence, or perhaps even part of 
established terrorist networks, but did not actually carry out many violent attacks. This is 
likely true of Saudi Hizballah, which was founded in 1987 as “an alternative political 
network” (T. Jones, 2012, p. 144). The only terrorist attack attributed to Saudi Hizballah 
in the GTD is the 1996 attack on the United States military barracks at al Khobar towers, 
a relatively sophisticated truck bomb attack that killed 19 airmen and wounded 386 
people. Jones (2012) reports that following the al Khobar attack, Saudi authorities made 
numerous arrests of Saudi Hizballah members, essentially decimating the organization. 
 
In all, the organizations that carried out terrorist attacks for less than a year are a product 
of a diverse array of processes. I ultimately exclude these organizations from the 
trajectory analyses for two reasons. First, some of them, particularly those that were 
neutralized by law enforcement, bear particular relevance to an investigation of patterns 
of collective desistance from terrorism. However others, such as those that never 
managed to become fully-fledged organizations, hold less significance for the present 
research. It is not possible to disentangle these various scenarios in order to quantify them 
given currently available data. Second, the vast majority of these organizations were only 
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active for a single day. This is both a practical and a conceptual issue in that a series of 
data points is needed to perform longitudinal statistical analysis, but also there is little 
else of substance to glean from the available data regarding patterns of activity among 
organizations that discontinue the use of terrorism in a very short period of time.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that perpetrator organizations have been known to 
engage and disengage from terrorist violence in less than one year, which has important 
implications for future research and policy. 
 
Long-term Perpetrator Organizations 
Once I exclude the perpetrator groups that engage in terrorist violence for less than a 
year, 711 organizations remain. These groups carried out 53,679 attacks, causing 145,439 
deaths between 1970 and 2013. These perpetrator organizations make up 29.2 percent of 
all non-generic perpetrators, but their terrorist activity comprises 93.8 percent of attacks 
and 95.4 percent of all fatalities perpetrated by non-generic organizations. On average, 
these organizations engaged in terrorism for 8.7 years, ranging from one year (75 
organizations) to 43 years (three organizations). Figure 4.2 shows that even after the 
removal of perpetrator organizations that engaged in terrorism for less than a year, the 
distribution is still heavily skewed to the right, as more than half of the organizations 





Figure 4.2 Time span of terrorist violence, perpetrator groups active > 365 days 
 
Because the analysis that follows uses the peak year of activity as a pivot point for 
patterns of desistance or decline and patterns of onset, I examine the pre-peak and post-
peak time span for the 711 organizations in Figure 4.3. The pre-peak time span is the 
number of years between an organization’s first terrorist attack and its peak year of 
terrorist violence. The post-peak time span is the number of years between the 
organization’s peak year of terrorist violence and its last recorded attack. As Figure 4.3 
illustrates, a very large number of organizations (305) peaked during their first year of 
activity. Examining the year of onset for these organizations, it appears that there is likely 
some degree of left-censoring among organizations that were active prior to the 1970 


























uniform over time, however 17 of them started in 1970, 2.4 times as many as one would 
expect from a uniform distribution. 
 
Figure 4.3 Pre-peak and post-peak time span of terrorist violence 
 
The next inclusion criterion relates to the organizations’ peak year of activity. Figure 4.4 
shows the distribution of peak years for the 711 non-generic perpetrator groups that 
engaged in terrorist violence for more than one year. The distribution is fairly variable 
and almost appears to fluctuate in waves over time. However, note that the largest 
number of perpetrator organizations experienced their peak year of activity in 2013, the 
last year of the series. This suggests the possibility of right-censoring, as these 
organizations may not have genuinely peaked by this point in time. I exclude these 43 
organizations from the trajectory analyses that follow because they have no indication of 
desistance to contribute to an analysis of patterns of collective desistance from terrorism. 







































Figure 4.4 Peak year of terrorist activity 
 
The final inclusion criterion pertains to the year the organizations began carrying out 
terrorist attacks. Of the remaining 668 perpetrator organizations, 36 carried out their first 
attack less than five years before then end of the time series in 2013. In order to avoid 
biasing the analysis by including perpetrator organizations that have not at least had an 
opportunity to run their course, I exclude groups that carried out their first attack after 
2008. While the five year threshold is an arbitrary cutoff, it is informed by the finding in 
Figure 4.2 (above), indicating that more than half of the perpetrator groups were active 
for a total time span of five years or fewer. Removing these 36 perpetrator organizations 
from the analysis reduces the sample to a final count of 632. 
 
Finally, before presenting the results of the trajectory analysis, I illustrate one of the main 
advantages of this methodology using the trajectories of perpetrator organizations that 





























































































































eight such organizations: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA), the Jewish Defense League (JDL), the National Liberation 
Army of Colombia (ELN), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command (PFLP-GC), the Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).9 Figures 4.5a-h show 
the individual trajectories of terrorist attacks over time for each of these organizations. 
Note that although these eight organizations were active for similar lengths of time 
according to the GTD, their patterns of activity are dramatically different.  
  
  
                                                 
9 Note that a ninth organization was active for more than 40 years: the New People’s 
Army in the Philippines (NPA). However, this organization is excluded from the 


















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.5a-h Indiviual trajectories, where time span > 40 years 
 
While several of these organizations have carried out relatively few terrorist attacks 
during the period of time in which they were active, others such as the ELN, ETA, and 
the PIRA were extremely prolific However, even among the more active perpetrator 
organizations, the patterns of activity suggest different mechanisms for decline. An 
analysis of these perpetrator groups based on total number of years of terrorist activity or 
a survival analysis would fail to capture this variation. Even a measure of average 
number of attacks per year is potentially misleading for an organization like the PIRA. 
Calculated over the entire span of activity, 65.2 attacks per year is actually a very poor 
measure of central tendency for almost any point in the PIRA’s 41-year history. In the 
next chapter I discuss the results of a trajectory analysis based on the premise that these 
















































































































































































































































































CHAPTER FIVE: Baseline Patterns of Decline 
 
The analysis in the previous chapter illustrates that the violent terrorist activity of 
perpetrator groups follows a variety of patterns. While it is informative to study the 
number of years a group engages in terrorist violence or the average frequency of attacks 
per year, this does not fully capture variation in the shape of the groups’ trajectories. In 
this chapter I present the results of a group-based trajectory analysis (GBTA), a 
maximum likelihood statistical method that summarizes large amounts of raw data on the 
trajectories of perpetrator organizations in the GTD by modeling trajectories for discrete, 
heterogeneous classes of observations. The goal of the GBTA is to determine the best 
fitting, most substantively informative approximation of types of trajectories a perpetrator 
group might follow. This strategy will allow me to address my first research question: 
What are the ways in which organizations that engage in terrorist violence desist from 
engaging in terrorist violence?  
 
I begin this chapter by presenting what I consider to be the most defensible trajectory 
model, as well as the process of model selection by which I arrived at this particular 
specification. The process of model selection is not absolute, but is instead a matter of 
interpretation that reflects a number of different goals. Model fit statistics provide an 
assessment of how closely the trajectories represent the underlying observed data, and 
these typically improve as the complexity of the model specification increases and allows 
for greater flexibility to reflect diverse patterns of activity. However, with increasing 
complexity comes decreasing substantive utility. One can imagine that a maximally 
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complex trajectory model is not much more informative for analysis than the observed 
data, while a minimally complex model offers a poor representation of the heterogeneity 
of the observed data. Thus, a balance between model fit and model parsimony is ideal; 
and, it is useful to present a transparent explanation of the decisions that impact model 
selection. 
 
It is also important to note that the best fitting approximation is not always a particularly 
good approximation of the groups’ terrorist activity. For this reason, the second 
component of this chapter is a critical analysis of the perpetrator groups’ patterns of 
decline as they relates to the trajectory model. This addresses the third research question 
identified in Chapter 1: What are the implications of measurement and analytical strategy 
for the study of collective desistance from terrorism? While the benefits of GBTA allow 
for more nuanced analysis of the shape of the perpetrator groups’ terrorist activity, the 
results must be interpreted with caution because they can be misleading in cases where 
the best approximation is a poor approximation. For ease of interpretation I use the 
classes of the trajectory model as a framework for this analysis, but urge the reader to 
bear in mind that these classes are merely estimates informed by the models, rather than 
true representations of their constituent groups. In fact, the primary goal of this part of the 
analysis is to assess the extent to which the GBTA approach is appropriate for 
representing the underlying data. 
 
A key component of the critical analysis of the trajectory estimates is a series of twelve 
brief case studies intended to provide contextual examples and challenge the assumptions 
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of the model. I select two perpetrator groups best characterized by each trajectory and use 
various sources of information—including media articles, reports produced by 
governmental and non-governmental agencies, and scholarly research—to illustrate the 
circumstances that generated the observed data. In selecting cases for further 
investigation, I attempt to compare and contrast examples that are both well- and poorly- 
represented by the model estimates. 
 
I conclude this chapter with a summary of my baseline model of collective desistance, its 
implications for our understanding of the ways in which perpetrator groups’ use of 




As I described in Chapter 3, because I am particularly interested in better understanding 
the ways in which perpetrator groups desist from carrying out terrorist attacks, I initially 
focus my analysis on the groups’ trajectories following their peak year of terrorist 
violence. Additionally, this analysis excludes groups that are identified as perpetrators of 
attacks in the Global Terrorism Database, but have carried out terrorist attacks for fewer 
than 365 days. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, many of these groups have not fully 
engaged in terrorist violence for a variety of reasons, making them poor representatives 
of desistance from terrorist violence. Likewise, I exclude from the analysis perpetrator 
groups that began their engagement in terrorism fewer than five years before the end of 
the data series from this analysis. The effect of truncated data prevents me from 
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observing the natural trajectory of these groups, so I remove them from the analysis in an 
effort to minimize the potential bias created by groups whose engagement in terrorist 
violence is potentially artificially short-lived. Finally, I exclude from this analysis all 
groups whose peak year of activity is at the end of the series, which is to say those groups 
whose terrorist violence is still increasing. In addition to having no post-peak terrorist 
violence with which to build the model, these organizations are substantively interesting 
due to their lack of desistance and therefore appropriate for separate analysis (see Chapter 
4). These decisions yield a set of 632 GTD perpetrator groups to include in the trajectory 
analysis. 
 
Identifying the most appropriate trajectory model is an iterative process by which an 
analyst estimates an array of model specifications and determines which is the most 
appropriate based on several criteria. For the present analysis, I estimated a series of 
models ranging from four trajectories to seven trajectories, each defined by second-, 
third-, and fourth-order polynomials, for a total of twelve different models. The final 
model I selected for further analysis is specified with six discrete trajectories, each based 




Figure 5.1a Trajectories of collective decline from terrorist violence. 
 
Figure 5.1a shows the six trajectories estimated in the final model, which vary with 
respect to peak level of terrorist violence (point 0 on the x-axis) and shape, or rate of 
decline. Figures 5.1b and 5.1c display the same information, but separate those 
trajectories with relatively low peak levels of terrorist violence (1, 2, and 4) from those 
with relatively high peak levels of terrorist violence (3, 5, and 6), for clarity. The solid 
lines on these figures represent the six trajectories estimated by the model, and the dotted 
lines represent the average observed terrorist activity of the perpetrator organizations 
whose behavior best fits each trajectory. For example Trajectory 1 represents a pattern of 
terrorist activity that involves a very low peak level of activity (approximately two 

































activity. This pattern is the closest fit for 397 of the 632 (62.8%) perpetrator 
organizations analyzed. The dotted line for Trajectory 1 shows the average annual 
number of terrorist attacks for those groups for which this Trajectory 1 is the best fit of 
the six possible trajectories.  
 
Overall, three of the six trajectories (1, 2, and 3) represent relatively rapid declines from 
various peak levels of terrorist violence (low, moderate, and high, respectively). The 
other three trajectories (4, 5, and 6) represent patterns characterized by much slower rates 
of decline following moderate and high peak levels of activity. I will describe these 
patterns in greater detail below, but there are several important considerations regarding 
the model selection process worth noting. 
 
 
































Figure 5.1c Trajectories 3, 5, and 6 of collective decline from terrorist violence. 
 
Model Selection 
First, before estimating the 12 different permutations of trajectory models, I censored the 
annual data on number of terrorist attacks at 100. The purpose of this is to facilitate 
model estimation, as few organizations carried out exceptionally high numbers of attacks 
in a given year. These outliers make the maximum likelihood estimation computationally 
intensive and can result in a failure of the model to converge. Censoring the data at 100 
attacks impacts 28 perpetrator organizations that carried out more than 100 attacks at 
their peak. I converted a total of 61 observed values to 100. This retains sufficient 
heterogeneity among the groups’ upper levels of activity, and using the censored values 






























adaptation must be kept in mind while interpreting the results of the model. Figure 5.1d 
(Appendix II) shows the final model with the original observed values used to compute 
the trajectories. 
 
Second, relying solely on model fit statistics, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) failed to indicate a single, clearly preferable model. Figure 5.2 shows the BIC 
values for each of the 12 models, as they increased in complexity from three trajectory 
groups to seven trajectory groups, each estimated with quadratic, cubic, and quartic 
polynomials. With the exception of the quadratic models, the BIC values generally 
continued to improve as model complexity increased. 
 














































































Third, several of the distinct trajectories that emerge in the final model are robust, and 
persistently appear across the various model specifications. The posterior probabilities of 
group assignment—the average likelihood that a perpetrator organization is best aligned 
with one trajectory rather than the others—is greater than .9 in all cases and greater than 
.98 for 38 of the 66 trajectories estimated. Likewise, the Odds of Correct Classification 
(OCC) were routinely higher than the threshold established by Nagin (2005) of 5. In 
particular, the trajectories that best represent the activity of exceptionally small numbers 
of perpetrator organizations (e.g., Trajectory 5 and Trajectory 6) emerge in all variations 
of the model. Increasing the number of trajectories estimated from four to seven does not 
increase the likelihood that these atypical trajectories emerge; rather, it more precisely 
parses the most typical trajectories, like Trajectory 1, into more diverse patterns. For 
example the main difference between a model with five trajectories and the selected 
model with six trajectories is that the six-trajectory model includes Trajectory 2. Most of 
the 130 (20.6%) perpetrator groups for which Trajectory 2 is the best fit in the 6-
trajectory model would best fit into the equivalent of Trajectory 1 or Trajectory 3 in the 
5-trajectory model, where these two patterns were more similar to each other. Estimating 
Trajectory 2 as a distinct, sixth pattern of activity improves the overall fit of the model, 
but also better serves to distinguish a unique pattern of high peak terrorist activity and 
dramatic decline (Trajectory 3) from a pattern of low peak activity and rapid decline 
(Trajectory 1). In contrast, the 7-trajectory model extracts an additional pattern that 
essentially splits the difference between Trajectory 1 and Trajectory 2 in the 6-trajectory 
model. While it is statistically distinct enough to improve the model fit statistics, I posit 
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that the seventh trajectory does not represent a pattern that is substantively meaningful 
enough to warrant further investigation as a unique pattern of post-peak terrorist activity. 
 
Analysis of Individual Trajectories 
Each of the six trajectories in the final model represents a distinct pattern of post-peak 
terrorist violence. Using the posterior probabilities of group ‘membership’ estimated by 
the model I identify which trajectory best characterizes each perpetrator organization. In 
the final model, the average posterior probabilities are greater than .93 for all six 
trajectories. Table 5.1 shows descriptive profiles of each trajectory class and its 
corresponding perpetrator organizations. The attributes presented in Table 5.1 include the 
number of perpetrator organization for which each trajectory is the best approximation of 
post-peak activity, as well as the average, minimum, and maximum posterior 
probabilities of trajectory group membership produced by the trajectory model. This 
provides an estimate of the likelihood that each perpetrator group is best represented by a 
particular trajectory, relative to the other five trajectories. Table 5.1 also shows 
information about the span of terrorist violence (in years) among the perpetrator groups 
most closely aligned with each trajectory, including the total number of years for which 
the perpetrator groups actively carried out terrorist attacks and the number of years for 
which they carried out terrorist attacks prior to reaching their peak level of terrorist 
violence, as well as the year they began engaging in terrorist violence, and the year their 


















Number of Perpetrator Organizations (%)  397 (62.8)  130 (20.6)  36 (5.7)  42 (6.6)  17 (2.7)  10 (1.6) 
Average Posterior Probability  
of Trajectory Group Membership 
0.99  0.95  0.99  0.97  1.00  1.00 
Minimum Posterior Probability  
of Trajectory Group Membership 
0.59  0.58  0.88  0.59  1.00  1.00 
Maximum Posterior Probability  
of Trajectory Group Membership 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Average Total Years of Terrorist Violence   6  10  14  19  24  22 
Minimum Total Years  
of Terrorist Violence  
1  1  2  2  7  4 
Maximum Total Years  
of Terrorist Violence  
43  43  42  43  39  41 
Average Pre‐Peak Years  
of Terrorist Violence 
2  4  7  7  9  10 
Minimum Pre‐Peak Years  
of Terrorist Violence  
0  0  0  0  0  2 
Maximum Pre‐Peak Years  
of Terrorist Violence 
21  37  23  32  30  21 
Average Year of Onset  
of Terrorist Violence  
1989  1985  1982  1989  1985  1989 
Average Peak Year of Terrorist Violence   1991  1989  1989  1995  1994  1999 
Total Number of Terrorist Attacks  2353  4265  9539  3372  13024  15929 
Total Number of Fatalities  
from Terrorist Attacks 
7780  8831  22074  12311  40160  39030 
Average Number of Terrorist Attacks  
at Peak (Uncensored) 
2.87  13.93  84.94  18.52  135.82  286.00 
Average Number of Terrorist Attacks  
Two Years Post‐Peak (Uncensored) 
0.34  1.95  8.17  3.03  58.59  71.83 
Average Number of Terrorist Attacks  
Five Years Post‐Peak (Uncensored) 
0.10  0.70  0.79  3.69  13.18  74.80 
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Finally, Table 5.1 shows statistics about the perpetrator groups’ terrorist activity 
including the total number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks, the 
average number of terrorist attacks carried out during the peak year of terrorist violence, 
and indicators of the perpetrator groups’ rate of decline two years, and five years after 
their peak year of terrorist violence. For the remainder of this chapter, I will describe 
each of the trajectories in detail, using the statistics presented in Table 5.1 as well as 
individual graphs of each trajectory. 
 
Trajectory 1: Low Peak and Rapid Decline 
In Figure 5.3 the colored trend lines represent the post-peak trajectories of terrorist 
violence by individual perpetrator organizations, and the black curve represents the 
prediction line estimated by the model for each trajectory classification. The main 
purpose of these graphs is not to identify each specific perpetrator organization’s 
trajectory, but rather to give an overall sense of the trajectory estimated by the model and 
the individual organizations’ variation from that predicted pattern. Erosheva, Matsueda, 
and Telesca (2014) review the literature on latent group trajectory analysis and note that 
researchers using these statistical techniques on individual-level data almost never 
examine the degree of individual variation around the group mean. They suggest that, in 
fact, patterns of activity among individuals are highly variable around group means, 
indicating that they adhere to a continuous, common distribution rather than a distribution 
marked by discrete, distinctive groups. By examining the variation of individual group 




Figure 5.3 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 1 
 
Of the six trajectories, Trajectory 1 provides the best approximation of post-peak terrorist 
violence for the largest number of perpetrator organizations. Shown in Figure 5.3, more 
than half (62.8%) of the perpetrator organizations are best characterized by this pattern— 
a relatively low peak number of terrorist attacks, followed by a rapid decline to a point of 
minimal activity for the remainder of the series. The average posterior probability of 
group membership for the perpetrator organizations represented by Trajectory 1 is very 
high, at 0.99. Among these perpetrator organizations, for those with the lowest posterior 
probability of being characterized by the low peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 1 the 
























The peak number of terrorist attacks for perpetrator groups represented by Trajectory 1 
ranges from one (130 organizations) to 11 (two organizations: the East Asia Anti-
Japanese Armed Front, from Japan, and Union Guerra Blanca (UGB), from El Salvador). 
The total number of years for which these organizations engaged in terrorist attacks 
ranges from one to 43, though the 19 organizations whose terrorist violence spans several 
decades maintained lengthy periods of inactivity or minimal terrorist activity. Several of 
these perpetrator organizations are not entrenched terrorist organizations, but instead 
established political parties, including the Communist Party of India- Marxist, the 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, and the Pakistani People’s Party. The 397 
perpetrator organizations represented by the low peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 1 
engaged in terrorist violence for an average of six years total, and for an average of two 
years prior to reaching their peak numbers of terrorist attacks. For 245 of the 397 
perpetrator organizations (61.7%), the first year of engagement in terrorist violence was 
the peak year of engagement in terrorist violence. 
 
Although Trajectory 1 represents the largest number of perpetrator organizations, their 
relatively low peak and rapid decline yields an overall infrequency and short duration of 
the organizations’ terrorist activity. This means that they comprise the fewest terrorist 
attacks (2,353) and fatalities from terrorist attacks (7,780) of all of the trajectory 
classifications. On average, the perpetrator organizations best characterized by a low 
peak and rapid decline carried out a total of 5.9 terrorist attacks, and caused an average of 
19.7 fatalities. Although these perpetrator organizations share in common a similar 
overall trajectory of post-peak activity, they are diverse in the frequency and especially 
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the lethality of their terrorist violence. The total number of deaths caused by their terrorist 
attacks ranges from zero (111 organizations) to 582, with 19 organizations causing more 
than 100 total deaths. 
 
Due to the relatively low impact of their terrorist activity, many of the organizations 
represented by the low peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 1 are obscure, and have 
unfamiliar names such as “Avengers of the Infants,” “Forest Brothers,” and  “Comite 
d'Action Viticole” (CAV; Committee for Viticultural Action)—a “shadowy organization 
with an estimated 1,000 members… who believe the French government is not doing 
enough to protect small wine producers from globalization” (Frank, 2006, p. 1). Members 
of CAV have been engaging in occasional violent and non-violent actions since 1998, 
motivated by the economic struggle facing France’s winemakers. 
 
Some of the other perpetrator organizations best characterized by a low peak and rapid 
decline also illustrate the ways in which terrorism is but one strategy for addressing 
perceived grievances or attempting to achieve political goals. In addition to the political 
parties referenced above in the context of organizations with sporadic and rare, but long-
term engagement in terrorist violence, there are many other political parties with even 
more tenuous involvement in terrorist violence in that their attacks and their trajectories 
are extremely short. Organizations like the Likud Party in Israel, the Jamaica Labor Party, 
and the al Da’wah Party, a Shi’a political party in Iraq, are each attributed responsibility 
for two or three terrorist attacks, despite having existed as political parties for decades. In 
contrast, other perpetrator organizations best characterized by a low peak and rapid rate 
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of decline, such as the Cali and Medellin drug cartels operating in Colombia, engage in a 
wide variety of illegal activity—including violent activity—though most of their violent 
attacks take place in the context of the drug trade and few satisfy the definitional criteria 
for inclusion in the Global Terrorism Database. 
 
Several of the organizations best characterized by the low peak and rapid decline of 
Trajectory 1 highlight limitations of event-level data on terrorist organizations. For 
example, although the GTD spans more than four decades, providing a comprehensive set 
of data on terrorist violence over time, naturally there are organizations that began 
engaging in terrorism before the GTD’s 1970 start date. For example, the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) was founded in 1865 in the United States, and came to be known as one of 
America’s first terrorist groups (Bartoletti, 2010; Bond, 1997). By 1970, however, the 
KKK was a shadow of its former strength and since then it has been attributed 
responsibility for 23 terrorist attacks over the span of 43 years. Given the KKK’s lengthy 
history, Trajectory 1’s low peak and rapid decline is likely a poor representation of the 
group’s actual decline in terrorist violence. 
 
Trajectory 1 Case Study: People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)  
The first case I selected for further investigation is the People’s Liberation Organization 
of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The PLOTE was one of five main Tamil independence 
organizations in Sri Lanka. It emerged in 1979, founded by Uma Maheswaran, a former 
member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada, 1992). A key point of conflict between the PLOTE and the LTTE was 
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the LTTE’s use of guerrilla tactics, which the PLOTE did not adopt. Nearly all of the 
violence the PLOTE engaged in was inter-group feuding with the LTTE, which would 
not qualify for inclusion in the GTD (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1992; 
Reuters, 1989). In 1987, following extensive violent conflict with the LTTE, the Sri 
Lankan and Indian governments entered into an agreement with several Tamil 
organizations, including the PLOTE. At that time the group continued fighting the LTTE, 
but in cooperation with the Indian military (Johnson, 1987). Since then, the PLOTE has 
claimed to be active only as a political group (Daily Mirror, 2009). 
 
 


























As Figure 5.4 shows, the PLOTE is responsible for four attacks in the GTD: one in 1988 
(an incendiary attack targeting a bus company), two in 1989 (an attack against the Sri 
Lankan military that killed 12, and the kidnapping of Batticaloa Deputy Municipal 
Commissioner), and in 1999 the group was suspected of involvement in an attack in 
which two Tamil politicians—members of a rival group—were killed. In fact, the PLOTE 
appears in the GTD as the target of at least three times as many attacks. Despite the fact 
that the PLOTE was active in an extremely violent context, the fact that this perpetrator 
organization was generally opposed to guerrilla tactics, that its engagement in violence 
was almost entirely restricted to clashes with rival militant groups, and that it ultimately 
fought in cooperation with the government, makes it problematic to conceive of PLOTE 
as a typical terrorist organization with a clear trajectory of terrorist violence. Indeed, the 
PLOTE is perhaps more appropriately identified as an organization that has political 
goals, but with few exceptions its chosen means for achieving those goals generally do 
not involve violence directed at the public or the government.  
 
I selected the PLOTE for further investigation because the organization represents several 
characteristics relevant to desistance from terrorism and the study of desistance from 
terrorism. The PLOTE existed in the context of an extremely volatile conflict between the 
Sri Lankan government and several militant groups (United Nations, 2011). Despite this, 
and despite its inclusion in the GTD as a perpetrator group, the PLOTE did not carry out 
large numbers of attacks, either against government or civilian targets. While its 
trajectory classification characterizes the PLOTE as an organization with a low peak and 
a rapid decline, the PLOTE was responsible for attacks over the span of a decade 
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following its peak year of activity. In addition, the way in which the PLOTE desisted 
from terrorism does not appear to be consistent with many of the typical explanations 
advanced by theorists. It was not overwhelmed by government response or law 
enforcement, it was not successful in achieving its goals or resolving its grievances, and it 
was not made stronger by opposition, either from the state or other militant groups. 
Indeed, it appears that the PLOTE desisted from terrorist violence because it lacked 
commitment to the use of terrorist violence in the first place. 
 
Trajectory 1 Case Study: Aum Shinrikyo 
Another organization characterized by the low peak number of attacks and rapid decline 
of Trajectory 1 is Aum Shinrikyo, based primarily in Japan. Aum Shinrikyo is an 
apocalyptic cult that was established in 1987 by a charismatic spiritual leader, Shoko 
Asahara (Fletcher, 2012; US Department of State, 2015b). Aum Shinrikyo is best known 
for its sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 that killed 13 and injured at least 
5,500. However, the group carried out a number of chemical and biological attacks as 
early as 1990, with varying degrees of success. As Figure 5.5 illustrates, the 
organization’s terrorist violence peaked and ended in 1995 with five attacks, including 
two prior to the subway attack on March 20, the attempted assassination of the chief of 
the National Police Agency ten days later (The Japan Times, 1998), and a parcel bomb 
that was sent to the governor of Tokyo in May (Langeland & Yamamura, 2012). Also in 
May 1995, police arrested Asahara for his role in planning the subway attack. He was 
convicted and sentenced to death in 2004. In 2010 and 2011 other members of Aum 
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Shinrikyo were also sentenced to death for their involvement in various attacks 
(Langeland & Yamamura, 2012; US Department of State, 2015b). 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Aum Shinrikyo 
 
Although Aum Shinrikyo has not carried out any terrorist attacks since May 1995, the 
United States Department of State designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) in 1997 (US Department of State, 2015b). Since then, somewhat 
conflicting reports indicate that the organization has remained active in various ways 
(Fletcher, 2012; Langeland & Yamamura, 2012; Onishi, 2004; US Department of State, 
2015b). In 1999, and again in 2004 when Asahara was sentenced to death, the group 
apologized for the 1995 attack (Langeland & Yamamura, 2012; Onishi, 2004). In 2000 
Aum Shinrikyo changed its name to Aelph and renounced violence and Asahara’s 
























against the Imperial Palace in Japan in an attempt to free Asahara from prison (Fletcher, 
2012; US Department of State, 2015b). In either 2003 (Fletcher, 2012) or 2007 
(Langeland & Yamamura, 2012) Aelph reportedly split into two groups due to internal 
disputes regarding strategy. In 2012, a bomb threat was made via email against a Japan 
Airlines flight, demanding the release of Asahara (US Department of State, 2015b; 
Westlake, 2012).  
 
As of 2015, the assessment of the US Department of State regarding Aum Shinrikyo is 
“Although AUM has not conducted a terrorist attack since 1995, concerns remain 
regarding its continued adherence to the violent teachings of Asahara” (US Department 
of State, 2015b, p. 340). After Asahara’s conviction, Japanese authorities continued to 
monitor the organization’s activity in accordance with surveillance laws established in 
the wake of the 1995 attack, and renewed in 2003 (Onishi, 2004). Based on the sequence 
of events following the organization’s most recent terrorist attacks in 1995, it is 
somewhat difficult to characterize its desistance from terrorism. Japanese authorities 
believe that at least some members of Aum Shinrikyo remain committed to violence, and 
the attempts of the group’s leadership to improve its image are superficial (Fletcher, 
2012; Onishi, 2004). Nonetheless, due to incompetence, lack of organizational cohesion 
and support, or effective policing, no terrorist attacks have come to fruition.  
 
I selected Aum Shinrikyo for further analysis because, unlike the PLOTE, Aum existed in 
an environment that experienced few terrorist attacks, the group held especially 
idiosyncratic goals, and it was notably characterized by a charismatic leader who was 
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ultimately incarcerated. While Aum was not successful at carrying out terrorist attacks 
after 1995, the conviction of Asahara in some ways promoted the group’s continued 
efforts to carry out terrorist attacks, simply due to their interest in using the threat of 
violence to coerce authorities to release him from prison. This illustrates the possibility 
that capturing a key leader may in fact produce a greater motivation to carry out attacks 
in the interest of group preservation. 
 
Consistent with the pattern represented by Trajectory 1, Aum Shinrikyo’s involvement in 
terrorism is characterized by a relatively low peak number of attacks and a clearly rapid 
rate of decline. Aum differs from PLOTE in that the group was committed to carrying out 
attacks, yet failed in spite of the will to make repeated attempts, while PLOTE’s interest 
in engaging in terrorist violence was certainly an exception to their usual repertoire of 
clashing with other militant groups. 
 
Trajectory 2: Moderate Peak and Rapid Decline 
Figure 5.6 shows that the shape of Trajectory 2 closely resembles that of Trajectory 1, 
although with a much higher average peak number of terrorist attacks (13.93 compared to 
2.87). It is similarly characterized by a rapid decline to a minimal number of attacks 
following the perpetrator organizations’ peak level of terrorist violence. This pattern, a 
moderate peak and rapid decline, is the best representation for 130 of the perpetrator 
organizations analyzed (20.6%). The peak number of terrorist attacks among perpetrator 
groups best characterized by the moderate peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2 ranges 
from four attacks (six organizations) to 42 attacks (one organization). Like organizations 
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characterized by the low peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 1, the average posterior 
probability of Trajectory 2 classification is high (0.95). For those individual organizations 
for which the posterior probability of membership to Trajectory 2 (moderate peak and 
rapid decline) is lower, the next best alternative classification is either Trajectory 1 (low 
peak and rapid decline) or Trajectory 4 (moderate peak and slow decline). 
 
Given higher peak levels of terrorist violence, the perpetrator organizations best 
represented by Trajectory 2 do appear to maintain engagement in terrorist violence for 
somewhat longer than those organizations best represented by the low peak and rapid 
decline of Trajectory 1. Two years following the peak of their terrorist violence, the 
organizations best represented by the moderate peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2 
carried out an average of 1.95 terrorist attacks annually, compared to an average of .36 
attacks carried out by the perpetrator organizations best characterized by the low peak 




Figure 5.6 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 2 
 
Like the perpetrator organizations characterized by a low peak and rapid decline, the 
perpetrator organizations characterized by a moderate peak and rapid decline carried out 
terrorist attacks for as few as 1 or as many as 43 years. Specifically, eight different 
organizations were actively engaged in terrorist violence for one year, and one 
organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) carried out 161 
terrorist attacks—the most of any organization represented by Trajectory 2— over a 
period of 43 years. However, unlike the groups best characterized by Trajectory 1’s low 
peak and rapid decline, the average time span of terrorist violence among Trajectory 2 
perpetrator organizations was somewhat longer, at 10 years, compared to six. Likewise, 

























among organizations best characterized by the moderate peak and rapid decline of 
Trajectory 2—four years, rather than two. 
 
Despite the fact that the number of perpetrator groups represented by a moderate peak 
and rapid decline (Trajectory 2) is less than one-third of the number of perpetrator groups 
represented by a low peak and rapid decline (Trajectory 1), these differences in the 
frequency and time span of terrorist attacks produced nearly twice as many total attacks 
among Trajectory 2 perpetrator organizations (180%), compared to the Trajectory 1 
perpetrator organizations. Although the difference is not as large, the perpetrator 
organizations best characterized by the moderate peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2 
were also responsible for 13.5 percent more fatalities than the organizations represented 
by the low peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 1. The specific number of fatalities 
caused by perpetrator organizations best represented by Trajectory 2 ranged from zero 
(10 organizations) to 654 (by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist). 
 
The perpetrator organizations best represented by Trajectory 2’s moderate peak and rapid 
decline include several well-known historical terrorist organizations, including both the 
Baader-Meinhof Group and its successor the Red Army Faction (RAF) from Germany, as 
well as the Weather Underground from the United States. In addition, many of the 
perpetrator groups that are best characterized by Trajectory 2 were linked to major 
terrorist conflicts, but were not necessarily the primary actors. These include, for 
example, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), the Irish People’s Liberation 
Organization (IPLO), the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), and the Official Irish 
 92
Republican Army (OIRA), all of which were involved in “The Troubles” in Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain. Likewise, al-Fatah, Black September, the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Force 17, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), are all factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
 
Trajectory 2 Case Study: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
The PFLP’s first recorded attacks in the GTD occurred in 1970; however, the 
organization emerged from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967 following the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and became the second largest faction of the PLO in 1968 
(BBC News, 2014; US Department of State, 2015b). In the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
PFLP carried out a number of high profile, ‘spectacular,’ hijackings of international 
airliners aimed at drawing the attention of the global community to the Palestinian cause, 
including a series of coordinated attacks in 1970 known as the “Black September” 
hijackings (Becker, 2014, p. 92). Early in its existence, several other groups emerged 
from the PFLP due to internal conflict regarding politics and strategy. These include the 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), which later changed 
its name to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC); and the Palestinian 




Figure 5.7 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
 
From 1970 to 2013, the PFLP averaged 3.7 attacks per year, ranging from zero to a peak 
of 25 in 2008. Figure 5.7 indicates that the frequency of its attacks varied considerably, 
declining somewhat in the 1980s and 1990s when the strength of the secular, Marxist-
Leninist organization was undermined by decline of the Soviet Union. While the PFLP 
opposed the 1993 Oslo peace agreement, it began engaging in Palestinian politics in 1999 
(BBC News, 2014). The group’s militant wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, continued 
to carry out terrorist attacks, claiming responsibility for 10 suicide bombings between 
2001 and 2004, during the Second Intifada. However, unlike the sensational, well-
orchestrated hijackings of the 1960s and 1970s, more than half of all PFLP attacks in the 
21st century (59.3%) involved rockets, missiles, or mortars fired at Israeli cities near the 




















allowed the PFLP to increase the number of attacks they carried out, despite the impact 
being qualitatively different. Rather than commanding worldwide attention, the PFLP has 
primarily been contributing to an atmosphere of fear in Israeli communities. 
 
I selected the PFLP for further investigation because it represents several key issues 
related to desistance from terrorism. Notably, the PFLP is best represented by the 
moderate peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2 because of its sharp decline in terrorist 
violence from a peak of 25 attacks in 2008, to one in 2009, and zero in 2010. However, 
21 of the 25 attacks in its peak year were rocket attacks which, compared to the high-
profile hijackings of the 1970s represent a desistance from one type of tactic in favor of 
another that is not captured by the statistical analysis. Furthermore, the frequency of 
PFLP attacks has declined to zero several times throughout its history, and, as it has in 
the past, the group resumed its use of violence in 2011 and 2012. Although this illustrates 
the challenge of operationalizing desistance, especially given periods of intermittency, in 
general it is clear that the impact of the PFLP has declined considerably. 
 
Trajectory 2 Case Study: Baader-Meinhof Group & Red Army Faction (RAF) 
The Baader-Meinhof Group and the Red Army Faction are both characterized by a 
moderate peak number of attacks and rapid decline. However, it is important to note that 
these are two distinct generations of the same organization (Merkl, 1995). Formed in 
West Germany in 1970 by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Ulrike Meinhof, the 
group originally called itself the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF; Red Army Faction) while 
the media and authorities referred to it as the Baader-Meinhof gang. The GTD uses 
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“Baader-Meinhof Group” to represent the first generation and “Red Army Faction” to 
represent the second generation.  
 
Figure 5.8 Baader-Meinhof Group & Red Army Faction (RAF) 
 
The Baader-Meinhof group grew out of the West German anti-Vietnam war movement 
and a history of militant socialist groups. It espoused an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, 
communist ideology, opposing the United States and its involvement in Vietnam, and 
supporting the Palestinian cause (Varon, 2004). Frustrated by an inability to mobilize the 
working class, the founders focused their efforts on anti-imperialism on an international 
level. For two years, the Baader-Meinhof group carried out armed assaults and bombings 
in West Germany against business, government, police, and US military targets that they 
believed represented the establishment. In June 1972, Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and 






















associates carried out 47 attacks in West Germany, Italy, France, and Switzerland, 
primarily in attempt to negotiate the release of the group’s leadership from prison (BBC 
News, 2007). The Baader-Meinhof group’s terrorist violence peaked in 1976 when it 
carried out 22 attacks; however, it was still unsuccessful in securing the release of 
Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and other members of the group. That same year, Meinhof 
committed suicide in prison and the others were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 
In October 1977, they committed suicide as well, effectively ending the entity known as 
the Baader-Meinhof group (BBC News, 2007). 
 
The remaining RAF members continued to carry out terrorist attacks, though Merkl 
(1995) argues that they lacked the ideological focus of the Baader-Meinhof gang. 
Nonetheless, between 1977 and 1991 they were responsible for 68 attacks, peaking in 
1985 with 21 attacks and declining to zero within two years, followed by a minor 
resurgence. Not unlike the PFLP and the fall of the Soviet Union, the RAF was weakened 
by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (BBC News, 2007). In 1992 the few remaining 
RAF members announced that they were abandoning violence; the group announced its 
dissolution on April 20, 1998, indicating that their cause was “a dead end” (Cowell, 1998, 
p. 9). 
 
The use of terrorism by the RAF as a tool to try and secure the release of the group’s 
imprisoned leaders suggests, like the experience of Aum Shinrikyo, that capturing key 
leaders can have a complex impact on the activity of the remaining group members. In 
one sense, the goal of securing the release of the leaders further motivated the ongoing 
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use of violence. However, the absence of the leaders made it difficult for the group to 
maintain a coherent political objective that was effectively transmitted to future 
generations (Crenshaw, 1991; Merkl, 1995). Furthermore, although both of these 
organizations declined fairly rapidly following their peak year of activity, the link 
between them represents an artifact of the data that obscures the fact that, combined, they 
engaged in fairly widespread terrorist violence for more than two decades. 
 
Trajectory 3: High Peak and Rapid Decline 
 
Trajectory 3 is the last of the three rapidly declining trajectories, and the one with the 
highest peak number of terrorist attacks. Trajectory 3’s high peak and rapid decline is the 
best approximation for 36 of the 632 perpetrator organizations analyzed (5.7%), which 
appear fairly tightly clustered together in Figure 5.9. These perpetrator organizations 
have a very high average probability of being classified as Trajectory 3 organizations, at 
0.99, with Trajectory 2 (moderate peak and rapid decline) or Trajectory 4 (moderate peak 
and slow decline) representing the best alternative for the four organizations whose 




Figure 5.9 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 3 
 
Like Trajectory 1, which is characterized by a low peak number of attacks, and 
Trajectory 2, which is characterized by a moderate peak number of attacks, Trajectory 3 
is characterized by a sharp pattern of declining terrorist violence following the peak. 
However, it is distinct in that the average peak number of attacks among groups best 
represented by Trajectory 3 is extremely high at 84.9—6.1 times as high as the average 
peak number of attacks for Trajectory 2 organizations, and 29.6 times as high as the 
average peak number of attacks for Trajectory 1 organizations. The peak number of 
terrorist attacks for perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 3 ranges 
from 24 (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) in Puerto Rico) to 492 



























In addition to extremely high peak levels of terrorist violence, the 36 perpetrator 
organizations best represented by Trajectory 3 also carry out terrorist attacks for longer 
spans of time—14 years on average, with an average of 7 years of involvement in 
terrorist violence prior to reaching a peak number of attacks. Although the average 
number of terrorist attacks among Trajectory 3 perpetrator organizations two years 
following the peak is still more than four times as many as the average number of 
terrorist attacks among the perpetrator organizations best characterized by the moderate 
peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2, the rate of decline among the perpetrator 
organizations best characterized by Trajectory 3 is so steep that by five years after the 
peak, the average number of terrorist attacks is comparably low for both trajectory classes 
(0.70 for Trajectory 2 and 0.79 for Trajectory 3). Collectively, the 36 perpetrator 
organizations represented by the high peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 3 were 
responsible for 9,539 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 22,074 deaths—more than twice 
as many terrorist attacks and deaths as the 130 perpetrator organizations represented by 
the moderate peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 2. 
  
For counterterrorism policymakers the perpetrator organizations characterized by 
Trajectory 3 appear to represent a highly desirable outcome in that fully engaged, highly 
active terrorist groups rapidly desist from terrorist violence within a relatively short time 
frame. This certainly warrants further investigation into the mechanisms for these 
apparent counterterrorism success stories, as well as any contextual information that 
might reveal that this finding is misleading. For example, several of the organizations 
aligned with Trajectory 3’s high peak and rapid decline are those that converted from 
 100
primarily militant groups into primarily political organizations. These include the African 
National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the FMLN in El Salvador, and even the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) whose decline in direct attribution of 
responsibility for terrorist attacks loosely coincides with the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords.  
 
In contrast, however, several of the named organizations best represented by Trajectory 3 
are characterized by a sharp decline not because they desisted from terrorism, but because 
they changed their name. Examples of this include Dev Sol in Turkey, which changed its 
name to Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which 
changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) in Algeria, which changed its name to al Qa’ida in the 
Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), and Tawhid and Jihad, which was the original 
name of the group that would later become al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and subsequently 
evolve into Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and 
ultimately Islamic State (IS). In many cases, not only did these name changes not signal 
the death of the organization or a real decline in their terrorist activity, but actually the 
opposite. The complex evolution of organizational dynamics, personnel, geography, and 
naming conventions proves to be one of the most challenging aspects of studying 
collective desistance among perpetrators of terrorism. 
 
Trajectory 3 Case Study: Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) 
The FMLN formed in 1980 as an alliance of five existing leftist revolutionary 
organizations engaged in the Salvadoran Civil War (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
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2015). Rather than undergoing a gradual process of group formation and radicalization, 
the FMLN carried out 159 attacks during its first year of existence, shown in Figure 5.10. 
Between 1980 and 1991, the organization was extraordinarily and consistently active, 
averaging 278.4 terrorist attacks per year, most frequently targeting the Salvadoran 
military (36.4%), utilities infrastructure (27.6%), and private citizens and property 
(11.0%). In 1992, only eight attacks were attributed to the FLMN, and since then the 
organization has not carried out any terrorist attacks. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
 
Despite the fact that the Salvadoran Civil War killed as many as 70,000 people, in terms 
of political change the FMLN was ultimately successful (Farah, 1993). Rather than 
























electoral politics as part of the ceasefire and peace agreement that ended the Civil War in 
1992. Two observations are important. First, during the war agents of the Salvadoran 
government—security forces, the military, and affiliated “death squads”—carried out 
thousands of acts of extrajudicial executions, torture, and disappearances (United Nations 
Security Council, 1993, p. IV–D). In fact, the United Nations Commission on the Truth 
for El Salvador estimates that the United States-backed Salvadoran government bears 
responsibility for 85 percent of the 22,000 atrocities reportedly committed during the 
Civil War, and the FMLN was responsible for the other 15 percent (Gugliotta & Farah, 
1993; United Nations Security Council, 1993). In this context, the organization’s attacks 
on civilian targets coincided with attacks on the military that many would consider acts of 
insurgency rather than terrorism (Abrahms, 2012; Asal, De La Calle, Findley, & Young, 
2012; Chenoweth, 2012; de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011; Sandler, 2014; Schmid & 
Jongman, 2005). Jones and Libicki (2008) point out that the injustices carried out by the 
Salvadoran state specifically motivated many to join the ranks of the FMLN. 
 
Second, the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords, which brought an end to the conflict, were 
brokered by the United Nations at a time when the FMLN saw its outside support begin 
to wane with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Jones and Libicki (2008) argue 
that a peaceful transition to politics was only possible in El Salvador because the war was 
at a military stalemate, and the FMLN had narrowly-defined, policy-oriented goals, 
including democracy, an end to repressive authoritarian rule and human rights abuses, 
and reallocation of land rights. The experience of the FMLN illustrates a case of 
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genuinely stark collective desistance from terrorism that reflects real-world events rather 
than artifacts of data structure or analytical methods. 
 
Trajectory 3 Case Study: Tawhid and Jihad & Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
In contrast to the FMLN, two organizations characterized by the steep decline in terrorist 
activity did not have positive outcomes. Both Tawhid and Jihad and the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI) were precursors to what has been referred to since 2014 as the Islamic State 
(Crenshaw, 2015). The organization began to form in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
initially led Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and 
operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Jordan (BBC News, 2004; Hafez, 2007; Moghadam, 
2008; Stewart, 2014). Its first terrorist attack was the assassination of a US diplomat in 
Jordan in October 2002. Beginning the following year the group began carrying out 
kidnappings and devastating suicide bombings aimed primarily at civilian targets, but 
also against Iraqi and coalition security forces. The frequency of attacks carried out by 
Tawhid and Jihad is shown in Figure 5.11. Between 2003 and October 2004, Tawhid and 
Jihad carried out 50 attacks in Iraq, killing 842 people and wounding 1,688. These attacks 
included numerous coordinated bombings of multiple targets at the same time.  
 
According to the GTD, 2004 was the peak year of terrorist activity for Tawhid and Jihad; 
it carried out 47 attacks through October of that year and none the following year, which 
is why it is best characterized by Trajectory 3. However, in reality the organization 
evolved and expanded rather than declined. In October 2004, Zarqawi pledged his 
group’s allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al Qa’ida, and changed the organization’s name 
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to al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) (Crenshaw, 2015; Pincus, 2004). In the trajectory analysis, 
AQI is estimated to follow a pattern most like Trajectory 6, characterized by an 
extremely high peak number of terrorist attacks followed by a very gradual post-peak 
decline. AQI’s activity is presented in Figure 5.11 for comparison. Indeed, AQI killed 
4,141 people in 636 terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2013, including 304 attacks 
during its peak year in 2012. Its activity declined to 79 attacks in 2013, the last year of 
the data series. Given no additional data beyond 2013, the model estimates are based on 
the pattern of known data. However, according to the GTD, AQI ceased its involvement 
in terrorism entirely as of April 2013.  
 
 




























Once again, however, the event data fail to accommodate the complex reality of this 
organization for the purpose of group-level analysis. In June 2006, Zarqawi was killed by 
a US airstrike and his successor, Abu Ayub al-Masri, sought to rebrand the organization 
by forming an alliance between AQI and several smaller Iraqi Sunni militant groups 
(Crenshaw, 2015; Fishman, 2006). The new group was called the Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI) and led by Abdallah bin Rashid al-Baghdadi (also known as Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi). Beginning in 2007, the names ISI and AQI were both used to refer to the 
activity of this group. Because ISI technically referred to the broader umbrella 
organization that included other groups, the two names are not precisely synonymous. As 
Figure 5.11 illustrates, ISI was attributed responsibility for 146 terrorist attacks and 1,738 
deaths between 2007 and 2011, peaking in 2009 with 57 attacks before declining to four 
attacks in 2011, and zero since then. 
 
Rather than desisting from terrorism, the organization continued to evolve. In April 2010 
al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid, and succeeded by a new 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Crenshaw, 2015; Roggio, 2010a). The names ISI and AQI 
were discontinued in 2013 in favor of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to 
signal its expansion into Syria, which coincided with considerable conflict both within 
the group and with core al Qa’ida (Crenshaw, 2015). In June 2014, al-Baghdadi changed 
the group’s name to the Islamic State to indicate his intention of establishing a global 
caliphate (Al Jazeera, 2014; Dearden, 2014). Numerous Salafi jihadi organizations on 
several continents have since pledged support or allegiance to al-Baghdadi’s organization 
while maintaining independent operations (IntelCenter, 2015). These include several 
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major actors such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. Reports are mixed regarding whether or not al 
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most powerful member of the core al 
Qa’ida network, has broken ties with al Qa’ida to ally itself to the Islamic State 
(Browning, 2015). 
 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the complex evolution of this group, it is alive and well 
as of the conclusion of this study. In 2014 and 2015 it carried out some of the most high 
profile, deadliest terrorist attacks that have happened since GTD collection began. While 
the Islamic State and its constituent groups present a worst case scenario for many 
reasons—least of which is the challenge for studying collective desistance from 
terrorism—it remains true that the name changes, organizational splits, and fluid 
allegiances they illustrate are the rule rather than the exception among perpetrator 
organizations (E. Miller, 2012b, 2014).  
 
Not unlike the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Red Army Faction, this case raises 
important questions about how to best address these challenges in the context of studying 
organizational desistance. Specifically, what’s in a name? Where are the edges of an 
organization, especially one as complex as the Islamic State? How do these boundaries 
shift over time as leadership and membership varies in solidarity and cohesiveness? 
Should a systematic, quantitative analysis of perpetrator organizations begin and end with 
groups that evolve through name changes alone, or take into account the activity of a 
broader network of affiliates and allies? While it may seem relatively straightforward to 
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consolidate the activity of a group like the Islamic State into a single time series, in 
reality it is quite difficult to construct a dataset that accurately captures the complex 
evolution of the entity that underlies discrete name changes. Moreover, conducting the 
necessary research to accurately codify the evolution of hundreds of entity names based 
on event-level data is not only extremely resource-intensive, but in some cases 
impossible due to poor record keeping and reporting among clandestine groups. What are 
the implications of the assumptions researchers make in the absence of clear information 
about how these entity names relate to each other? These are difficult questions that must 
be considered in order for quantitative analysis to best inform theory and policy 
development regarding collective desistance from terrorism. 
 
 
Trajectory 4: Moderate Peak and Slow Decline 
 
Shown in Figure 5.12, Trajectory 4 is the first of three trajectories that represent a pattern 
of gradual or slow decline following a moderate peak number of attacks. This is the best 
representation of post-peak terrorist violence for 42 perpetrator organizations (6.6%). 
Although they appear to be somewhat poorly aligned to the model, note that the shorter 
scale of the Y-axis makes the variation in individual trajectories more visible than it is for 
the high peak and rapid decline of Trajectory 3 shown in Figure 5.9. The perpetrator 
groups best represented by the moderate peak and slow decline of Trajectory 4 have a 
very high average posterior probability of classification to Trajectory 4, at 0.97. The 
perpetrator organizations that are classified as Trajectory 4 organizations, but have the 
lowest posterior probability of being characterized by Trajectory 4’s moderate peak and 
slow decline are most likely to be classified as Trajectory 2 (moderate peak and rapid 
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Figure 5.12 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 4 
 
On average, the 42 perpetrator organizations best represented by the moderate peak and 
slow decline of Trajectory 4 carried out 18.52 terrorist attacks during their peak year of 
terrorist violence. This is most similar to the peak level of violence for perpetrator 
organizations best represented by Trajectory 2 (13.93 attacks). The key distinction 
between Trajectory 2 and Trajectory 4 is the much longer period of terrorist violence 
characterized by Trajectory 4, compared to Trajectory 2’s rapid decline. Two years after 
their peak year of terrorist violence, Trajectory 4 perpetrator organizations continued to 


























organizations. Five years after their peak year of terrorist violence at, least 32 of the 42 
Trajectory 4 perpetrator organizations (76.19%) persist, with an even higher average of 
3.69 terrorist attacks per year, compared to 0.70 attacks among perpetrator organizations 
best represented by the rapid decline of Trajectory 2. In total, the 42 perpetrator 
organizations best represented by Trajectory 4 carried out 3,372 terrorist attacks, 
resulting in 12,311 deaths. 
 
The overall time span of terrorist violence among perpetrator groups represented by 
Trajectory 4 is naturally longer—14 years, on average—with an average of seven years 
of terrorist violence prior to the peak year of terrorist violence. However, the length of 
time for which these perpetrator groups engaged in terrorist violence ranges from two 
years to 43 years. The fact that a perpetrator organization that was engaged in terrorist 
violence for only two years would be best characterized by Trajectory 4 is somewhat 
surprising, given the overall pattern of persistence. The organization in question, Hizbul 
al Islam, has the lowest posterior probability of membership in Trajectory 4 of all 
Trajectory 4 organizations, at 0.59, with a posterior probability of a Trajectory 2 
classification (moderate peak and rapid decline) of 0.41. Hizbul al Islam was active in 
Somalia from 2008 through 2010 at which time it merged with its rival group al-Shabaab 
(Roggio, 2010b). Al-Shabaab, in turn, is currently among the most active and deadly 
terrorist organizations in the world. In particular, this group is responsible for several 
high profile terrorist attacks including an assault on Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 and 
a 2015 assault on Garissa University, also in Kenya (E. Miller, 2013a; Pate, Jensen, & 
 110
Miller, 2015). Because al-Shabaab’s terrorist activity was still increasing at the time of 
this research, it is excluded from the group-based trajectory analysis. 
 
Beyond Hizbul al Islam, many of the diverse perpetrator organizations best represented 
by a moderate peak and slow pattern of decline are relatively well known. In some cases, 
such as that of the animal rights group the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the 
environmental group Earth Liberation Front (ELF), this is primarily due to their relatively 
long period of time spent engaging in attacks (27 years and 16 years, respectively). In 
other cases, however, the organizations are also responsible for particularly high profile, 
deadly terrorist attacks. For example, the perpetrator organizations best represented by 
Trajectory 4 include core al Qa’ida, the group responsible for the September 11, 2001 
attacks in the United States; Jemaah Islamiya, which has been active in Indonesia and the 
Philippines for 13 years and is likely best known for its involvement in the coordinated 
nightclub bombings in Bali that killed more than 200 people in 2002; and Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT), the Pakistani organization responsible for the eight coordinated attacks in 
Mumbai in 2008 in which more than 170 people were killed over the course of three 
days. 
 
Trajectory 4 Case Study: Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
Founded in Malaysia in the early 1990s, but primarily active in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, JI is a Salafi jihadi group that shares a similar ideological view to core al 
Qa’ida (Australian National Security, 2013). The group seeks an Islamic state in 
Indonesia, a pan-Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia, and ultimately worldwide. 
 111
Accordingly, the group’s imprisoned leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged his allegiance to 
al Baghdadi’s Islamic State in 2014 (Bachelard, 2014).  
 
As Figure 5.13 shows, JI’s use of terrorism did not begin until 2000, when the group 
carried out a series of 39 nearly simultaneous bombings targeting churches across 
Indonesia on Christmas Eve. Many of the explosive devices failed to cause any 
casualties, however those that did killed a total of 19 people and wounded at least 118. 
The following week, JI members carried out five simultaneous attacks at various 
locations in the Philippines, killing 22 people and wounding approximately 100 others. 
 
Figure 5.13 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
 
The Christmas and New Year’s Eve attacks made 2000 JI’s peak year of activity, with 45 
























Western media with coordinated mass-casualty attacks at two adjacent nightclubs in Bali. 
The two massive explosions killed 202 people and wounded at least 300. Approximately 
three-quarters of the victims were tourists. JI continued to carry out a few attacks each 
year, often selectively using tactics designed to cause maximum casualties among tourists 
or other foreign targets. For example, in 2003 JI bombed the Australian Embassy and the 
JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in two separate mass-casualty suicide attacks. In 2005, the 
group again carried out simultaneous suicide bombings against restaurants frequented by 
tourists in Bali. The JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta was targeted again in 2009, along with 
the Ritz-Carlton, when JI carried out two suicide bombings within 15 minutes of each 
other. 
 
The group’s repeated targeting of Western interests in mass-casualty attacks, and its goal 
of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia has led authorities in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, and the United States to 
marshal tremendous resources in an effort to defeat the organization (Belford, 2010; US 
Department of State, 2015b). The US Department of State reports that more than 400 JI 
operatives have been captured or killed by authorities in Southeast Asia since it was 
designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2002. In particular, JI’s 77-year-old 
founder Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested in 2010 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in 
2011 (Onishi, 2011). Although JI has remained active, the group has not carried out any 
major terrorist attacks since 2009. 
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The case of JI illustrates several important considerations about terrorist threat, collective 
desistance and the limitations of the statistical analysis, mainly having to do with the 
significance of attack frequency in comparison to attack lethality. JI’s statistical trajectory 
with respect to number of attacks is quite distinct from its statistical trajectory with 
respect to lethality of attacks. The group carried out an especially high number of attacks 
during its peak year that represented somewhat of an anomaly in that they all took place 
during a concentrated period of time. Years later, while the group’s trajectory of 
terrorism in terms of attack frequency is sharply declining, it carried out several of the 
most devastatingly deadly terrorist attacks Indonesia has ever experienced. Furthermore, 
JI has been the subject of massive counter-terrorism efforts. However, given the group’s 
demonstrated capacity to carry out major attacks intermittently, it remains unclear what 
the exact impact of these efforts is with respect to its desistance from terrorism.  
 
Trajectory 4 Case Study: Animal Liberation Front (ALF) & Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
The ALF and the ELF were each founded separately in England, but they share common 
goals and are perhaps the most active and well-known eco-terrorist groups (Deshpande & 
Ernst, 2012). The two groups have carried out terrorist attacks in Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Both are loose 
networks or movements, rather than formally structured organizations, and they have at 
times claimed shared responsibility for attacks (Deshpande & Ernst, 2012; Leader & 




Figure 5.14 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) & Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
 
The ALF and ELF’s use of primarily non-lethal terrorist violence is only a small 
percentage of their criminal activity, which includes extremely destructive vandalism and 
sabotage, particularly targeting businesses and research facilities they perceive to be 
harmful to the animals or the environment (Abbey, 1985; Carson, LaFree, & Dugan, 
2012; Leader & Probst, 2003; Smith, 1994). Although the loose organization and 
leaderless resistance practiced by these groups make them difficult to counter, some 
research indicates that certain policies and law enforcement strategies have been 
somewhat effective at prosecuting individual perpetrators and, in some cases, reducing 
the likelihood of attacks (Carson, 2014; Deshpande & Ernst, 2012; Leader & Probst, 



























Founded in 1976, the ALF committed its first terrorist attacks in the mid-1980s, including 
an arson attack on a veterinary medicine research facility at the University of California-
Davis (Deshpande & Ernst, 2012). As Figure 5.14 shows, its terrorist activity nearly 
peaked in 1988, when the group carried out 12 attacks, followed by a rapid decline and 
subsequent increase in attacks in the early 1990s. The ELF was not founded until 1992, 
however its involvement in terrorist violence followed an upward trajectory in the early 
1990s that mirrored that of the ALF. With respect to terrorist attacks, the ALF’s activity 
peaked in 2001 with 12 attacks and the ELF’s activity peaked in 2001 with 13 attacks, 
and again in 2003. Both groups have followed a gradually declining pattern of terrorist 
activity since the late 1990s and early 2000s, generally consistent with Trajectory 4 
estimated by the model.  
 
Although neither group was responsible for terrorist attacks in 2012 or 2013, they 
remained engaged in recruitment and non-terrorist criminal activity such as vandalism 
and animal release (Bella, 2015; Cernetich, 2013; McKellar, 2013; Ng & Binkley, 2013; 
Tomlinson, 2013). In February 2014, ALF claimed responsibility for an arson attack at a 
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) in New Zealand, and in March 2015 ‘ALF’ was spray-
painted at a KFC in Nevada where an attempted arson had occurred (Sonner & Ritter, 
2015). Later that year, in the United Kingdom, ELF joined with the Informal Anarchist 




Given the ALF and the ELF’s pattern of terrorist activity—somewhat decreased from 
peak level of violence, yet still persistent to some small degree—it appears that 
Trajectory 4’s moderate peak and slow pattern of decline is a reasonable representation of 
their engagement in terrorism. The fact that these groups carry out violence aimed at 
causing economic impact rather than human casualties likely explains the fact that efforts 
to counter them typically rely on legal responses rather than use of force. It is possible 
that this, as well as their loosely networked organizational structure and involvement in 
other types of non-violent criminal activity, has influenced their overall trajectories of 
engagement in terrorist violence. 
 
Trajectory 5: High Peak and Slow Decline 
 
 






















Figure 5.15 shows the individual trajectories for the 17 perpetrator organizations (2.7%) 
best represented by Trajectory 5. In general, the individual post-peak trajectories are 
somewhat diverse and difficult to summarize; however, on average Trajectory 5 is 
characterized by a high peak level of terrorist violence and a relatively slow rate of 
decline. The high peak number of terrorist attacks—135.82 on average—is heavily 
influenced by two outliers in particular, the Shining Path from Peru, which peaked at 509 
attacks in 1989 and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which peaked at 361 
attacks in 1992. To some degree, the shape of the trajectories is characterized by 
prolonged involvement in terrorist violence; at least 15 of the 17 perpetrator 
organizations remained engaged in terrorist violence five years after their peak, carrying 
out an average of 13.2 terrorist attacks. However, despite this prolonged activity, some of 
the perpetrator organizations are also characterized by patterns of steep decline in number 
of attacks, including Shining Path; the PKK (albeit with a strong resurgence 19 years 
after peaking); the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
which declined from 197 terrorist attacks in 1990 to 11 attacks in 1991 and then averaged 
17 terrorist attacks per year in the 10 years that followed; and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which declined from 160 terrorist attacks to two terrorist attacks 
over the course of five years, having been heavily engaged in terrorist violence for 35 
years.  
 
Despite this apparent variation among the trajectories of individual perpetrator 
organizations, the posterior probability of membership to Trajectory 5 is 1.000 for all 17 
organizations. That is, none of the other five trajectories modeled provides a potentially 
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suitable alternative classification. The groups best represented by the high peak and slow 
decline of Trajectory 5 were active for a minimum of seven years, and 24 years on 
average, which is the longest of all six trajectory classes. Also, these 17 perpetrator 
organizations were engaged in terrorism for an average of nine years before reaching 
their peak level of terrorist violence. Individually, it appears that they loosely follow a 
similar pattern, however it also appears that their commonality lies primarily in their high 
numbers of peak terrorist attacks, rather than the shape the attack trends that followed. 
 
In a sense, this variation is not unexpected. While it is reasonably straightforward to 
cluster together perpetrator organizations whose activity dropped off suddenly, albeit for 
a variety of reasons, among those organizations whose activity did not drop off suddenly 
there is a nearly infinite potential for diversity in trajectory patterns. This is even moreso 
the case when perpetrator organizations peak with a high number of attacks—the 
subsequent trajectory can essentially follow many different patterns, except that which 
surpasses the peak (which would only establish a new peak). The fact that so few 
perpetrator organizations form the basis for Trajectory 5 (and Trajectory 6, which has a 
high peak and even more gradual pattern of decline) also causes the model to be very 
sensitive to variations influenced by a small number of organizations, or even only one 
organization. Thus, Trajectory 5 exhibits a distinct upward pattern at the end of the series, 
due entirely to the activity of the only organization to remain engaged in terrorist 
violence more than 23 years after its peak, the Corsican National Liberation Front 
(FLNC). The FLNC carried out 58 terrorist attacks over the course of three non-
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consecutive days in 2012, causing only property damage, after a decade of averaging 
fewer than six attacks per year. 
 
Despite the fact that only 17 perpetrator organizations are best represented by Trajectory 
5, these organizations were responsible for a combined total of 13,024 terrorist attacks, 
causing 40,160 deaths—more fatalities than any other trajectory group. That said, the 
lethality of these perpetrator organizations is far from uniform. Trajectory 5 best 
represents Shining Path, to date the deadliest perpetrator group in the GTD, having 
carried out terrorist attacks that caused 11,581 fatalities between 1978 and 2013. The 
LTTE in Sri Lanka is third deadliest perpetrator organization in the GTD, bearing 
responsibility for 10,967 fatalities between 1975 and 2010. However, Trajectory 5 also 
best represents the FLNC, which carried out 639 attacks between 1974 and 2012 
primarily in Corsica and mainland France, causing a total of 13 deaths. 
 
Trajectory 5 Case Study: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)  
The PKK, a Marxist-Leninist organization that originally sought an independent Kurdish 
state in Turkey, formed in the late 1970s and began engaging in armed conflict in the 
mid-1980s (BBC News, 2013; US Department of State, 2015b). Figure 5.16 illustrates 
that the PKK increased its use of terrorist violence rapidly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, attacking both military and civilian targets, almost entirely in Turkey but 
occasionally in Western European countries as well. In 1992, the PKK’s terrorist activity 
peaked with 361 attacks and declined rapidly to 22 attacks within four years. During this 
time period Turkish armed forces engaged in numerous human rights violations in the 
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interest of counterinsurgency, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and the destruction 
of villages and displacement of more than two million people, most of whom were non-
combatants (Ron, 1995; US Department of State, 1995).  
 
 
Figure 5.16 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
 
In 1999 Turkish authorities arrested the organization’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and that 
same year the group attempted to re-focus its goals on engaging in the political process, 
establishing a five-year ceasefire that effectively minimized the intensity of the conflict 
while in effect (BBC News, 2013). At that time it may have appeared that the PKK had 
desisted from terrorist violence. However, Turkish authorities were not receptive to the 
PKK’s interests in political participation, and the organization resumed the use of 






















2009, at which point the PKK again declared a ceasefire that held until 2011 (US 
Department of State, 2015b). Peace negotiations resumed in late 2012, following a sharp 
increase in violence during which the PKK carried out 140 terrorist attacks. Ocalan again 
renounced the use of violence in 2013 while serving a life sentence in prison (BBC News, 
2013). The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government ultimately resulted in 
the deaths of more than 40,000 people, most of whom were Kurdish (BBC News, 2015). 
 
The peak number of attacks estimated by Trajectory 5 fails to account for the exceptional 
level of terrorist violence carried out by the PKK in 1992. However, its lingering decline 
and uncertain end over the course of more than two decades is consistent with the 
predicted pattern. Although the PKK’s terrorist activity decreased 85 percent between 
2012 and 2013, it remains to be seen whether the efforts toward peace and increased 
Kurdish representation in Turkish politics will take hold. On June 23, 2015, Abdullah 
Ocalan’s niece, Dilek Ocalan, was sworn in as a member of the Turkish parliament 
(Hurtas, 2015; Reuters, 2015). Observers suggest that this would have been unheard of 15 
years earlier, and that it is indicative of a tremendous shift away from anti-Kurdish 
sentiment in Turkey. Since 2014, PKK members have been fighting to defend vulnerable 
areas of northern Iraq and Syria from ISIL incursions (Al Jazeera America, 2015; Beck, 
2014; Malek, 2014). 
 
I selected the PKK for further investigation because it represents the distinct possibility 
of resurgence following a sharp decline in terrorist activity. Certain organizations, like 
the PKK and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (discussed below), are motivated by 
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deeply entrenched ethnic conflict and power dynamics. These provide a foundation for 
ongoing engagement in violence that transcends a single person or generation of people. 
Key considerations that might impact the trajectories of these groups include the ability 
and willingness of the government to forcefully suppress them, the ability of the militant 
organizations to maintain a cohesive unit and the support of a constituency, and the 
degree to which the organization is ultimately able to engage in non-violent means of 
achieving goals such as electoral politics.  
 
Trajectory 5 Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Like the PLOTE, the LTTE is one of five ethnic Tamil militant groups that operated in 
Sri Lanka in pursuit of an independent Tamil state they referred to as Tamil Eelam. 
Formed in 1975, the LTTE was by far the most dominant Tamil separatist group, and 
essentially defeated its far less active rivals. The group was extremely robust, including a 
political wing and a hierarchical structure not unlike that of a professional military. 
Specialized branches fulfilled various operational roles, including suicide attacks (the 
Black Tiger Squad), naval operations (the Sea Tigers), intelligence, research and 
development, and arms procurement (Al Jazeera, 2009; Crenshaw, 2013; Hogg, 2006). 
As Figure 5.17 shows, the LTTE began engaging in armed conflict using terrorist 
violence in earnest in the mid 1980s, triggering the start of the Sri Lankan Civil War 
(Crenshaw, 2013). Between 1984 and 2013, the group carried out more than 1,600 
attacks that killed more than 10,900 people. The average lethality of the LTTE’s terrorist 
attacks peaked at 23.60 deaths per attack in 1987, the year it carried out its first suicide 
attack. Approximately one-third (34.12%) of the LTTE’s attacks targeted the Sri Lankan 
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(28.88%) or Indian (5.24%) military. One-fifth (19.78%) targeted private citizens and 
property, and 15.47 percent targeted the Sri Lankan police. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 
In the late 1980s the LTTE’s terrorist activity rapidly increased to more than 100 attacks 
per year in 1988, 1990, and 1991, and more than 150 attacks in 1996, before finally 
peaking in 2006 with 160 attacks and rapidly declining thereafter. The trajectory of the 
LTTE is marked by several steep declines in terrorist activity that coincided with 
negotiations with the Sri Lankan government. For example, in 1989 LTTE terrorist 
attacks declined by nearly half (47.76%) while its political wing, the People’s Front of 
Liberation Tigers, entered into several months of peace talks with a newly elected 






















elected in 1994, following the assassination of a presidential candidate by an LTTE 
suicide bomber (De Silva, 2012). Negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government began in 1995, but failed following several major terrorist attacks (Nubin, 
2002). Finally, in 2002, a ceasefire and a series of talks brokered by Norway brought the 
number of LTTE terrorist attacks down to just three that year and it appeared that the 
peace process was making real progress. However, these efforts were ultimately 
unsuccessful as well (Crenshaw, 2013; Hogg, 2006).  
 
Following multiple unsuccessful attempts at negotiating a truce, LTTE violence increased 
rapidly and the Sri Lankan government resorted to a devastating military offensive 
against the organization in 2006. Investigations found credible allegations of widespread 
human rights abuses on the part of the government, including indiscriminate shelling of 
humanitarian aid staging areas and hospitals, causing extensive death and displacement of 
civilians; extrajudicial killings and disappearances; torture; and detention (Human Rights 
Watch, 2015; Miles, 2015; United Nations, 2011, 2014; US Department of State, 2015a). 
Likewise, the LTTE was found to have recruited children, targeted civilians, and used 
civilian populations as human shields in the late stages of the conflict (Hogg, 2006; 
United Nations, 2011, 2014; US Department of State, 2015a). In 2009, as a result of a 
decisive military victory by Sri Lankan forces, including the death of the LTTE’s leader, 
the organization conceded defeat. Although no attacks have been attributed to the LTTE 




Despite the fact that the LTTE engaged in a prolonged period of extreme increases and 
decreases in activity over the course of several decades, following its final peak the Sri 
Lankan government defeated it fairly rapidly. For this reason, the pattern of activity 
estimated by Trajectory 5—a fairly steep decline from a high peak number of attacks, 
followed by a period of prolonged activity—is a somewhat poor fit for the LTTE’s 
sharply and decisively declining post-peak terrorist violence. Two considerations remain, 
however. First, although the pre-2006 data for the LTTE were not included in the 
trajectory analysis, the group did nearly approach its peak number of attacks at least 
twice prior to actually peaking in 2006. This overall pattern of activity, a high peak 
number of attacks coupled with a persistent pattern of violence, makes it not altogether 
unreasonable to characterize the LTTE as a perpetrator organization that substantively 
aligns with Trajectory 5, albeit coincidentally. Second, although the defeat of the LTTE 
appears to be complete, the ethnic conflict that motivated the group’s campaign has not 
been resolved. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the use of violence by Tamil 
separatists will resume in the future as it did in the case of the PKK in Turkey. 
 
Trajectory 6: High Peak and Very Slow Decline 
Finally, Figure 5.18 represents the organizations best characterized by Trajectory 6. 
Based on the terrorist activity of only 10 perpetrator organizations (1.6%), Trajectory 6 
shares many of the same types of imprecision as Trajectory 5. Also, like Trajectory 5, this 
occurs despite the fact that the organizations best represented by Trajectory 6 all have a 
posterior probability of 1.000; the model estimates indicate that none of the other five 
trajectories are a suitable alternative characterization. In general, the perpetrator 
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organizations represented by Trajectory 6 had the highest peak numbers of terrorist 
attacks (286 attacks on average), were active for long periods of time (22 years on 
average), and declined very slowly in that they carried out an average 71.83 terrorist 
attacks two years after they peaked and 74.8 attacks five years after they peaked. At least 
four of the 10 perpetrator organizations were still actively engaged in terrorist violence at 
that point; one other organization had declined rapidly to zero for the remaining 25 years 
of the data series. The remaining five perpetrator organizations had not yet reached their 
fifth year post-peak—note that perpetrator organizations represented by Trajectory 6 have 
the latest average peak year, 1999— but they were still carrying out dozens, if not 
hundreds of attacks during the last recorded observation in 2013.  
 
 





































All but one of the perpetrator organizations characterized by the high peak and very slow 
decline of Trajectory 6, al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), rank among the 20 
perpetrator organizations in the GTD that carried out the most attacks between 1970 and 
2013. Collectively, these 10 organizations were responsible for 15,929 terrorist attacks 
resulting in 39,030 deaths during this time period. More than one-quarter of the fatalities, 
however, were the result of attacks carried out by the Taliban in Afghanistan, which 
appears in Figure 5.18 as an extreme outlier with a peak of 784 attacks in 2012. 
Ostensibly, these terrorist organizations are those that have, at various points in recent 
history, posed the greatest threat to the regions in which they operated.  
 
That said, like the perpetrator organizations represented by Trajectory 5, they do not 
share a singular pattern of post-peak activity aside from, for the most part, an absence of 
rapid and lasting desistance from terrorist violence. Many of these organizations 
continued to be highly active in perpetrating terrorist violence as of 2013, including al 
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Communist Party of India-Maoist, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Likewise, al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) not only remained 
active but substantially increased its engagement in terrorist violence, albeit under the 
name the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The National Liberation Army of 
Colombia (ELN) remained active, but carried out far fewer terrorist attacks in recent 
years compared to its peak in 1988. In contrast, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the Nicaraguan Democratic Force 
(FDN) are essentially defunct organizations. 
 128
The two organizations I selected from the Trajectory 6 classification for further 
investigation are informative because they represent complementary examples of patterns 
of decline. The PIRA and ETA have many things in common, beyond their unusually 
lengthy trajectories of terrorism. They were both motivated by nationalist-separatist 
causes in Western Europe. They were both heavily active in the 1970s and 1980s. They 
both carried out an extraordinary number of attacks; however, the average lethality of 
their attacks (0.72 deaths per attack by the PIRA and 0.43 deaths per attack by ETA) was 
much lower than is typical of some other prolific perpetrator organizations, like the 
Islamic State network, Shining Path, or the Taliban, which averaged approximately 3 to 
15 times as many deaths per attack. In fact, various sources report not only solidarity, but 
operational links between the PIRA and ETA as well, including that they shared 
resources and training (Horgan & Braddock, 2011; Maillot, 2005; S. Morris, 2001; The 
Economist, 1998). Despite these commonalities, and the fact that Trajectory 6 best 
represents both organizations, their patterns of decline are considerably different (Hogan, 
2009). For the final two case studies I compare patterns of collective desistance from 
terrorism for the PIRA and ETA. 
 
Trajectory 6 Case Study: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
The PIRA is one of several groups whose names include the phrase “Irish Republican 
Army,” however it is easily the oldest, most active and most familiar. Commonly referred 
to as the IRA or “the Provos,” the PIRA emerged in December 1969 from the remnants 
of the Irish Republican Army that had fought British forces between 1916 and 1921 in a 
conflict that resulted in the establishment of an Irish Free State (English, 2005; Gregory, 
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2010). In addition to the PIRA, the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) split from the 
IRA at the same time, both with the same goal of Northern Irish independence from Great 
Britain. The OIRA, which was a Marxist group, only remained active for a few years 
before renouncing violence. 
 
Figure 5.19 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
 
As shown in Figure 5.19, the PIRA rapidly increased its use of violence in the early 
1970s, carrying out more than 160 attacks in 1972. The group sustained a high level of 
violence for more than 30 years, peaking with more than 200 attacks in 1979, and again 
in 1991. This dual-peak distribution of attacks is certainly relevant to the trajectory 
analysis. Due to a slightly higher number of attacks in 1979, the PIRA’s post-peak 



















1991. The rapid decline from an extremely high local maximum in 1991 suggests that 
Trajectory 3, which is characterized by a high peak and rapid decline, is a plausible 
alternative trajectory. Given the 1979 peak, the PIRA is best represented by the high peak 
and prolonged period of decline of Trajectory 6. 
 
The dramatic 97.28% decline between 1994 and 1995 was a result of a ceasefire that 
marked the beginning of the end of the PIRA (Kearney, 2014; Schmidt, 1994). Although 
not fail-proof, the 1994 ceasefire paved the way for multi-party peace talks that 
ultimately produced the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (Agence France Presse, 1998a). 
Although the peace accord was met with a great deal of trepidation by those party to the 
decades-old conflict, by 2005 the IRA had completely disarmed and renounced violence 
(Agence France Presse, 1998c; Dodds, 2005; Lavery & Cowell, 2005).  
 
Despite the rapid decline between 1994 and 1995, the number of attacks carried out by 
the PIRA did not quite reach zero until 2001, likely as a result of dissident members 
continuing to carry out low-intensity attacks in the name of the PIRA. From 2005 and 
2013, between zero and two attacks were attributed to the PIRA each year. Republican 
organizations that were opposed to the peace process emerged, including the Continuity 
Irish Republican Army (CIRA), the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Oglaigh na 
hEireann (ONH), and the New Irish Republican Army, however none of these 
organizations came close to reaching the level of violence perpetrated by the PIRA 
between 1972 and 1994. 
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Trajectory 6 Case Study: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Basque: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)) was formed in 
1959 with the goal of establishing an independent state in the Basque regions of northern 
Spain and southwestern France (US Department of State, 2015b). Although ETA 
unsuccessfully attempted to engage in terrorism as early as 1961, the group’s first lethal 
attack took place in 1968 (BBC News, 2011; Clark, 1984; Muro, 2011). As Figure 5.20 
illustrates, ETA carried out relatively few attacks in the early 1970s and then increased its 
use of violence very quickly, peaking with 171 attacks in 1979.  Unlike the PIRA, ETA 
did not maintain this level of violence and, although the group carried out many terrorist 
attacks in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, it never again returned to the frequency of 
terrorist activity seen in the late 1970s. 
 
 




















Within days of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, observers, including members of 
ETA, made comparisons between the peace process in Northern Ireland and the potential 
for peace in the Basque conflict (Agence France Presse, 1998b; The Irish Times, 1998). 
Until that point, ETA had observed brief periods of truce in 1988, 1989, 1992 (coinciding 
with the Olympic Summer Games in Barcelona), and 1996 (E. Miller & Smarick, 2011). 
Indeed, not six months after the Good Friday Agreement, in September 1998, ETA 
declared their own ceasefire (The Economist, 1998).  
 
Despite the fact that the 1998 ceasefire lasted approximately 14 months, at the time their 
longest period of inactivity, ETA’s declarations lacked credibility with Spanish 
authorities, who continued to devote extensive law enforcement resources to 
apprehending and prosecuting members of the group (US Department of State, 2015b). 
Against a backdrop of aggressive policing and prosecution of ETA operatives by a 
skeptical government with no interest in negotiating, the group declared additional 
ceasefires in 2006 and 2010, and reaffirmed its “permanent” and “verifiable” 
commitment to nonviolence in 2011 (E. Miller & Smarick, 2011, p. 3). Since then, ETA 
has not carried out any terrorist attacks, Spanish authorities continue to make arrests and 
convictions, and in February 2014 the organization reportedly began to hand over its 
weapons (Caron, 2015; The Economist, 2014; Tremlett, 2014). Given ETA’s pattern of 
activity, the pattern of activity estimated for Trajectory 6 appears to be a reasonable 
approximation of its engagement in terrorist violence—a high peak number of attacks 
followed by a prolonged period of decline.  
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Having observed the different trajectories of the PIRA and ETA, several scholars 
investigate the differences between the organizations that might explain the divergence 
despite the superficial similarities between them (Alonso, 2004; Hogan, 2009). In 
particular, Hogan (2009) points out six important distinctions that might have contributed 
to ETA’s somewhat painstaking process of desistance. First, while the PIRA sought to 
regain independence, ETA sought to establish independence. Second, the IRA had greater 
popular support than ETA. Third, ETA generated revenue to support itself (illegally), 
while the PIRA relied on external support. Fourth, the PIRA was governed by a 
democratically elected council, while ETA was led by a single person. Fifth, the PIRA’s 
political wing, Sinn Fein, was much more closely involved in PIRA decision-making than 
ETA’s political wing. Finally, the British counterterrorism response much more 
indiscriminately impacted the Irish people, while Spanish authorities targeted ETA 
members specifically. Although it is not clear which, if any, of these distinctions 
impacted the trajectories of PIRA and ETA, the case studies illustrate the variation 
among the perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 6. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the trajectory analysis provide additional insight for two of my research 
questions. First, as initially indicated by the descriptive analyses in Chapter 4, there exist 
various patterns of desistance from terrorist violence among perpetrator organizations, 
even those with similar time spans of activity. This conclusion is supported not merely by 
the fact that I extracted six trajectories of post-peak terrorist violence from the dataset—
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that is a model specification that I assume a priori. Instead, I base this conclusion on the 
fact that the substantive analysis of the trajectories revealed patterns of activity among 
the individual perpetrator groups that, in general, fit the model exceptionally well and 
with a great deal of conceptual clarity. The case study analysis further illustrates that 
while perpetrator organizations vary greatly with respect to their peak number of terrorist 
attacks; overall, they may decline rapidly or very slowly. While the majority of the 
perpetrator organizations analyzed appear to decline rapidly from a relatively modest 
peak number of attacks, there are also many organizations that follow a much more 
prolonged pattern of declining terrorist violence.  
 
The trajectory analysis provides a useful framework with which to investigate these 
patterns of activity over time among a relatively large number of perpetrator 
organizations. Isolating the post-peak terrorist violence from the overall trajectory is 
particularly useful for focusing on patterns of decline, however the descriptive statistics 
and the case studies presented in this chapter are also critically important for 
understanding the implications of measurement and analytical strategy for the study of 
collective desistance from terrorism. In particular, these analyses illustrate how 
problematic it is to simply accept the data on perpetrator organizations’ terrorist violence 
over time at face value, assuming that they systematically and comprehensively represent 
the behavior of stereotypical terrorist organizations that exist in a vacuum. We observe 
that, in reality, the contexts in which these organizations operate are extremely complex. 
For example, not every perpetrator organization is, first and foremost, a terrorist 
organization. The activity of an organization that typically does not engage in terrorism 
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provides a poor representation of patterns of desistance among those that exclusively 
adopt this tactic.  
 
Additionally, structured data on perpetrator organizations that are derived from event-
level databases are extremely powerful, but can also be misleading. They fail to 
effectively capture the evolution of groups over time, including mergers, divisions, and 
name changes that create potentially artificial distinctions in the data. In some cases, they 
fail to capture the totality of the perpetrator organizations’ life course due to arbitrary 
restrictions in the scope of the data collection period. This analysis reinforces the idea 
that it is valuable to leverage various types of large-N quantitative analysis with in-depth 
case studies and qualitative analyses in an effort to more fully understand collective 
desistance from terrorism. 
 
The goal of this chapter was to establish a baseline model of discrete trajectories of 
decline among terrorist perpetrator organizations, in order to illustrate the diversity of 
their patterns of desistance. However, the results of the analysis prompt further 
investigation to better understand the various dimensions of the problem. The next 
chapter presents several complementary analyses—variations on the base model—which 
provide a more comprehensive conceptualization of collective desistance from terrorism. 
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CHAPTER SIX: Variations on the Model  
 
The trajectory analysis presented in Chapter 5 introduces the various ways in which 
perpetrator organizations desist from terrorism after reaching a peak number of attacks; 
however, it raises several additional questions, which I investigate next. First, the results 
of the baseline analysis suggest that perpetrator groups vary with respect to the 
magnitude of their peak number of attacks in ways that heavily influence the results of 
the trajectory model. While modeling the absolute frequency of post-peak terrorist 
violence captures important dynamics of threat beyond simply whether or not the 
perpetrator organization was engaged in terrorism at a given time, it may obscure the 
dynamics of the relative frequency of post-peak violent activity—the shape of the 
trajectory rather than the magnitude. To address this possibility, I estimate a variation of 
the model based on the perpetrator organizations’ frequency of attacks relative to their 
peak number of attacks.  
 
Second, the analysis in Chapter 5 and the theoretical literature discussed in Chapter 2 
indicate that patterns of collective desistance from terrorism may vary with respect to 
qualities or characteristics of the organizations and their terrorist behavior. Although the 
goal of this research is not to test the theoretical paradigms or constructs discussed in 
Chapter 2, I do aim to inductively build a comprehensive understanding of the collective 
ways in which organizations desist from terrorism. In the latter part of this chapter I focus 
specifically on my second research question: How do salient attributes of perpetrator 
organizations’ terrorist activity relate to their patterns of desistance from terrorist 
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violence? In particular I analyze the ways in which patterns of onset and other attributes 
of terrorist violence correlate with particular patterns of desistance. 
 
Isolating the Shape: Desisters vs. Persisters 
The baseline trajectories articulated in Chapter 5 are clearly influenced by the perpetrator 
groups’ overall magnitude of activity. Organizations cluster together on the basis of their 
peak frequency of attacks. This is not unreasonable, because frequency of terrorist attacks 
is a useful dimension of likeness among perpetrator groups, as well as an important 
consideration for understanding the process of declining engagement in terrorist violence. 
However, in doing so the model is limited in its capacity to isolate the shape of the 
groups’ post-peak terrorist activity, and explicitly differentiate those perpetrator groups 
whose terrorist violence declines rapidly from those whose terrorist violence declines 
gradually, or hardly at all.  
 
For example, several of the perpetrator organizations estimated to most closely follow the 
patterns of Trajectory 5 (high peak; slow decline) and Trajectory 6 (high peak; very slow 
decline) appear to be classified as such primarily because their unusually high levels of 
terrorist violence mean that no other trajectory is a close approximation of their activity. 
By removing the absolute number of attacks from the equation, I am able to isolate the 
shape of post-peak terrorist activity and gain additional insight into how these patterns 
vary. To do so, I use the data on the number of terrorist attacks carried out by each 
perpetrator organization each year to calculate the ratio of each organization’s attacks in a 
given year to the number of attacks it carried out during it’s peak year of terrorist 
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violence. Thus, an organization that carried out 10 attacks during its peak year and five 
attacks the following year, and an organization that carried out 100 attacks during its 
peak year and 50 attacks the following year will appear identical in the data, with 1.0 as 
their first data point and 0.5 as their second data point.  
 
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter 5, it appears that there are likely as few as two 
meaningful shapes of post-peak terrorist violence: one that involves rapid desistance and 
one that represents a more persistent pattern of activity. Because of this, I began the 
iterative process of modeling the ratio data with two trajectory groups based on a 
quadratic polynomial, and progressively increased the complexity of the model. Based on 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values, the posterior probabilities of group 
membership, and the conceptual clarity of the resulting trajectories, I determined that 
adding a third trajectory group does not improve the model fit. Figure 6.1 shows that the 
BIC does not improve markedly as the model complexity increases. Although the Odds 
of Correct Classification (OCC) for the second trajectory (3.2) were slightly lower than 
the threshold of 5 established by Nagin (2005), all things considered the most defensible 




Figure 6.1 Model selection: Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
 
As indicated by the analysis of the baseline model presented in Chapter 5, the two 
trajectories that comprise the ratio model do represent rapidly declining and gradually 
declining post-peak patterns of terrorist violence (Figure 6.2). Trajectory 1, which is 
characterized by a rapid rate of decline, estimates that perpetrator groups will decline to 
less than 10 percent of their peak number of attacks within four years, and less than 5 
percent of their peak number of attacks within five years. This pattern is the best fit for 
511 of the 632 (80.9%) perpetrator organizations analyzed. In contrast, Trajectory 2, 
which is characterized by a relatively gradual rate of decline, estimates that perpetrator 
groups will not drop below 10 percent of their peak number of attacks until 12 years 
following their peak, and they do not reach 5 percent until 20 years after they peak. 















have very high average predicted probabilities of group membership—0.97 and 0.93, 
respectively. This suggests that they represent distinct patterns, and that perpetrator 
groups are likely to clearly align with one or the other. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Trajectories of collective decline, ratio model 
 
Table 6.1 compares information about the perpetrator groups best represented by each 
trajectory, revealing interesting similarities and differences in their activity. The 
perpetrator groups best characterized by the rapid decline of Trajectory 1 engaged in 
terrorist attacks for an average of six years, while those organizations best characterized 
by the more gradual decline of Trajectory 2 carried out terrorist attacks for a total of 20 











































years the groups were active. Fifty-seven of the perpetrator organizations represented by 
Trajectory 1 were active for only a year, while five were active for more than 30 years. 
All five of these organizations peaked after more than 30 years of engaging in terrorist 
violence and then declined rapidly from a peak of as many as 160 to as few as seven 
attacks. In contrast, 17 of the gradually declining perpetrator organizations engaged in 
terrorist violence for more than 30 years, while 19 actively carried out attacks for fewer 
than 10 years. Of these 19 organizations, 11 were still active within three years of the end 


























Despite the fact that they experienced longer periods of declining terrorist violence, and 
therefore a compressed window of opportunity with respect to available data on pre-peak 
activity, the perpetrator organizations aligned with Trajectory 2 also had longer spans of 
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pre-peak violence on average. This is consistent with their longer period of engaging in 
terrorist violence overall. 
 
The 121 perpetrator organizations characterized as gradually declining were collectively 
responsible for 24,151 terrorist attacks resulting in 52,446 fatalities. Although there are 
more than four times as many perpetrator organizations characterized as rapidly 
declining, they were responsible for approximately the same number of total attacks—
22,331—and only 48% more deaths, at 77,740. While this is a fairly large disparity in 
terms of total harm caused, the two sets of perpetrator organizations are fairly similar in 
terms of deaths per perpetrator group per year active (23 for Trajectory 1 organizations 
versus 22 for Trajectory 2 organizations). 
 
The graphs of individual perpetrator group patterns of activity reveal that, with only two 
trajectory classes, there is a great deal of variation visible around the predicted 
trajectories. Figure 6.3 shows the individual patterns of post-peak terrorist violence 
among perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 1 in the ratio model, 
and Figure 6.4 shows the individual patterns of post-peak terrorist violence among 
perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 2 in the ratio model. The post-
peak trajectories of perpetrator groups classified as rapidly declining are heavily clustered 
near the Y-axis, however there are a number of organizations whose activity spans a 
longer time period, but with sporadic, isolated attacks. In fact, 47 of the 511 organizations 
aligned with Trajectory 1 do have attacks recorded ten years or more after their peak 
level of activity. Some of these even approach their peak number of attacks; however, 35 
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of the 47 perpetrator organizations (74%) peaked with fewer than eight attacks. Two of 
the rapidly declining organizations that were active more than 10 years beyond their 
peak—Movement of April 19 (M-19) in Colombia, and Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua—carried out more than 100 attacks at their peak.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 1 (ratio) 
 
M-19’s use of terrorist violence peaked in 1985, followed by a fairly rapid decline to 
inactivity over the course of four years during which it renounced the use of violence and 
began to engage in electoral politics. With the exception of two years when M-19 was 
attributed responsibility for a small number of attacks (two in 1992 and four in 1994), M-
19 has not engaged in terrorist violence since. Likewise, the FSLN’s terrorist activity 








































Revolution. At that time the organization, then a ruling political party, continued to be 
inactive with respect to terrorist violence for a decade before briefly resuming low-level 
terrorist violence in 1991 following a loss of political power in 1990. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Perpetrator organizations best characterized by Trajectory 2 (ratio) 
 
The individual trajectories of post-peak terrorist violence for perpetrator organizations 
best characterized by the gradual decline of Trajectory 2 further illustrate the overall 
similarity among the rapidly declining perpetrator organizations in Figure 6.3 (above). In 
contrast, Figure 6.4 shows extremely varied individual patterns of post-peak terrorist 
violence that share in common the fact that they persist well beyond 10 years post-peak 
and in many cases even more than 20 years post-peak. Specifically, at least 81 of the 121 








































or more years after their peak year of terrorist violence. At least 34 perpetrator 
organizations were responsible for attacks 20 or more years after they peaked. 
 
The ratio model neutralizes certain attributes of terrorist activity that distinguish the six 
trajectory groups presented in Chapter 5, but we can examine how membership to the 
original trajectories relates to membership to the two ratio trajectories (Figure 6.5). Recall 
that the first three trajectories presented in Chapter 5 represented patterns of rapid decline 
from varying peak numbers of terrorist attacks—low, medium, and high, respectively. As 
such, it comes as no surprise that the rapidly declining shape of Trajectory 1 in the ratio 
model best represents the vast majority of perpetrator organizations best characterized by 
these three original trajectories.  
 
 












































Likewise, Trajectory 4 in the original model had a distinctly persistent post-peak shape, 
while Trajectory 5 and Trajectory 6 predicted persistent patterns of post-peak activity but 
their constituent perpetrator groups were characterized by much more diverse observed 
patterns of violence. Thus, it makes sense that most of the perpetrator organizations 
represented by Trajectories 4 and 5 in the original model are classified as gradually 
declining in the ratio model. The perpetrator organizations represented by Trajectory 6 in 
the original model were actually slightly more likely to be classified as rapidly declining 
than gradually declining, confirming the observation made in Chapter 5 that some of 
them were likely clustered together based entirely on the high levels of terrorist violence 
they had in common. These results suggest that the original model and the ratio model 
offer complementary perspectives for investigating patterns of collective desistance from 
terrorism. 
 
Characteristics of Terrorist Activity and Patterns of Collective Desistance 
 
Having established a robust framework for understanding the ways in which perpetrator 
organizations desist from terrorist violence, I now expand the analysis to consider the 
ways in which other aspects of an organization’s terrorist violence relate to patterns of 
decline. Specifically, I investigate patterns of onset, lethality, use of suicide attacks, and 
execution of logistically international attacks. Each of these represents an aspect of the 
perpetrator groups’ capacity for violence and chosen tactics, which, based on the 




To evaluate how patterns of onset relate to patterns of decline, I first estimate a trajectory 
model based on the 632 perpetrator groups’ violent terrorist activity over the period of 
time from their first recorded attack to the year their terrorist violence peaked. Like the 
model for patterns of post-peak terrorist violence, which isolated patterns of decline, by 
focusing the analysis on pre-peak activity I isolate patterns of onset. The trajectory of an 
organization’s initial engagement in terrorist violence is illustrative of its overall strength, 
the threat it poses (and thus the extent to which it provokes a response from the state), 
and capacity to rapidly amass resources. However, like trajectories of decline, the onset 
trajectories might also be indicative of structural or measurement artifacts of 
organizational evolution. I will discuss these possibilities below, in the context of the 
model results.  
 
As with the previous trajectory models, my presumption is that there are meaningfully 
distinct patterns of onset that can be used as a data summary framework to approximate 
the observed patterns of onset. I estimated eight separate models and compared them on 
the basis of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), average posterior probabilities of 
trajectory group membership, Odds of Correct Classification (OCC), and conceptual 
clarity. Despite the fact that the BIC value (Figure 6.6) continues to improve between the 
models that estimate three trajectories and the models that estimate four trajectories, the 
posterior probabilities and conceptual clarity deteriorate rapidly at this point in the model 
selection process. In particular, the four trajectory group models include two trajectories 
with very similar shapes, and several of the means for predicted probability of group 
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membership drop to 0.8 or below. While these values are still higher than the threshold of 
0.7 recommended by Nagin (2005), I determined that without the benefit of additionally 
meaningful trajectories this is an unnecessary sacrifice and concluded the model selection 




Figure 6.6 Model selection: Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
 
The selected trajectory model for patterns of onset is shown in Figure 6.7, below. The 
three trajectories estimated represent rapidly increasing, moderately increasing, and 
slowly increasing numbers of terrorist attacks leading up to the peak year of activity. The 
pattern of onset represented by Trajectory 1 involves a very low number of terrorist 
attacks leading up to a low peak level of violence. This is estimated to represent 















characterized by a somewhat more rapid increase in violence and a moderate peak 
number of attacks. This is the best approximation for one-fifth (19.9%) of the perpetrator 
groups analyzed. As was the case with the model for declining terrorist violence, the data 
on the onset of terrorist violence are censored at 100 attacks per year, which is most 
evident in the shape of Trajectory 3 because it is characterized by exceptionally high 
numbers of attacks and a rapid increase following the first attack. Trajectory 3 is the best 
approximation of the pattern of onset for only 5.1 percent of the perpetrator groups 
analyzed. 
 




























The low-frequency pattern identified by Trajectory 1 represents a wide variety of 
observed activity. Although the predicted pattern of onset is lengthy, it is important to 
note that this does not mean the onset of all perpetrator groups assigned to this trajectory 
experienced lengthy patterns of pre-peak terrorist violence. Indeed, many are quite short, 
or even peak during their first year of engagement in terrorist violence, but Trajectory 1 is 
estimated as the best approximation due to the low peak number of attacks they share in 
common. On average, the peak number of attacks for perpetrator groups best represented 
by Trajectory 1 is 6.0. The span of time for which these organizations carry out terrorist 
attacks prior to their peak year ranges from zero to 37 years.  
 
The perpetrator groups whose terrorist activity is best represented by this pattern of onset 
include established terrorist organizations like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
and the Red Army Faction (RAF). However, they also include numerous political parties, 
such as the Communist Party of India- Marxist, the Likud Party, and the Pakistani 
People’s Party (PPP); criminal organizations, such as the Cali and Medellin drug cartels; 
and named groups that are decidedly lesser known, like Guerrillas of Christ the King, 
which carried out two attacks over two years in Spain.  
 
In comparison, the perpetrator groups best characterized by the more rapidly increasing 
pattern of Trajectory 2 include many well-known terrorist organizations: al Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), the Corsican 
National Liberation Front (FLNC), Hizballah, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Red Brigades, 
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the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and numerous others. On 
average, these organizations peaked with 41.2 terrorist attacks, however this ranged from 
five attacks to 784 carried out by the Taliban. 
 
The 32 perpetrator organizations best represented by Trajectory 3 are collectively 
characterized by a rapid increase in terrorist violence and an extremely high peak number 
of attacks—122.3 on average. However, these organizations have other interesting 
attributes and contexts that set them apart. Nearly three-fifths (59.4%) of the perpetrator 
groups best characterized by a rapidly increasing onset trajectory peaked within a year of 
their first attack. The organization that took the longest to reach its peak, the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), reached its maximum number of attacks in 13 
years, however it increased from one attack to 159 attacks in the course of two years.  
 
That said, at least 10 of the 32 rapidly increasing organizations, including the FMLN as 
well as the Islamic State of Iraq, the Nicaraguan Resistance, and al Qa’ida in the Lands of 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), evolved from existing organizations as alliances, splinter 
organizations, or, they were simply re-branded. Furthermore, four of the 32 rapidly 
increasing perpetrator organizations—the Black Panthers, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA), the Tupamaros, and the Weather Underground—were active 
in 1970, suggesting that the beginning of the GTD time series does not adequately 
capture the onset of their terrorist violence. However, this is no more common for 
Trajectory 3 than for the other trajectories, which indicates that it is not the sole reason 
for their classification.  
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Because perpetrator organizations exist in heterogeneous contexts, classifying them 
according to the trajectories that best represent their patterns of onset provides a 
somewhat mixed set of circumstances within each trajectory. With this in mind, I 
examine the relationship between membership to an onset trajectory and membership to a 
declining trajectory. Figure 6.8 shows the probability of membership to each of the six 





































































The results indicate that the overall frequency of attacks that was very influential in the 
initial estimation of the trajectories continues to be influential in how they relate to each 
other. The vast majority (80%) of perpetrator organizations characterized by a low 
frequency of terrorist attacks and gradual or very little increase were best represented by 
the low peak/rapid decline post-peak trajectory, while none of these perpetrator 
organizations were classified as high peak/very slow decline groups. Likewise, none of 
the perpetrator groups that were assigned to the high frequency/very rapid increase onset 
trajectory were grouped with perpetrator organizations characterized by a low peak and 
rapid decline.  
 
These findings at the extremes are, of course, to be expected in light of the fact that both 
models are based on the peak number of terrorist attacks as a starting or ending point. 
There are, however, other results that are somewhat less obvious. For example, the 
perpetrator organizations with rapid onset trajectories (Onset Trajectory 2 and 3) are 
disproportionately likely to be best characterized by the post-peak trajectories that 
involve rapid desistance (Decline Trajectories 2 and 3). This suggests the possibility of 
overall volatility in the attack patterns of these perpetrator organizations in that many of 
the groups that increase rapidly also decline rapidly.  
 
A related possibility is that perpetrator organizations that demonstrate a rapid increase to 
extremely high levels of violence represent a particular security threat that the state is 
extraordinarily motivated to resolve quickly, either though conciliatory or repressive 
means. Yet a third speculation is that this relationship represents a lack of stability among 
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these perpetrator organizations that is an artifact of organizational evolution. Perhaps the 
organizations and the threats they pose do not necessarily come and go as the data 
suggest, but instead these perpetrator groups are exceptionally likely to form alliances, 
break apart, or, like the Islamic State, change names more than once. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Probability of declining trajectory given onset trajectory (ratio) 
 
In order to show the relationship between patterns of onset and patterns of decline in a 
way that is not as heavily influenced by the overall frequency of attacks, Figure 6.9 
presents the probability of membership each of the two post-peak trajectory groups from 
the simplified ratio model. Figure 6.9 shows that the perpetrator organizations best 














































than gradually increasing organizations to be best represented by the gradually declining 
Trajectory 2 from the ratio model. This is somewhat in contrast to Figure 6.8 (above), 
which takes into account the overall frequency of attacks and presents more varied 
results. 
 
Finally, to better understand the significance a group’s activity prior to its peak, I use an 
ordinal measure of pre-peak span of terrorist activity (in years) to examine the 
relationship between the length of time a group is active before peaking and the rate of 
decline once it peaks. This measure of pre-peak span disregards the frequency of the 
groups’ terrorist violence prior to the peak, such that an organization that engaged in 
terrorism for more than 10 years before peaking might have carried out two attacks or 
200 attacks during that time period.  




































































Among all 632 perpetrator organizations, the minimum pre-peak span of activity is zero 
years (44.5% of the sample), meaning that the first year of activity was the peak year of 
activity. Ten groups were active for more than 20 years before peaking. As Figure 6.10 
shows, the perpetrator organizations most likely to be classified as having a low peak and 
rapidly declining trajectory are those that peaked during their first year of activity and 
those that were active for less than five years before peaking. Likewise, the perpetrator 
organizations that were active for a year or more before peaking were more likely to 
carry out a moderate or high number of terrorist attacks at their peak. In particular, the 
organizations with the longest pre-peak spans of activity were the most likely to either 
carry out the highest number of attacks and their peak and/or decline more slowly. 
 
 
In order to isolate the relationship between pre-peak span of terrorist activity and rate of 
decline, independent of peak number of attacks, I analyzed the same ordinal variable 
representing the groups’ pre-peak span of activity against the ratio model of decline. The 
results, shown in Figure 6.11, indicate a fairly clear distinction whereby perpetrator 
organizations that were active for five or more years prior to peaking are approximately 
twice as likely to be classified as persisting organizations (Trajectory 2) compared to 
those that were active for less than five years before peaking. That said, there is little 
additional variation in that longer pre-peak spans of terrorist violence do not further 
increase the likelihood that the group will persist rather than desist. In fact, the 
probability of rapid decline increases slightly for the perpetrator organizations with 
especially long pre-peak periods of terrorist violence. 
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Figure 6.11 Probability of declining trajectory given pre-peak span of activity (ratio) 
 
The estimation of the onset trajectories and analysis of how the pre-peak span of activity 
relates to patterns of collective desistance further illustrates the complexity of the 
contexts in which the perpetrator organizations operate. While rapid patterns of onset are 
correlated with gradual patterns of decline, so too are longer periods of pre-peak terrorist 
violence. This also demonstrates how this analytical strategy can contribute a useful 
framework for hypothesis generation that accommodates diverse patterns of terrorist 
activity among the organizations. In the next section, I investigate the ways in which the 
post-peak trajectories of terrorist violence vary with respect to lethality of attacks. 
 
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks 
In Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter I referenced the lethality of the perpetrator groups 















































this measurement of group lethality gives a sense of the overall impact of the perpetrator 
organizations, particularly with reference to their representation in the trajectory 
categories, there are a number of other salient aspects of lethality that I investigate here in 
greater detail. Specifically, in contrast to the overall lethality of the perpetrator group, the 
lethality of the group’s attacks could potentially influence its longevity or rate of decline. 
While the lethality of the perpetrator group is largely a function of the length of time 
during which they actively engage in violence, measures of attack lethality such as 
average number of deaths per attack, or the execution of mass casualty attacks, capture 
more information about the capacity of the organization, its brutality, and its ability to 
rapidly garner attention, both from potential recruits and the state. 
 
The average attack lethality for the 632 perpetrator organizations is 3.0 deaths per attack. 
It ranges from zero for 127 organizations that caused no fatalities, to 61.3 for the Special 
Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), a Chechen rebel group responsible for a mass hostage-
barricade attack at a Moscow theater in 2002 that resulted in 170 deaths, including 
perpetrator deaths. Figure 6.12 shows the average lethality of terrorist attacks for each 




Figure 6.12 Average attack lethality by declining trajectory group 
 
The average attack lethality for each declining trajectory group ranges from 2.3 fatalities 
per attack for Trajectory 2, which is characterized by a moderate peak number of attacks 
and a rapid decline post-peak, to 3.7 fatalities per attack for Trajectory 4, which is 
characterized by a moderate peak number of attacks and a slow rate of decline post-peak. 
In general, the trajectories that best represent perpetrator groups characterized by gradual 
patterns of post-peak decline have higher measures of average attack lethality than those 
characterized by rapid decline.  
 
This suggests that greater average attack lethality does not necessarily prompt a decisive 




















































exception is the higher than average lethality of attacks carried out by perpetrator groups 
best characterized by Trajectory 1. Like SPIR, or the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance 
and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs—another Chechen rebel group responsible 
for several especially deadly hostage-barricade events—these organizations sometimes 
carry out very few attacks that are highly lethal. Thus, their patterns of activity in terms 
of frequency of terrorist attacks appear relatively innocuous because they carry out a 
small number of attacks for only a short period of time. However, the actual impact of 
these groups with respect to lethality and psychosocial consequences of terrorism is much 
greater than that of organizations that carried out a larger number of attacks.  
 
Another consideration regarding the lethality of attacks involves the perpetrator groups’ 
engagement in mass-casualty terrorist attacks, which I define here as terrorist attacks that 
result in more than 25 deaths (LaFree et al., 2015). Of the 632 perpetrator organizations 
analyzed, 126 carried out at least one mass casualty terrorist attack and 17 perpetrator 
organizations carried out more than 10 mass casualty terrorist attacks. The organization 
responsible for the highest number of mass casualty attacks is the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, which carried out 92 mass casualty terrorist attacks 
during its 35 years of activity. Figure 6.13 shows the distribution of perpetrator 





Figure 6.13 Probability of declining trajectory given use of mass-casualty attacks 
 
Despite the experiences of SPIR and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage 
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, the perpetrators organizations with the greatest likelihood 
of being characterized by a low peak number of attacks and a rapidly declining post-peak 
pattern of terrorist violence are those that do not engage in mass-casualty terrorism. 
Likewise, the perpetrator organizations that do engage in mass casualty terrorism are 
most likely to be best represented by post-peak trajectories characterized by moderate or 
high peak numbers of terrorist attacks, regardless of rate of decline.  Those organizations 
that were responsible for more than 10 mass-casualty attacks were especially likely to 

































































This stark relationship appears to suggest that there is a strong positive correlation 
between peak number of terrorist attacks and use of mass casualty terrorism, but offers 
little conclusive insight regarding the relationship between use of mass casualty terrorism 
and the shape of the perpetrator groups post-peak trajectory. This may mean that in some 
circumstances mass-casualty attacks lead to rapid desistance, but in other circumstances 
mass-casualty attacks are an indication of group strength and capacity to persevere. 
Figure 6.14 presents the same dimensions of terrorist activity—use of mass casualty 
terrorism and declining trajectory membership—but the latter is based on the ratio 
trajectory model discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 















































By removing the influence of the peak number of terrorist attacks from the model and 
isolating the shape of the post-peak trajectory, the analysis indicates that the perpetrator 
groups that do not engage in mass-casualty terrorism are somewhat more likely to be best 
characterized by a rapidly declining pattern of terrorist violence. Specifically, Figure 6.14 
shows that 83.8 percent of organizations that did not carry out mass-casualty attacks were 
classified as rapidly declining, compared to 68.8 percent of perpetrators that were 
responsible for 1 to 10 mass-casualty terrorist attacks, and 70.6 percent of perpetrator 
organizations that were responsible for more than 10 mass-casualty attacks. Likewise, the 
organizations that did engage in mass casualty terrorist attacks were almost twice as 
likely to be classified as gradually declining, regardless of their peak number of attacks. 
The number of mass-casualty attacks perpetrated (1-10 versus more than 10) does not 
correspond to different post-peak outcomes. 
 
Suicide Tactics 
The use of suicide attacks, in which the perpetrator does not intend to survive, has both 
symbolic and strategic distinctions from non-suicide attacks (Bloom, 2007). Because the 
perpetrator may be able to more precisely target the attack, strategic advantages of 
suicide attacks include the possibility of higher casualties or improved likelihood of 
killing the intended victims. Symbolically, the use of suicide attacks communicates an 
extreme commitment to a cause for which the perpetrators are willing to die. Either of 
these might influence patterns of collective desistance from terrorism, through 
mechanisms related to recruitment and group solidarity or counter-terrorism. 
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Of the 632 organizations analyzed, 64 carried out at least one suicide attack, and 16 
carried out more than 10 suicide attacks. The perpetrator organization responsible for the 
most suicide attacks was the Taliban, with 347. This is nearly three times as many suicide 
attacks as the perpetrator organization with the next highest number of suicide attacks, al 
Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) with 126. However, between 2002 and 2013 AQI underwent several 
name changes, across which it carried out a total of 236 suicide attacks. Figure 6.15 
shows the probability of membership in each post-peak trajectory group, given the use of 
suicide tactics.  
Figure 6.15 Probability of declining trajectory given use of suicide tactics 
 
Much like the results for frequent use of mass casualty attacks, the relationship between 
frequent use of suicide attacks appears to be largely a function of overall frequency of 































































attacks are exceptionally likely to be best characterized by the trajectories with high peak 
numbers of attacks, especially Trajectories 3, 5, and 6. They are also disproportionately 
likely to be characterized by a moderate peak number of attacks, but a gradually 




Figure 6.16 Probability of declining trajectory given use of suicide tactics (ratio) 
 
To isolate the relationship between the use of suicide tactics and the shape of the post-
peak trajectory independent of overall frequency of terrorist violence, Figure 6.16 shows 
the probabilities of assignment to the two declining trajectories based on the ratio model 
given the use of suicide tactics. The results are somewhat more straightforward in that 
perpetrator organizations that have carried out suicide attacks are nearly three times as 













































perpetrator groups that have not carried out suicide attacks. Likewise, those organizations 
that have carried out suicide attacks are approximately two-thirds as likely to be best 
represented by the rapidly declining Trajectory 1. The distinction between perpetrator 
groups that have carried out 1-10 suicide attacks and those that have carried out more 
than 10 suicide attacks appears to be largely immaterial. 
 
Logistically International Attacks 
Logistically international terrorist attacks are those in which the perpetrators cross a 
border—typically a secured border—to carry out the attack (LaFree et al., 2015 Chapter 
8). These attacks may be motivated by an international ideology, as is the case when al 
Qa’ida carries out attacks in the United States, or a domestic ideology, such as when the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) travels from Northern Ireland to Great Britain 
to carry out an attack in pursuit of its nationalist/separatist goals. Regardless, the task of 
leaving a country of origin to execute a terrorist attack in another country is a 
demonstration of resource capacity, and logistical ability. Of the 632 perpetrator 
organizations analyzed, 227 carried out logistically international attacks at some point 
between 1970 and 2013, and 41 of these carried out more than 10 logistically 




Figure 6.17 Probability of declining trajectory given use of international attacks 
  
Figure 6.17 shows the probability of the perpetrator organizations’ membership in each 
of the declining trajectory groups, given the use of logistically international attacks. The 
results indicate that, compared to perpetrator organizations that have not carried out 
logistically international attacks, those that do carry out logistically international attacks 
are most likely to be best represented by all five trajectories other than the low peak and 
rapid decline of Trajectory 1. Organizations that carried out more than 10 logistically 
international attacks are exceptionally likely to be best characterized by the high peak and 
slow decline of Trajectories 5 and 6. Like the results for mass casualty attacks and suicide 
attacks, this is in part a result of the explicit requirement that a group has carried out at 
least 11 terrorist attacks in order to have carried out more than 10 logistically 
































































2.87. Because of this restriction, organizations that have carried out more than 10 
logistically international attacks are essentially disqualified from assignment to the 
trajectory characterized by a low peak number of attacks. 
 
 
Figure 6.18 Probability of declining trajectory given use of international attacks 
(ratio) 
 
To illustrate how the use of logistically international attacks relates to patterns of post-
peak terrorist violence regardless of the peak number of attacks, Figure 6.18 shows the 
probability of classification to the rapidly declining Trajectory 1 or the gradually 
declining Trajectory 2 estimated in the ratio model. Once again, it appears that the 
perpetrator groups that carry out more logistically skilled and resource-intensive attacks 
are best characterized by a gradual decline in activity after they peak. One key distinction 














































casualty attacks or suicide attacks is that the number of logistically international attacks 
appears to be relevant. While organizations that carried out 1-10 logistically international 
attacks are more than twice as likely as those that have carried out none to be best 
characterized by the gradually declining trajectory, organizations that were responsible 
for more than 10 logistically international attacks are nearly four times as likely as those 
responsible for none to be best represented by the gradually declining trajectory. 
 
Conclusions 
The literature I discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that myriad influences, both internal and 
external to perpetrator groups, impact their patterns of terrorist activity, including 
processes of collective desistance. The analyses in Chapter 5 and in this chapter illustrate 
that, while trajectory classifications are a useful tool for summarizing data on the terrorist 
activity of perpetrator groups, they nevertheless represent heterogeneous patterns and 
contexts. That is, perpetrator organizations that are best characterized by the same 
trajectory might represent vastly different experiences. Therefore, none of these analyses 
in isolation are suited to identify the specific mechanisms that influence patterns of 
collective desistance from terrorism. More sophisticated multivariate analysis of patterns 
of onset, attack lethality, suicide tactics, and logistically international attacks as they, 
along with a host of other relevant variables, relate to patterns of collective desistance is 
needed to fully disentangle the various effects and the degree and direction of causality.  
 
Instead, the analyses in this chapter contribute to an understanding of the ways in which 
perpetrator organizations desist from terrorism and how we can generate hypotheses 
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regarding salient aspects of the organizations’ strategy and tactics. For example, it 
appears that there may be an association between patterns of onset at the beginning of the 
perpetrator groups use of terrorism and the ways in which they desist from terrorism—
how might organizational dynamics and the evolution of group structure over time 
influence this relationship? Also, the commission of mass-casualty terrorist attacks, 
suicide attacks, and logistically international attacks—each a different indication of an 
organization’s capacity to carry out more impactful or sophisticated attacks—consistently 
corresponds to an increased likelihood of membership to the gradually declining ratio 
trajectory rather than the rapidly declining ratio trajectory. Are these types of attacks 
actually indicative of more robust and capable organizations, or are organizations that 
continue to carry out terrorist attacks long after they peak more inclined to carry out these 
types of attacks due to a natural escalation of violence over time? Is it the case that mass-
casualty terrorist attacks or suicide attacks are not actually more likely to command 
decisive and effective counterterrorism efforts targeting the organizations responsible? 
Are organizations that carry out attacks across borders more challenging to counter 
because of the difficulty of international security and law enforcement? Conducting these 
analyses within the framework established by the trajectory models promotes 
consideration of the various dimensions of collective desistance from terrorism, beyond 
the comparatively blunt measures of total time span of terrorist activity or dichotomous 
assessments of active versus inactive organizations.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion 
 
With the research presented here, I expand on a growing literature that addresses the 
question of collective desistance from terrorism. My aim is to empirically establish a 
foundational understanding of the ways in which perpetrator organizations disengage 
from terrorist violence. To do so, I applied both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods and closely examine the underlying contexts and patterns of group activity in 
order to avoid relying on unfounded assumptions about the homogeneity of the 
perpetrator organizations. In conclusion, I summarize and discuss the results of the 
analyses, identify key limitations and opportunities for further investigation, and identify 
important implications of the research for theory and policymaking. 
 
Discussion 
Summarizing the results of this research, I return to the research questions I established in 
Chapter 1: 
1. What are the ways in which organizations that engage in terrorist violence desist from 
engaging in terrorist violence? What patterns or trajectories of declining violence do 
we observe among organizations that engage in terrorism? 
 
To address Question 1 the analyses presented here, including the initial descriptive 
analysis, the group-based trajectory analysis, and the qualitative case studies, illustrate 
the many different ways in which perpetrator organizations’ use of terrorist violence 
increases and decreases over time. Organizations that have engaged in terrorist violence 
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for the exact same length of time follow any number of unique trajectories from start to 
finish. While the offending patterns of individuals can also be diverse, actors are 
constrained by physiological limitations such as birth, death, and aging; social processes 
including marriage, employment, and child-rearing; and institutional restrictions like 
incarceration (cf., Laub & Sampson, 2003). These factors do not have the same restrictive 
impact on the violent activity of organizations. As a result, most trajectories identified in 
applied criminology research on life course trajectories are what Erosheva, Matsueda, 
and Telesca (2014, p. 315) refer to as “weakly unimodal.” 
 
With respect to collective desistance in particular, in Chapter 5 I identified six distinct 
patterns of post-peak terrorist violence among the perpetrator organizations identified in 
the GTD as having carried out terrorist attacks for at least one year. These six trajectories 
of decline primarily differ based on two dimensions of the perpetrator organizations’ 
activity: the total frequency of attacks during the peak year of violence, and the shape or 
rate of decline in the number of terrorist attacks carried out. Three of the trajectories 
represent rapidly declining patterns of post-peak terrorist violence, from low, moderate, 
or high peak numbers of attacks. The observed activity of perpetrator organizations best 
characterized by these trajectories adheres closely to the pattern of activity predicted by 
the model. The other three trajectories represent more gradually declining patterns of 
post-peak terrorist violence. The much more open-ended potential for variation among 
perpetrator groups best characterized by these trajectories means that the model 
prediction is a somewhat looser approximation of reality. 
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The fact that the six trajectories vary dramatically in terms of overall frequency of 
terrorist attacks is interesting in and of itself, but makes it somewhat difficult to isolate 
the general shape of decline, which could be useful for understanding how perpetrator 
organizations that rapidly desist from terrorism differ from those that do not. The ratio 
model presented in Chapter 6 is based on the relative frequency of each perpetrator 
organization’s attacks, and addresses this limitation of the original model by identifying a 
rapidly desisting trajectory of post-peak violence and a gradually desisting trajectory of 
post-peak violence. Approximately 81 percent of the perpetrator organizations analyzed 
were best represented by the rapidly desisting trajectory, and 19 percent were 
characterized by the more gradually declining trajectory. Regardless of the overall 
frequency of violent attacks the perpetrator groups carry out, we can observe 
meaningfully distinct shapes of collective desistance. 
 
2. How do salient attributes of perpetrator organizations’ terrorist activity relate to their 
patterns of desistance from terrorist violence? For example, are particular tactics or 
patterns of onset correlated to particular patterns of desistance? 
 
In Chapter 6 I examined several attributes of terrorist activity, including patterns of onset, 
lethality and the use of mass casualty terrorism, suicide tactics, and logistically 
international attacks. These features are indicative of organizational qualities that are 
potentially relevant to processes of collective desistance through a wide variety of 
mechanisms, some of which would anticipate an increase in the likelihood of rapid 
decline, and some would anticipate a decrease in the likelihood of rapid decline. The 
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results of the analysis suggest that perpetrator organizations that began engaging in 
terrorist violence on a rapidly increasing trajectory, as well as those that have carried out 
mass-casualty attacks, suicide attacks, or logistically international attacks are 
disproportionately less likely to be characterized by a rapidly declining trajectory of post-
peak activity, compared to those groups whose terrorist activity does not have each of 
these attributes. 
 
Note that this result is based on the ratio model of post-peak activity, which does not take 
into account the absolute frequency of attacks. The results based on the baseline 
frequency trajectory model were somewhat more mixed in that perpetrator groups that 
carried out these specialized types of attacks were disproportionately more likely to be 
characterized by any of the six post-peak trajectories except that which was represented 
by a low peak number of attacks and rapid decline. The probabilities are likely influenced 
by the inherent commonality of the overall frequency of terrorist violence, making it 
difficult to discern a clear relationship between use of these types of attacks and rate of 
decline independent of attack frequency. 
 
3. What are the key implications of measurement and analytical strategy for the study of 
collective desistance from terrorism? How do these issues impact our understanding 
of the longevity and patterns of decline of terrorist organizations? 
 
One of the most important motivators of this research is my observation that the vast 
majority of empirical research on collective desistance from terrorism involves 
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qualitative research methods that, while extremely informative, concentrate on a small 
number of terrorist organizations that are unlikely to be representative of the full 
population of interest (Crenshaw, 1991; S. G. Jones & Libicki, 2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989; 
United States Institute of Peace, 1999). In contrast, the few studies that have included 
qualitative analysis of relatively large-N data generally overlook the complex dynamics 
of perpetrator organizations and the contexts in which they operate (Blomberg et al., 
2010, 2011; Dugan et al., 2012; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2013; Phillips, 2014a, 2015; 
Young & Dugan, 2014). As a result, the development and testing of theories to explain 
collective desistance has been limited (Schmid & Jongman, 2005). 
 
The results of the analyses conducted to address the first two research questions have 
several implications for the third research question. First, event databases of terrorist 
attacks are extremely useful and it is appealing to aggregate the data on perpetrator 
organizations and leverage it to study their patterns of activity. This seemingly avoids the 
challenge of defining what is meant by a ‘terrorist organization’ a priori because it 
provides information on all groups that have carried out terrorist attacks. However, this 
operationalization can lead researchers to assume that the organizations they study are a 
relatively homogenous set of ‘terrorist groups’ when in fact, as the analyses here 
illustrate, the perpetrator organizations in the GTD are more of an assortment of what we 
might consider quintessential terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, insurgent 
groups, political parties that engage in occasional terrorist attacks, political parties that 
routinely engage in terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations that have evolved into 
political parties, and a plethora of splinter groups, alliance groups, single-use names of 
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perpetrator groups, and in a few cases unaffiliated or weakly affiliated individuals who 
have branded themselves with a group name. This complexity in the data is likely above 
and beyond variation in the cohesion or organizational structure of terrorist groups, which 
most scholars would expect. 
 
Second, and relatedly, when faced with a dataset of terrorist activity it is important to 
keep in mind the vast diversity of contexts in which perpetrator organizations operate. 
The start date of the Global Terrorism Database in 1970, while roughly coinciding with 
the use of portable cameras and satellite technology, and thus the onset of modern 
terrorism (LaFree et al., 2015, p. 15), excludes terrorist attacks by perpetrator 
organizations who began engaging in terrorism prior to 1970. Moreover, some 
perpetrator organizations are active in locations where political organization is 
discouraged or banned, making it less likely that violent groups develop a coherent, 
named identity. Also, organizations evolve over time, merging with other organizations, 
splitting apart, and sometimes changing names despite little or no change in the structure 
of the organization. These factors, which would almost certainly come to light in a 
qualitative analysis of collective desistance among a single terrorist group or a small 
number of terrorist groups, are more difficult to identify and address when dealing with 
hundreds of perpetrator organizations. 
 
A third key implication for research is that, consistent with much of the qualitative 
literature discussed in Chapter 2, the analyses here suggest that desistance is a process, 
rather than a state. The various trajectories estimated using group-based trajectory 
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analysis illustrate different patterns of decline that a perpetrator group’s terrorist activity 
might follow; however, even those that involve rapid decline often take place over the 
course of several years. A perpetrator organization’s rate of decline can also vary based 
on its frequency of attacks, and if an organization transitions from heavily active to 
completely inactive in the span of one year, it is quite possibly due to an artifact of the 
data, such as a name change. Because of this, in order to better understand the process of 
desistance it is important that we use analytical methods that can accommodate dynamic 
changes in behavior over time. In particular, this research illustrates the utility of 
examining the question of collective desistance from terrorism from as many perspectives 
as possible and actively seeking to disaggregate the data. Analysis of the longevity of 
perpetrator organizations’ terrorist violence is insightful, but it can be misleading in the 
absence of information about variation in its intensity over time. This too, however, can 
be misleading in the absence of qualitative contextual information about the 
organizations’ evolution. 
 
Finally, a key contribution of this study is that it presents a systematic, multi-method 
analysis of a relatively large sample of perpetrators of terrorism in a way that identifies 
key analytical challenges that are likely relevant to research on collective offending more 
broadly. Just as the criminology literature finds evidence of diversity of offending 
(Mazerolle, Brame, Paternoster, Piquero, & Dean, 2000; McGloin et al., 2008; Simon, 
1997) and intermittency or ‘drift’ among individuals (Glaser, 1964; Laub & Sampson, 
2001; Maruna, 2001; Matza, 1964), these appear to also be true of organizations that 
engage in terrorism. Due in part to the challenges of data collection, no systematic 
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analyses of criminal gangs or other types of collective offenders, such as corporate 
offenders or organized criminals, are as broad in scope as the current study. However, it 
is certainly plausible that the variation in trajectories and patterns of collective desistance 
observed here for terrorist perpetrator organizations is similarly present in other contexts. 
 
Implications for Theory Development 
In addition to the methodological implications discussed above, the results provide some 
substantive insight for theory development as well. Before discussing the implications for 
theoretical explanations of collective desistance in particular, I note that the analysis 
provides important insight regarding the challenge of theorizing about what a group or 
organization even is. Issues related to the psychological concept of entitativity I 
referenced in Chapter 3 appear throughout the analysis.  
 
Recall that entitativity is an assessment of the extent to which group members are similar 
to each other, engaged in coordinated efforts to pursue common goals, and are physically 
near to each other, as well as the extent to which the boundaries of membership are fixed 
and stable rather than fluid. The prevalence of generic perpetrator attributions, and non-
generic perpetrator groups that engaged in terrorism for less than one year, or even only a 
day, makes it clear that many of the groups that engage in terrorism are not terrorist 
organizations in the conventional sense. In addition, the prevalence of perpetrator 
organizations that carry out very few attacks and decline rapidly indicates that even 
organizations with an established record of engagement in terrorist violence are not all 
equally committed to the use of violence to achieve political goals. Furthermore, fluidity 
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of group membership, leadership, and overall identity as allegiances come and go suggest 
that the entitativity of collectives that engage in terrorism is highly variable and should 
not be taken for granted. 
 
With respect to the grievance or strain theories outlined in Chapter 2, we do see evidence 
that perpetrator groups may desist from violence when transitioning to electoral politics, 
as was the case for the PIRA in the United Kingdom, and the FMLN in El Salvador, for 
example. This suggests that making certain concessions that afford aggrieved groups an 
opportunity for political power can facilitate peace. However, it is important to note that 
these transitions did not occur in isolation, but instead in the context of a military 
stalemate and a general climate of fatigue over prolonged periods of violence. In 
addition, there is also evidence that political concessions or efforts to ameliorate 
grievances are not necessary conditions for desistance, as was the case for ETA in Spain, 
which was dismantled gradually by law enforcement, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which 
was dismantled rapidly through costly military efforts following a prolonged conflict. 
 
Although the analyses do not provide a test of the organizational theories described in 
Chapter 2, there are several ways in which they are consistent with this theoretical 
framework. This is not particularly surprising, because in their most simple form these 
theories suggest that organizations that have the capacity to persevere will persevere, and 
those that lack resources, cohesion, common goals will fail to mobilize be more likely to 
desist. In addition to the salience of cohesion and entitativity discussed above, the 
analysis of patterns of onset, the use of mass casualty attacks, suicide attacks, and 
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logistically international attacks are generally consistent with this expectation. Each of 
these variables provides an operationalization of the constructs that organizational 
theorists concentrate on. A rapid pattern of onset suggests a reliable pool of resources.  
The ability to carry out mass casualty attacks or logistically international attacks 
demonstrates capacity to plan and execute more complex attacks than a conventional 
shooting or firebombing. And the use of suicide tactics illustrates an elevated level of 
commitment to a common cause. The fact that each of these characteristics corresponds 
to an elevated probability of organizational persistence rather than rapid desistance 
indicates support for a theoretical framework that accounts for the robustness and 
capability of the perpetrator organization. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Though the work presented here aims to help bridge the gap between quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of collective desistance from terrorism, it is in many ways a starting 
point that illustrates how collective desistance from terrorism occurs, but not why 
collective desistance from terrorism occurs. There are several key limitations and many 
opportunities for future investigation that can improve upon and extend the current 
research.  
 
First, while trajectory analysis is a useful framework for summarizing large amounts of 
temporal data it has certain limitations. In particular, the trajectories estimated in the 
model are not perfect representations of the perpetrator organizations’ actual trajectories. 
In a sense, this is no more or less problematic than the fact that an arithmetic mean is not 
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a perfect representation of the individual values it summarizes. In some ways, the fact 
that the predicted trajectories are not rigid representations of observed trajectories is 
actually extremely useful. For example, I noted in Chapter 5 that some of the perpetrator 
groups classified as having low peak levels of violence and rapid desistance actually 
carried out few attacks over long periods of time with extensive intermittency. Because of 
this, a trajectory likely captures the essence of the group’s activity more faithfully than a 
survival analysis or life span calculation would. However, trajectory analysis does benefit 
from critical assessment of the estimated trajectories and the observed trajectories in 
order to be constructive (Erosheva et al., 2014). I have attempted to address this 
limitation by essentially deconstructing many of the trajectory models presented here, 
investigating the contexts of organizational desistance for specific organizations, and 
carefully considering the extent to which the observed data are well-represented by the 
discrete categories estimated by the model. 
 
A second limitation of trajectory analysis is that it does not allow the analyst to test the 
impact of key events that occur over the course of an organization’s engagement in 
terrorism. Other statistical methodologies, such as interrupted time series analysis, or 
series hazard modeling (Dugan, 2011), are better suited for this type of inquiry and may 
prove useful in future analysis. For the purpose of this research, however, my primary 
goal was to illustrate the various ways in which perpetrator organizations desist from 
terrorism in order to contribute to a strong foundation for additional inferential analyses. 
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This leads to a third key opportunity for improvement and expansion upon the current 
research—the investigation of numerous independent variables that may be influential in 
determining a perpetrator organization’s pattern of collective desistance. The theoretical 
literature identifies many potentially relevant characteristics and events, both internal and 
external to an organization, that are likely to influence its desistance from terrorism. 
These are discussed at length in Chapter 2, and include, for example, internal 
organizational dynamics, ideology, opportunities for alternative resolution of grievances, 
competition among organizations, and state response, including counterterrorism 
strategies. What variable or combination of variables might predict a greater or lesser 
likelihood of organizational desistance from terrorism? It is my intention that future 
research can leverage the findings of this study to evaluate a more fully specified model 
that seeks to explain collective desistance from terrorism. 
 
Fourth, this research is limited in its capacity to provide insight into the patterns of 
activity among perpetrator organizations that were active for less than one year. Although 
one possibility for future research involves estimating similar models using a monthly 
unit of analysis, this strategy does not address the fact that the names of perpetrator 
groups that have been active for less than one year represent a host of potential scenarios, 
which I discussed in Chapter 4. As a consequence of leveraging event-level data on 
terrorist attacks in order to conduct this analysis, I have very little systematic information 
about the background of the organizations, much of which is difficult to come by for 
clandestine groups. Future research might focus particularly on this set of organizations 
to determine what processes generate their exceptionally short periods of engagement in 
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terrorist violence. This line of inquiry is also likely to contribute to an understanding of 
varied patterns of offending among criminal gangs or criminal organizations as well. 
 
Finally, one of the key challenges to studying collective desistance from terrorism that 
this research identifies is the complexity of evaluating desistance given the complex and 
fluid evolution of perpetrator organizations. For many of the perpetrator organizations 
named in the GTD, the date of their first attack and date of their last attack do not 
represent the true beginning and end of the organization’s engagement in terrorist 
violence. Because the aggregation of event-level data is based on the group’s name, 
naming conventions or distinctions can produce artificial cut-offs that falsely imply 
organizational desistance.  
 
This is a limitation of structured event data itself, not the analytical method I use here. 
Preliminary analysis of movements identified in the GTD—clusters of diverse perpetrator 
entities that share common goals—indicate that their patterns of terrorist activity are very 
different from those of individual perpetrator organizations (E. Miller, 2012b, 2014). For 
example, while the distribution of active time spans among perpetrator organization is 
heavily skewed to the right (most have very short periods of activity while a few have 
much longer periods of activity), the opposite is true of movements. This suggests that 
while the names of organizations come and go, the broader cause is often much more 
robust. Like terrorist organizations, terrorist movements can be very difficult to 
operationalize. It is not immediately clear what the appropriate level of aggregation or 
granularity is—does the Islamic State’s movement consist of those named organizations 
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that have directly evolved over time, with shared leadership, personnel, and resources? 
Or, is it more appropriate to broadly conceive of the Islamic State movement as any 
organization that has pledged allegiance to al Baghdadi? Or, is the broader salient 
movement essentially all of Salafi jihadism? Regardless, this research makes it clear that 
quantitative research on how individual groups relate to the broader cause is a necessary 
next step in order to accurately evaluate patterns of collective desistance from terrorism.  
 
Policy Implications 
Due to the fact that this analysis raises numerous unanswered questions, the direct policy 
implications of the present study are somewhat modest compared to the policy 
implications of the broader research agenda this study supports. First, insofar as the 
trajectories reveal diverse patterns of desistance, and the case studies indicate wide 
substantive variation among organizations classified as having similar trajectories, this 
analysis is consistent with Crenshaw’s (1991) observation that the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism operations is likely to differ depending on context. These results 
illustrate how diverse the context can be, suggesting that it is important for policymakers 
to consider the historical patterns of activity not only among perpetrator organizations 
that are loosely organized versus hierarchical, but also differ with respect to degree of 
intermittency and specialization in offending. 
 
Second, because there is a great deal of complexity in the scenarios represented by the 
perpetrator groups under investigation here, the results suggest that policymakers would 
be well-served to carefully consider the organizational nature of the threat. To what 
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extent is a perpetrator group exclusively engaged in terrorist violence rather than other 
types of activity; and, can groups that do engage in other types of activity be prompted to 
devote more of their energies to pro-social efforts to effect change, rather than violence? 
To what extent is a group likely to evolve rather than dissolve? 
 
Third, and relatedly, the results illustrate that rapid desistance from extremely high levels 
of violence does not always indicate a favorable outcome and often comes at a high cost. 
This pattern could occur as a result of groups being violently suppressed by the military, 
causing tens of thousands of casualties in the context of asymmetric warfare, as was the 
case with the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the PKK in Turkey, and the FMLN in El Salvador. Or, 
it could represent a scenario where organizations are actually expanding or merging 
together in ways that are more problematic. 
 
Fourth, tactics such as mass casualty attacks, suicide attacks, and logistically international 
attacks appear to be indicative that a group has a greater capacity to prolong the use of 
terrorist violence. These might be usefully considered as indicators of an increased risk of 
organizational persistence, above and beyond the immediate impact of these potentially 
devastating attacks.  
 
Finally, to the extent that future research is able to better identify, across diverse contexts, 
the events, circumstances, or policies that promote rapid collective desistance from 
terrorism rather than gradual desistance from terrorism, policymakers may adopt 
strategies that leverage this information for the purpose of fostering rapid desistance and 
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preventing groups from continuing to engage in terrorism for decades. However, in order 
for this research agenda to be truly productive, scholars must embrace the challenging 
work of multi-method, critical analysis of terrorist perpetrator organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to support a better foundational understanding of patterns of collective desistance 
from terrorism, I adopt an inductive analytical strategy intended to avoid assumptions 
about the substantive contexts and circumstances that generate the data. While 
comprehensive data on terrorism can be extremely useful, the field of terrorism studies is 
relatively young, and in particular the use of systematic quantitative techniques has 
increased dramatically in recent years (LaFree et al., 2015; Lum et al., 2006). Combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, the results of this study challenge many of the 
premises and conclusions of one-dimensional analyses in ways that may also be fruitful 
for understanding collective desistance from other types of offending. 
 
With this research, I did not set out to answer a discrete question with “yes or no,” 
“greater than or less than” or “reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.” Instead, I based 
this study on the principle that the function of research is not always to simplify complex 
phenomena, but sometimes it is valuable to recognize and expose the inherent 
complexity. It is often the case that if we are transparent about the limitations of data and 
statistical methodologies, research on many of the challenging issues faced by social 
scientists raises more questions than it answers. The results presented here demonstrate 
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that this is certainly true of patterns of collective desistance from terrorism, and establish 




APPENDIX I: Perpetrator Group Names by Trajectory Group 
Trajectory 1 
1st of May Group 
2nd of June Movement 
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades 
1 May 
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) 
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) 
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA) 
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front 
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) 
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia) 
Ahrar Al-Jalil (Free People of the Galilee) 
Akali Dal Party 
Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM) 
Al Jehad 
Al Jihad 
Al Nasirin (India) 
Al Zulfikar 









Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia 





Albanian National Army (ANA) 
Alejo Calatayu 
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) 
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) 
All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazgan Party 
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) 
All Nepal National Free Student Union-
Revolutionary 
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 
Allah's Tigers 
America Battalion 
American Indian Movement 
Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir 
Ananda Marga 
Andres Castro United Front 
Animal Rights Militia 
Anti-Castro Command 
Anti-Imperialist International Brigades 
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA) 
Anti-terrorism ETA (ATE) 
Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) 
Argentine Liberation Front (FAL) 
Argentine National Organization Movement 
(MANO) 
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN) 
Armed Communist Formations 
Armed Communist Struggle 
Armed Forces for Liberation of East Timor 
(FALINTIL) 
Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP) 
Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy 
Armed Proletarian Groups for Communism 
Armed Proletarian Power 
Armed Proletarian Squads 
Armed Revolutionary Action (ENEDRA) 
Armed Squads for Communism 
Army of Islam 
Arya 
Aryan Nation 




Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA) 
Autonomous Resistance 
Avengers of the Infants 
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO) 
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) 
Bangladesh Sarbahara Party 
Beja Congress 
Belarusian Liberation Army 
Bharatiya Janata Party 
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK) 
Black Cells 
Black Flag (Bandera Negra) 
Black Hand (Colombia) 
Black Order 
Black Panther Group (Palestinian) 
Black September II 
Black War 
Black Widows 
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) 
Bolivian Socialist Falange 
Cali Narcotics Cartel 
Catholic Reaction Force 
Charles Martel Group 
Che Guevara Brigade 
Children of November 
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Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance (ACHA) 
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP) 
Colonel Karuna Faction 
Combat 18 
Comite d'Action Viticole 
Committee for the Safeguard of the Islamic 
Revolution 
Communist Fighting Unit 
Communist Party of India- Marxist 
Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist 
Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist-
Leninist (CPN-UML) 
Communist Party of Thailand 
Condor 
Croatian Freedom Fighters 
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat 
Death to Bazuqueros 
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR) 
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) 
Democratic Revolutionary Party 
Dev Yol 
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD) 
Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) 
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution 
Earth First! 
East Asia Anti Japanese Armed Front 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front 
(EPRLF) 
Egypt's Revolution 
Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad 
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (Bolivia) 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party 
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International 
Conspiracy (EMETIC) 
Farmer's Movement of the Philippines (KMP) 
Fatah Hawks 
Fatah Uprising 
Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos) 
Federation of Students and Scholars of Cote d'Ivoire 
(FESCI) 
Fighting Guerrilla Formation 
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) 
Forest Brothers 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya 
Francisco Villa People's Front 
Free Fatherland 
Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka) 
Freedom Party 
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners 
Front For the Liberation of the Azores 
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda 
(FLEC) 
Fuerza Nueva 





Greek National Socialist Organization 
Grey Wolves 
Grupo de Combatientes Populares 
Grupo Estrella 
Guadeloupe Liberation Army 
Guardsmen of Islam 
Guatemalan Communist Party 
Guerrillas of Christ the King 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) 
Harkat ul Ansar 
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) 
Hizballah Palestine 
Holy Spirit Movement 
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) 
Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL) 
Independent Nasserite Movement 
International Revolutionary Solidarity 
Iraqi Islamic Vanguards for National Salvation 
(IIVNS) 
Iraqi Mujahideen 
Islam Liberation Front 
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq) 
Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) 
Islamic Front 
Islamic Jihad (Ideological Grouping) 
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) 
Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen) 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
Islamic Movement Organization 
Ittehad-i-Islami 
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC) 
Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura 
Jamaat-al-Fuqra 
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan) 
Jamaica Labor Party 
Jamiat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan 
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front 
January 22 
Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
Jarrai 
Jaysh al-Muslimin (Army of the Muslims) 
Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT) 
Jordanian Islamic Resistance 
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Nationalist Movement 
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad 
Kach 
Kahane Chai 
Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front 
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) 
Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front 
(KLNLF) 
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Karenni National Progressive Party 
Kashmiri Hizballah 
Kata'ib al-Khoul 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
Khasi Students Union 
Khristos Kasimis 
Kirat Janabadi Workers Party 
Ku Klux Klan 
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) 
Kuki National Army (KNA) 
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) 
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP) 
Kurdistan Free Life Party 
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) 
Landless Peasants' Movement (MST) 
Latin America Anti-Communist Army (LAACA) 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) 
Lebanese Liberation Front 
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 
Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac (UCPMB) 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) 
Likud Political Party 
Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT) 
Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) 
Malaysian Communist Party 
Mano Blanca 
Martyr Abu Ja'far Group 
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit 
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade 
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine 
Medellin Drug Cartel 
Miskito Indian Organization 
Mohajir National Movement 
Mong Thai Army (MTA) 
Montoneros Patria Libre 
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras 
(FMLH) 
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad 
(MDJT) 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign 
State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ) 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) 
(Venezuela) 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
Mujahedeen Corps in Iraq 
Mujahedeen Shura Council 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani 
National Anti Communist Commando 
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda 
(NALU) 
National Committee Against Independence (CNCI) 
National Integration Front (FIN) 
National League for Democracy 
National Liberation Army (Ecuador) 
National Liberation Army (Peru) 
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
Nepal Defense Army 
New Armenian Resistance 
New Order 
New Order- France 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) 
Nihilists Faction 
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 
Omar Torrijos Commando for Latin American 
Dignity 
Orange Volunteers (OV) 
Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories 
Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican 
Revolution 
Organized Comrades for Feminist Counter-Power 
Organized Proletarian Communists 
Orly Organization 
Oromo Liberation Front 
Otpor 
Pakistani People's Party (PPP) 
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces 
Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA) 
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) 
People's Alliance 
People's Democratic Party (PDP) 
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) 
People's Revolutionary Command (CRP) 
People's Revolutionary Organization- Colombia 
(ORP) 
People's United Liberation Front (PULF) 
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) 
Phalange 
Poor People's Party 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gen 
Cmd (PFLP-GC) 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR) 
Popular Will (Greece) 
Proletarian Action Group 
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism 
Proletarian Patrols 
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) 
Ranbir Sena 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC) 
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Red Brigades Fighting Communist Union (BR-
UCC) 
Red Cell 
Red Flying Squad 
Red Guerrilla 
Red Hand Commandos 
Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO) 
Reform of the Armed Forces Movement 
Republican Action Force 
Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Nicaragua (FARN) 
Revolutionary Armed Forces- Argentina (FAR-A) 
Revolutionary Bolivariano Movement 200 
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade 
Revolutionary Commandos of the People (CRP) 
Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) (Spain) 
Revolutionary Eelam Organization (EROS) 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN) 
Revolutionary Nuclei 
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems 
Revolutionary Perspective 
Revolutionary Popular Left 
Revolutionary Solidarity 
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the 
People Party (PROCUP) 
Revolutionary Workers Party 
Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia (PRTB) 
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage 
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs 
Rodrigo Franco Command 
Rohingya Solidarity Organization 
Rote Zora 
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) 
Salafi Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Army 
Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha 
(SJTMM) 
Sandinist People's Army (EPS) 
Sanidila Secessionist Movement 
Saor Eire (Irish Republican Group) 
Save Kashmir Movement 
Scottish National Liberation Army 
Secret Cuban Government 
Secret Organization Zero 
Seikijuku 
Sekihotai 
Senki ("Battle Flag") 
September 11 Commandos 
Shan State Army 
Social Resistance 
Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK) 
Soldiers of Truth 
Somali National Alliance 
Somali National Movement 
Southern Sierra Peasant Organization 
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist) 
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) 
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) 
Sudan Alliance Forces 
Sudan Liberation Movement 
Sudanese People's Liberation Forces 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 
Syrian Mujahideen 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) 





The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave 
– Renewed (FLEC) 
The Joint Revolutionary Council 
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) 
Tribal Battlefront 
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement 
Turkish Communist Workers Party 
Turkish Hizballah 
Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB) 
Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) 
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development 
(UFDD) 
United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF) 
United Democratic Front (UDF) 
United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) - India 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (ULIMO) 
United National Party 
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) 
United Popular Action Front (FAPU) 
United Somali Congress 
Up the IRS, Inc 
Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate 
Communists and Restore the Nation 
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors 
White Wolves 
Workers' Organization for Communism 
Workers' Self-Defense Movement (MAO) 
Young Communist League 
Youth Action Group 
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation 
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front 





20 December Movement (M-20) 
23rd of September Communist League 








Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) 
Armed Commandos of Liberation 
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) 
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) 
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement 
(MIRA) 
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) 
Army of God 
Aryan Republican Army 
Awami League 
Baader-Meinhof Group 
Black Liberation Army 
Black Panthers 
Black September 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
Brunswijk Jungle Commando 
Canary Islands Independence Movement 
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC) 
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC) 
Chicano Liberation Front 
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction) 
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement 
Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium) 
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M) 
Conspiracy of Cells of Fire 
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
Coordination of the United Revolutionary 
Organization (CORU) 
Cuban Action 
Death to Kidnappers (MAS) 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP) 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) 
Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP) 
(Argentina) 
Eritrean Liberation Front 
Force 17 
Forqan Group 
Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army 
George Jackson Brigade 
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) 
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) 
Haqqani Network 
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 
Informal Anarchist Federation 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) 
Iparretarrak (IK) 
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO) 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
Italian Social Movement (MSI) 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) 
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM) 
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Goit (JTMM-G) 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Rajan Mukti 
(JTMM-R) 
Jewish Armed Resistance 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 
Khalistan Commando Force 
Khalistan Liberation Force 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
Lebanese National Resistance Front 
Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF) 
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF) 
Macheteros 
Mahdi Army 
Maoist Communist Center (MCC) 
May 19 Communist Order 
Meibion Glyndwr 
Misurasata Indian Organization 
Mizo National Front 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Peru) 
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM) 
Muslim Brotherhood 
National Council for Defense of Democracy 
(NCDD) 
National Front for the Liberation of Cuba (FLNC) 
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi) 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang 
(NSCN-K) 
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) 
Omega-7 
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People 
(PALIPEHUTU) 
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM) 
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU) 
People's Liberation Front of India 
People's Revolutionary Organization 
People's War Group (PWG) 
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Polisario Front 
Popular Forces of April 25 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
Popular Revolutionary Army (Mexico) 
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) 
Prima Linea 
Quintin Lame 
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR) 
Red Army Faction (RAF) 
Red Flag (Venezuela) 
Red Hand Defenders (RHD) 
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) 
Revolutionary Struggle 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 




The Justice Department 
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) 
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK) 
Tupamaros (Uruguay) 
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML) 
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C) 
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) 
Uganda People's Army 
United Freedom Front (UFF) 
United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 
Weather Underground, Weathermen 
Zapatista National Liberation Army 
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) 
Zimbabwe African People's Union 
 
Trajectory 3 
African National Congress (South Africa) 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia 
Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic 
Channel 
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 
Dev Sol 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala Singh 
(JTMM-J) 
Khmer Rouge 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
Montoneros (Argentina) 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile) 
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM) 
New World Liberation Front (NWLF) 
Nicaraguan Resistance 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
People's Liberation Forces (FPL) 
People's Liberation Front (JVP) 
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (El Salvador) 
Popular Liberation Army (EPL) 
Red Brigades 
Resistenza 
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP) 
Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC) 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board 
(CGSB) 
Tawhid and Jihad 
The Extraditables 
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 
United Popular Action Movement 
 
Trajectory 4 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
Al-Qa`ida 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
Breton Liberation Front (FLB) 
Caucasus Emirate 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group 
(GRAPO) 
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) 
Hizb-I-Islami 
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia) 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
Jewish Defense League (JDL) 
Karen National Union 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
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Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance 
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) 
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-
Muivah (NSCN-IM) 
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO) 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
People's Liberation Army (India) 
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak 
(PREPAK) 
Popular Resistance Committees 
Purbo Banglar Communist Party 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 
Revolutionary Cells 
Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms 
(ORPA) 
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo) 
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) 
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force 
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
Turkish People's Liberation Army 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 




Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) 
Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQLIM) 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) 
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 
Hizballah 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
M-19 (Movement of April 19) 
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement 
(MNR) 
National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) 
Shining Path (SL) 
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 




Al-Qa`ida in Iraq 
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) 
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
Taliban 
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